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THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LEO C. GOODWIN, SR.
SYMPOSIUM:
THIRTY YEARS AFTER ANITA BRYANT'S CRUSADE: THE
CONTINUING ROLE OF MORALITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LEGAL RIGHTS FOR SEXUAL MINORITIES
INTRODUCTION: THE FLORIDA EXAMPLE
ANTHONY NIEDWIECKI*
WILLIAM E. ADAMS, JR.**
Over the past couple of decades, issues of morality have played a sig-
nificant role in how the law regulates behavior and sexuality. For example,
the debates about regulating sex and the legal rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgender ("LGBT") individuals have often centered on society's dif-
fering views of what is right and what is wrong.' In fact, one does not have
to look further than the State of Florida's own history to see how views of
morality have shaped its laws regarding sexual identity.
Much of this history began thirty years ago when a runner up to Miss
America and spokesperson for Florida Citrus Association, Anita Bryant,2
began a crusade against "homosexuality." Bryant began with her efforts to
overturn an anti-discrimination ordinance passed in Dade County in 1977,
* Anthony Niedwiecki is an Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Lawyering
Skills and Values program at Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center. He
co-chaired the 2007 Leo Goodwin Symposium with Associate Dean William Adams.
** William E. Adams, Jr. is the Associate Dean for International, Online and Graduate
Programs, and a Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law
Center.
1. See e.g. Mary Becker, Article, Women, Morality, And Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 165 (1998); John M. Finnis, Article, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation,
69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1049 (1994).
2. Anita Bryant had three big pop songs: "'Til There Was You" (1959); "Paper Roses"
(1960) (successfully covered 13 years later by Marie Osmond); and "In My Little Comer of
the World" (1960). She became a spokeswoman for the Florida Citrus Commission in 1969,
and nationally televised commercials featured her famous saying: "A day without orange juice
is like a day without sunshine." She sang "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" during the
graveside services for Lyndon Johnson in 1973, and performed the National Anthem at Super
Bowl III in 1969. See William Eskeridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1015 (2005); Thomas C. Tobin,
Bankruptcy, Ill-will Plague Bryant, St. Petersburg Times (April 28, 2002).
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which included protections based on sexual orientation.3 Through her ef-
forts, the ordinance was overturned and the Florida legislature subsequently
passed a statutory ban on adoptions by gay and lesbian individuals.4 Al-
though a new anti-discrimination law was later passed and remains good law
in Miami-Dade County,5 the State of Florida's adoption ban is still being
applied today and remains the only statutory ban in the entire nation.6
During Bryant's campaign, she invoked religious and morality argu-
ments into her speeches and political commercials.7 These arguments were
often built on her underlying assumption that being gay was morally wrong.
Knowing that she could not simply rely on demonizing gays,' she tried to
develop a message that was both secular and promoted a goal that would be
uniformly accepted-that nothing should be done to harm children:
But I am a wife and a mother, and I especially address you today
as a mother. I have a God-given right to be jealous of the moral
environment for my children . . . . And I, for one, will do
everything I can as a citizen, as a Christian, and especially as a
mother to insure that they have the right to a healthy and morally
good life.9
To show how overturning the gay rights law would promote this
seemingly neutral goal, she needed to show how gays were harmful to
children. The central part of this argument was that because gays and
lesbians could not have children naturally, they would need to recruit
children to be gay, which was morally unacceptable. To show how the fight
against the Dade County ordinance was based on protecting the children,
3. See Dudley Clendinen & Adam Nagourney, Out for Good: The Struggle to Build a
Gay Rights Movement in America 296-97 (1999). The ordinance specifically protected indi-
viduals from discrimination based on "sexual preference." Id. at 299.
4. See idat 308.; FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007).
5. Miami-Dade County Code 11A-2(8), I1A-12, I1A-19, 11A-26.
6. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
7. She often stated that gays were "abnormal" and "vile beastly creatures." ANITA
BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE
THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 13-15 (Fleming H. Revell Co. 1977) ("I express the
valid fears we now felt of widespread militant homosexuals' efforts to influence their abnor-
mal way of life"); William Eskeridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitu-
tion of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2005) (quoting PERRY DEAN
YOUNG, GOD'S BULLIES: NATIVE REFLECTIONS ON PREACHERS AND POLITICS 44 (Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston 1982)) (stating that she compared gays to Sodom and Gomorrah and
called them vile).
8. See Eskeridge, supra note 7, at 1017.
9. Part of Anita Bryant's speech given to the Dade County Commission. See BRYANT,
supra note 7, at 24-25.
(Vol. 32
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Anita Bryant and her husband named the group "Save Our Children."' A
typical argument about how gays recruit children appeared in one of the
advertisements by "Save Our Children" that appeared in Miami newspapers:
This recruitment of our children is absolutely necessary for the
survival and growth of homosexuality-for since homosexuals
cannot reproduce, they must recruit, must refresh their ranks. And
who qualifies as a likely recruit: a 35-year old father or mother of
two .. .or a teenage boy or girl who is surging with sexual
awareness? (The Los Angeles Police Department recently
reported that 25,000 boys 17 years old or younger in that city alone
have been recruited into a homosexual ring to provide sex for adult
male customers. One boy, just 12 years old, was described as a
$1,000-a-day prostitute). 1
Further illustrating Bryant's underlying assumption that being gay was
morally wrong, she made this statement about the dangers of laws protecting
gay and lesbian individuals:
What these people really want, hidden behind the obscure legal
phrases is the legal right to propose to our children that there is an
acceptable alternate way of life .... No one has a human right to
corrupt out children. Prostitutes, pimps and drug pushers, like
homosexuals, have civil rights, too, but they do not have the right
to influence our children to choose their way of life. Before I yield
to this insidious attack on God and his laws, and ... parents and
their right[] to protect their children, I will lead such a crusade to
stop it as this country has not seen before. 12
These themes still are heard today. Just last summer, the Mayor of Fort
Lauderdale, Florida spent a great deal of time preaching about the problems
he believed are associated with "homosexuality" and the need to protect our
children. 3 The mayor even stood next to some religious leaders at a press
conference in city hall while they spoke against the immorality of homo-
10. BRYANT, supra note 7, at 41.
11. BRYANT, supra note 7, at 146.
12. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURMEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD
A GAY RIGHTS MovEMEuN IN AMERICA 292 (1999).
13. Abby Goodnough, A Mayor Stands by His Comments, and Gay Advocates Stand
Against Him, N.Y. TIMES, August 16, 2007, at A13 (quoting Naugle as saying "I'm more
concerned about protection of parks for our kids and saving lives"); Amy Sherman, Mayor's
Refusal to Apologize Riles Gays for Rally: Hundreds Rallied to Show Distaste for Comments
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sexuality and how we need a new religious crusade to establish a better
moral foundation in South Florida.14
This assumption that being gay or lesbian is immoral has a long history
in the State of Florida. It is appropriate that this seminar take place in Flor-
ida, and not only because of the fact that Anita Bryant launched her initial
campaign against anti-discrimination laws meant to protect lesbians and gay
men. Florida has long been at the center of legal controversies concerning
the rights of lesbians and gays, as recounted in earlier articles published in
this law review by the late Allan Terl, an attorney who spent most of his le-
gal career advocating for the rights of LGBT persons and the civil liberties of
everyone 5 and one of the co-authors of this introduction.16
Not unlike many other metropolitan areas in the 1950's, some Florida
cities had ordinances seeking to prevent gays from congregating in bars. In
1954, the City of Miami enacted an ordinance that precluded alcoholic bev-
erage licensees from knowingly employing "a homosexual person, lesbian or
pervert" or from serving alcohol to homosexuals or permitting them to con-
gregate or remain in the licensee's business. 7 The Supreme Court of Florida
disbarred attorney Harris L. Kimball in 1957 for violating a state law prohib-
iting homosexual relations. Kimball was arrested for lewd and lascivious
conduct for having sex with a man on a deserted stretch of lakefront late at
night in Orlando.'8
In the 1950's, a Florida Legislative Investigative Committee named the
"Johns Investigative Committee" after its Chair, Senator Charley Johns en-
gaged in an extensive witch hunt of gays. Utilizing spies and informants
traveling undercover, individuals engaged in a variety of activities to dis-
cover gays and lesbians, including "luring persons to places where the [In-
vestigative Committee] staff waited, hidden, with cameras" so as to take pic-
tures of the persons.' 9 The Committee members also targeted "college stu-
dents and educators" by renting hotel rooms and hosting parties where gays
and lesbians would be led to believe that the informants were sexually at-
tracted to the "guests" and conversations were recorded to be turned over to
14. Fort Lauderdale's Gay Stance Splits Local Blacks: Mayor Jim Naugle's Anti-Gay
Crusade Threatens to Drive a Wedge into South Florida's Black Community, MIAMI HERALD,
September 24, 2007, at B 1.
15. Allan H. Teri, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida, 24
NOVA L. REV. 793 (2000).
16. William E. Adams, Jr., A Look at Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida Today: Con-
fronting the Lingering Effects of Legal Animus, 24 NOVA L. REV. 751 (2000).
17. Miami Fla. Ordinance 5135 (1954) (codified at Miami Fla. Code § 4-13 (167)), cited
in Teri, supra note 15 at n.9.
18. Florida Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
19. Ten, supra note 15, at 796.
[Vol. 32
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campus police. The campus security would then question the individuals and
expel them or force them from their jobs.20 As Terl reported, it is not possi-
ble to know how many persons were forced from Florida schools. However,
one report indicated that sixteen faculty and staff were forced out of their
jobs in the spring of 1959. An additional seventy-one teachers had teaching
certificates revoked and thirty-nine deans and professors had been removed
from universities by April of 1963. Interviews of over 200 teachers resulted
in the names of more than 123 teachers being turned over to the Florida De-
partment of Education as being suspect.2' State educational institutions that
permitted gay organizations on campus would be threatened with denials of
funding in the 1980's in a series of state legislative amendments, which were
successfully challenged in court.22
Florida courts have long been involved in deciding the constitutionality
of ordinances and laws aimed at LGBT persons.23 Circuit Court Judges in
Dade County ruled that ordinances banning persons from wearing clothing of
persons of the opposite sex and of serving drinks to homosexuals to be un-
constitutional.24 In 1972, two Miami Beach ordinances were also declared
unconstitutional by trial judges, one of which made it illegal for a man to
impersonate a woman and another that made it illegal for a person to wear "a
dress not becoming to his sex. 2
5
The Supreme Court of Florida would be asked to determine whether an
openly gay applicant to the Florida Bar could be considered to be of good
moral character. 26 The Florida Board of Bar Examiners had deadlocked on
the question of whether an admitted homosexual who was otherwise fully
qualified for admission could be so considered.27 Although it admitted Mr.
Eimers, opining that sexual orientation alone could not disqualify, it reserved
judgment on the issue of whether an individual who admitted engaging in
"homosexual acts" could be admitted.28 It would be three more years before
the Supreme Court of Florida would address that issue. 29 The Court ruled,
with two dissents, that the private commercial sexual activity between con-
senting adults was not relevant to prove fitness to practice law.3°
20. Id.
21. Id. at 796-797.
22. See Terl, supra note 15, at 811-815.
23, Id. at 801-803.
24, Id. at 802.
25. Id.
26. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id.
29. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 403 So.2d 1315 (1981).
30. Id. at 1316.
2008]
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Florida courts have also addressed sexual orientation issues in a number
of family law cases. A Monroe County Circuit Court Judge would find Flor-
ida's statutory ban on adoption to be unconstitutional under the state consti-
tution, but the case was not appealed.3' A similar decision, however, would
be overturned by the Second District Court of Appeal.32 The Supreme Court
of Florida upheld the DCA opinion denying the challenges on state due proc-
ess and privacy grounds, although it remanded the equal protection claim.33
Another challenge to the constitutionality of the adoption statute would also
fail in Broward Circuit Court.
34
A lesbian mother had the custody of her eleven-year-old daughter re-
moved and placed in the household of her natural father, who had murdered
his first wife. The trial court held that the child should be permitted to live in
"a non-lesbian world or atmosphere., 35 The First District Court of Appeal
upheld the trial court's order, although it stated that it was not suggesting that
sexual orientation alone would justify a custodial change.36 The First DCA
would also uphold another trial court decision removing children from the
custody of a lesbian mother so that they could be raised in a more traditional
family environment.37
During the time that anti-gay ballot initiatives similar to the one over-
turned in Romer v. Evans,38 the State of Florida also faced an anti-gay
amendment trying to limit the right of local governments to ban discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. The proposed Florida measure would
not have permitted the state or any local government to ban discrimination
on the basis of any category other than race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, handicap, ethnic background, marital status or family status. The
measure was struck from the Florida ballot for failing to abide by the state
constitution's single-subject requirement.39 This was probably beneficial for
the LGBT community, as a number of local Florida communities had previ-
31. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991).
32. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
33. Cox v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
34. Amer v. Johnson, No. 92-14370 (11) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1997).
35. Ward v. Ward, No. 92-2424-CAOI-H (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. Aug. 1995); cited in Ted,
supra note 15, at 826.
36. Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
37. Packard v. Packard, 727 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
38. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
39. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimi-
nation, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
[Vol. 32
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ously repealed anti-discrimination ordinances through local ballot initia-
tives. 40
These same moral principles also are at play in today's legal debates re-
garding gay rights laws. One only needs to look to the majority and dissent-
ing opinions of Lawrence v. Texas41 to see the disagreement over the role
morality should play in determining law. Justices Kennedy warned against
mandating a moral code,42 while Justice Scalia adopted the belief that the
promotion of a majoritarian view of sexual morality is a legitimate state in-
terest.
43
Throughout the lecture series, the Goodwin speakers examined a wide
range of theories and beliefs about how morality has shaped the legal doc-
trine affecting sexual minorities. The first speaker was Suzanne Goldberg, a
former attorney with Lambda Legal Defense and the current Director of the
Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic at Columbia Law School. While working
for Lambda, Professor Goldberg worked on some of the most important
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with LGBT issues, including
Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans. Professor Goldberg's speech fo-
cused on the lack of legal justification for laws that discriminate based on
sexual orientation. Instead, she points out, our courts tend to intuition and
morals based justifications for upholding or creating such discrimination.
The second speaker was David Mixner, an influential political activist
who was at the forefront of the civil rights, Vietnam, and HIV/AIDS aware-
ness movements when it was dangerous to do so. Mixner is known as one of
the most successful LGBT activists because of his prolific writing and influ-
ence with political leaders such as Bill Clinton-his college roommate.
Mixner even influenced then Governor Ronald Reagan to change his mind
and oppose a California ballot proposition banning gay and lesbian individu-
als from being public school teachers. Mixner's lecture, which also touched
on the 292 friends he buried due to AIDS, was not only a great history les-
son, but a moving and inspirational experience for the audience.
Our third speaker was Matt Foreman, who served as the Executive Di-
rector of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force for several years. Fore-
man visited Nova at a historic time in our country because the United States
Congress was debating adding sexual orientation to the federal employment
40. See Terl, supra note 15, at 839.
41. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
42. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
850 (1992)) (affirming the proposition that the court should not be mandating its own "moral
code").
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non-discrimination laws on the same day that Foreman was visiting the law
center. Foreman speech focused on the fact that, despite the innumerable
social advancements our society has made, we remain stagnant in our moral
and political attitudes toward LGBT people and change is desperately
needed.
The final speaker was the Right Reverend V. Gene Robinson, the
Bishop of New Hampshire. After being elected the first openly gay Episco-
palian Bishop in 2003, Bishop Robinson became the focus of the debate over
the full inclusion of gays and lesbians in the Anglican Communion. Bishop
Robinson's speech focused on the role religion plays in the debate over
LGBT rights. He analyzed the manipulation of scripture by some sectors of
the religious community to incorrectly use Bible passages in support of the
denial of LGBT rights. Bishop Robinson faced a sometimes tough and vocal
audience, but his warm and calming presence was the perfect end note to the
Eleventh Annual Leo Goodwin, Sr. Lecture Series.
10
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INTUITION, MORALS, AND THE LEGAL CONVERSATION
ABOUT GAY RIGHTS
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG*
When lawyers and judges converse in litigation, factual and legal analy-
sis typically takes center stage. Yet, when the legal conversation' turns to
the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals,2 the ground shifts. Intuition
* Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This essay is an
edited version of remarks delivered for the 2007 Eleventh Annual Leo Goodwin, Sr. Lecture
Series on the Continuing Role of Morality in the Development of Legal Rights for Sexual
Minorities. My thanks to Henry Monaghan, Kent Greenawalt, Bill Adams, David Enoch, Jeff
Gordon, and other colleagues at Columbia Law School and the Shepard Broad Law Center for
helpful conversation about the role of intuition in legal argument, and to Amy McCamphill,
Michael Budabin McQuown, Ethan Frechette, and the Nova Law Review staff for excellent
research assistance.
1. By legal conversation, I mean to encompass both the arguments made by lawyers in
litigation and the court's adjudication of those claims.
Although this essay focuses on litigation, similar questions arise regarding arguments
made in the legislative arena and in political discourse more generally. Kent Greenawalt
offers thoughtful explorations in two books, with a particular focus on the legitimacy of reli-
gious convictions in law-related political discourse. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); see also Kathleen M. McGraw, Manipulating Public Opinion
with Moral Justification, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 129 (1998) (observing the
effectiveness of moral claims in shaping public opinion and the difficulty of detecting decep-
tive use of these kinds of claims).
2. Actually, legal discussions rarely turn to questions specifically related to bisexuals.
See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 359
(2000).
Many of the points made in this essay are also relevant to legal conversations about
the rights of transgender individuals, although this essay's limited scope precludes develop-
ment of that analysis here. Likewise, many of the points here may be relevant to legal conver-
sations about abortion, where intuition and moral judgment have often similarly displaced
reasoned analysis. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court incorporated its own, non-evidence-based views about abortion's effect on
women in sustaining the federal "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003." The Court wrote:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexception-
able to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained.... The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a
choice is well informed.
Id. at 1634 (emphasis added). On the use of this type of argument in abortion jurisprudence
and political rhetoric, see Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and
the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, DUKE LJ. (forthcoming 2008).
11
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and morals rationales often displace evidence-based reasoning.' More spe-
cifically, arguments to limit the rights of lesbians and gay men tend to de-
pend explicitly on intuition,4 and sometimes morality,5 in ways that contem-
porary arguments to restrict the rights of other social groups6 rarely do.7
In addressing this dissonance, this essay has two central aims. The first
is simply to observe the disproportionate openness to arguments based on
intuition and morals in legal conversation regarding gay rights, particularly
in equal protection litigation The second is to consider some of the func-
3. Some commentators have described more generally a "gay exception" to constitu-
tional doctrine and family law rules. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation
and Accountability Under Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1633, 1710 & n.319 (2004)
(citing discussions identifying "gay exceptions" to the ordinary application of settled rules).
4. In this essay, I use the word intuition in its ordinary, dictionary-definition sense,
meaning a "knowing or sensing without the use of rational processes" or, put another way,
"[a] sense of something not evident or deducible." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 947 (3d ed. 1992). At later points in the essay, I also refer to "uan-
provable assumptions" to mean essentially the same thing. See infra note 51 and accompany-
ing text. The essential shared trait is the impossibility of marshalling support that would sat-
isfy ordinary evidentiary rules.
5. By morals-based justifications, I mean to include only rationales that rely explicitly
on morality as a justification for government action as distinct from the larger number of
arguments and analyses that may have morality-based underpinnings. A paradigmatic exam-
ple of the morals justifications I focus on here is Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the majority
relied on "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate... that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable" to sustain Georgia's sodomy law. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court rejected this reasoning, holding that "'the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."' 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citation
omitted). Although we see less explicit reliance on morals rationales post-Lawrence, I include
reference to morals-based justifications in this essay both because they continue to appear in
some cases involving lesbians and gay men, and because they share many of the troubling
features that are associated with intuition-based arguments. For an example of morals-based
reasoning in a post-Lawrence case, see State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 375, 383 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that state interest in "prevent[ing] the gradual deterioration of... sexual mo-
rality" justified more burdensome age-of-consent rules for same-sex than different-sex cou-
ples). I have addressed morals-based justifications in greater detail elsewhere. See Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233 (2004) [hereinafter Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications].
6. Asylum law context provides a useful definition of social group for the purposes of
this essay. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (defining
"particular social group" category to include individuals of "similar background, habits, or
social status") (citation omitted).
7. To be clear, the point here is a comparative one-that gay and lesbian rights cases
have a relatively high concentration of these arguments-and not a claim that these arguments
always appear in gay rights cases or never appear in other cases. Cf supra note 2.
8. Again, my focus here is on contexts in which intuitions play an explicit role in justi-
fying government action rather than on contexts where intuitions may underlie arguments or
[Vol. 32
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tions and consequences of intuition-based arguments in legal conversations
more generally. I concentrate primarily on intuition-based arguments be-
cause they are the focus of scholarly inquiry less often than morals argu-
ments, although I address morals-based arguments as well.
I begin by sketching the work that intuitions do in sexual orientation
cases. Against this backdrop, I propose that the explicit proffer of intuitions
and moral claims as rationales for government action in cases involving the
rights of lesbians and gay men, while pleasingly transparent, also raises trou-
bling problems for legal decision-makers. Finally, I offer some brief
thoughts as to why intuition- and morals-based arguments are so freely made
in connection with challenges to sexual orientation-based distinctions, when
references to similar intuitions and moral views would not typically appear in
conversations about other types of government action.
I.
Our first task is to consider the work of intuition rationales in sexual
orientation cases. Although any constitutional law student knows that the
rationales function in constitutional adjudication as justifications for gov-
ernment action, I discuss the background law here briefly to highlight the
contrast between the justifications offered in sexual orientation and other
types of cases.
The requirement that governments justify their acts arises everywhere in
constitutional law, whether the acts involve treatment of enemy combatants, 9
punishment of students for unfurling a "Bong Hits for Jesus" banner, ° or
anything in between. In the equal protection context, in particular, govern-
judicial reasoning but remain unmentioned. There is an extensive literature addressing ques-
tions of intuition and adjudication more generally. See, e.g., Chris Gunthrie et al., Blinking on
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (2007) (proposing a model
"[s]upported by contemporary psychological research on the human mind and [the authors']
empirical evidence" which posits that "judges generally make intuitive decisions but some-
times override their intuition with deliberation"); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch'" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929)
(discussing the use of "hunches" in judicial decisionmaking); Richard A. Posner, The Role of
the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1049, 1063-68 (2006) (discussing "the
role of the personal, the emotional, and the intuitive" in judicial decisionmaking); R. George
Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 Hous. L. REv. 1381, 1384
(2006) (concluding that "intuition is invariably central-whether overtly so or not-to the
process of arriving at a judicial outcome by any standard recognized means").
9. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2003).
10. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
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ments must legitimize their decisions to draw the challenged classifications."
Explanations for line-drawing must be given when courts are deciding, for
example, whether a public university can exclude women from admission 2
or whether the state can maintain different rules regarding involuntary insti-
tutionalization for people with mental retardation and mental illness.1 3
At this general level, equal protection's demand for justification of gov-
ernment action related to sexual orientation is, of course, no different. Ques-
tions regarding a government's authority to deny same-sex couples the right
to marry or to allow or forbid gay adults from adopting children, for exam-
ple, are all variations on the standard constitutional inquiry into a govern-
ment's authority to impose a limitation on the rights of some, but not others.
When these questions arise, standard principles of constitutional adjudi-
cation require us to look to the text of the Constitution's equal treatment
guarantees 14 and to cases interpreting that text. Most fundamentally, we ask
whether the government has supplied a good enough justification for its ac-
tion.'5 What qualifies as "good enough" depends on what the government is
doing and against whom it is acting. 6 Under current constitutional doctrine,
restricting rights based on a person's race or sex requires a fairly weighty
rationale."' By contrast, the hurdle a government must surmount before re-
11. In some circumstances, governments need not themselves produce the legitimizing
justification. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("[A] legislature that creates these
categories need not 'actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
classification."') (citation omitted). See also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
12. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
13. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 314-15.
14. See U.S. CONST. art. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Equal Protection Clause
is the central repository of constitutional equal treatment jurisprudence, cases applying due
process guarantees also frequently bear on equality questions. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Compare, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding due
process protections require pre-termination hearing for public assistance recipients), with
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (rejecting due process claim for re-termination
hearing for disability benefits recipients).
15. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985) (stating that
all legislation must, at a minimum, be "rationally related a legitimate state interest" and that
some legislative classifications call for heightened judicial scrutiny).
16. Elsewhere, I have argued that the traditional separation of equal protection review
into three distinct tiers serves as a barrier to equality and meaningful analysis. See generally
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 515 (2004) [hereinafter
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers].
17. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny
to law school's consideration of race in affirmative action plan); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33
(requiring the state to proffer an "exceedingly persuasive" interest to justify a sex-based clas-
sification); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (explaining that strict scrutiny applies to
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stricting the rights of most social group members, including the elderly, the
young, the disabled, and gay people, tends to be rather easier to overcome. 18
According to the weakest version of this review standard, any reasonably
conceivable justification will do.19
Ultimately, though, whether the standard is one of strict scrutiny or ra-
tional basis review, the bottom line question in any constitutional equal
treatment challenge is the same: Does the government have a permissible
justification for its action?"°
II.
It turns out, however, that although the core question regarding gov-
ernment rationales remains the same for classifications involving different
types of social groups, the conceptualization of "permissible" reasons-how
we think about which reasons are legitimate and sufficient and which are
not-often looks different in sexual orientation cases than in others.21
In the usual case, the government characterizes its restriction on an in-
dividual or group member as necessary to prevent a demonstrable harm. For
statutes "classif[ying] by race, alienage, or national origin" and that "heightened" scrutiny
applies to "classifications based on gender").
18. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320-21 (upholding a distinction between mentally ill
and mentally disabled individuals under rational basis review); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (sustaining mandatory retirement statute under rational basis review); cf
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (applying rational basis review to state consti-
tutional amendment that classified based on sexual orientation and invalidating the amend-
ment because animus, rather than a legitimate government interest, explained the state's dis-
tinction). But see In re Marriage Cases, No. S147999, 2008 WL 2051892, at *45 (Cal. May
15, 2008) (holding that sexual orientation-based classifications should be subjected to strict
scrutiny under the California Constitution's equal protection clause).
19. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 ("[A] classification must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.") (internal quotation omitted). At times, however, even low-level,
rational basis review is applied with some degree of rigor. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. 620
(invalidating state amendment notwithstanding application of rational basis review); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580-83 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that
criminal law imposing penalties on same-sex but not different-sex couples violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, supra note 16, at 514-17 (discussing
additional weight added to minimal rational basis requirements in some "strong" rational basis
cases).
20. See, e.g., Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, supra note 16, at 533.
21. For an illustrative list of cases in which courts have rested decisions in sexual orienta-
tion cases on intuition- or morals-based frameworks, see infra note 30. Again, I do not sug-
gest that this approach appears in all sexual orientation cases but instead that advocates and
courts that make arguments to sustain sexual orientation discrimination are unusually likely to
deploy this type of reasoning.
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example, the argument goes, national security depends on restricting the
rights of enemy combatants.22 Or a school argues that its educational mis-
sion will be undermined if it cannot punish the "bong hit" banner-waver.23
Simply put, the government identifies some demonstrable need that it aims to
serve by whatever action it has taken. A related premise of the argument is
that something particular about the burdened group--enemy combatants or
high school students in the illustrations here-justifies restricting members
of those groups but not others.
In the kinds of cases that we think of as classic individual rights cases
involving discrimination based on an aspect of individual identity, courts
also typically focus on a demonstrable fact about the group that justifies the
restriction on group members' rights. When the United States Supreme
Court sustained different involuntary institutionalization rules for people
with mental retardation and mental illness, for example, the Court cited fac-
tual differences between the two groups to support the differential treat-
ment.24 The Court similarly looked to the fact that only women can give
birth when considering whether to sustain immigration sponsorship rules that
are more onerous for fathers than mothers.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these "demonstrable fact" argu-
ments always succeed. For example, when Virginia argued that it could ex-
clude women from its military training institute because the school's adver-
sative training method was better suited to men than women, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument as flawed and impermissibly stereotyping.26 Nor
am I suggesting that the assertion of factual difference should be enough to
justify a state-sponsored classification. As Justice O'Connor observed in her
dissent in Nguyen v. INS, the fact that women can give birth to children can-
not, without more, explain why the government treats mothers as more likely
to inculcate American citizenship values than fathers.27
Whether or not we agree that these empirical distinctions justify a gov-
ernmental restriction in any particular case is not my concern here, however.
Instead, the point is simply that when a government seeks to restrict the
rights of one group of people relative to others, the focus tends to be on
whether demonstrable differences exist between the burdened group and
22. See Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
23. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
24. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-29.
25. Nguyen v. INS., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
26. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520-23, 558 (1996).
27. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 79-83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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others sufficient to justify the burden being challenged. 8 So, returning to the
high school students and enemy combatants for a moment, the discussion
turns, at least in part, on demonstrable features or attributes associated with
the relevant population-whether it is a susceptibility to being distracted in
the case of high school students, or a heightened risk to the interests of the
United States thought to be posed by enemy combatants. The legal conver-
sation in these cases is about facts that are arguably related to the group and
about the connection between those facts and the need for the governmental
restriction.
When it comes to restrictions on the rights of lesbians and gay men,
however, the conversation and analysis tend to be different. The rationale
for the government treating gay people differently from others for purposes
of marriage, the military, adoption, or anything else is not, except in the out-
lier case, tied to a feature that makes gay people demonstrably different from
non-gay people. More specifically, the focus of courts and governments is
not typically on physical differences, educational differences, or differences
in mental health. Even the once-favored argument that gay people are more
likely than others to be sexual predators no longer gets much traction in legal
or, indeed, popular conversation.29
Instead of arguing that demonstrable differences exist, the claim, made
by both advocates and judges, is often that intuition or morality, or both in
some cases, are enough to justify treating gay people differently from every-
one else.3 ° Put most simply, the argument is that "our" shared intuition or
28. See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Virginia, 518 U.S. at
533; see also Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (noting that the state "has proffered more than adequate
justifications for the differences in treatment between the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill").
29. See Gregory M. Herek, Facts About Homosexuality and Child Molestation,
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts molestation.html (last visited June 3, 2008).
30. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton 1), 358 F.3d
804, 819-20 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (relying on "'unprovable assumptions"' about parenting to sus-
tain Florida's bar on gay adults from adopting children); State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 236
(Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that "the legislature could have reasonably determined that" an
age-of-consent statute that imposed greater punishment on same-sex than different-sex cou-
ples could help "prevent the gradual deterioration of the sexual morality approved by a major-
ity of Kansas") rev'd, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y.
2006) (relying on "[i]ntuition and experience" regarding childrearing to sustain the state's
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage). In other cases where the language of intuition
and unprovable assumption is not used explicitly, courts have embraced rationales that rest on
similar intuitions. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (plu-
rality opinion) (sustaining Washington's ban on same-sex couples' marrying in part because
"children tend to thrive" in a "'traditional' nuclear family") (emphasis added); cf Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999-1000 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (find-
ing the state legislature could have rationally concluded that "married opposite-sex parents"
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life experience shows that being gay is not as desirable, morally preferable,
or good for society as not being gay. These intuitions or moral commit-
ments, the argument concludes, suffice to support official distinctions be-
tween gay and non-gay people. Some describe this as "heteronormativity" to
convey the idea that the social norm is heterosexual and that anything other
than heterosexuality involves a non-neutral, negative deviation. 3'
While this intuition or preference for heterosexuality undoubtedly plays
a powerful role in social conversation among individuals and within many
communities, the aim here is to capture its role in legal conversation. So, we
might ask, if the government has to point to a difference between gay and
non-gay people to justify its sexual orientation-based distinctions between
constituents, what are the available options, other than intuition?
There's the rub, at least for government lawyers and courts that would
uphold these classifications. As just noted, unlike for some other social
groups, sexual orientation gives rise to no known differences in physical
capacity, intellectual ability, and mental health.32 There are also no credible
are "the optimal social structure in which to bear children" and that same-sex couples "pre-
sent[] an alternative structure for child rearing that has not yet proved itself').
31. Linda C. McClain, Some ABCs of Feminist Sex Education (in Light of the Sexuality
Critique of Legal Feminism), 15 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63, 74-75 (2006); see also Katherine
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
181, 184 (2001). For discussion of sex stereotyping embedded in some of these intuition-
based rationales, see generally Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent
Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007).
32. At one time, homosexuality was considered a psychiatric disorder among mental
health experts, but in 1973 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) voted unanimously to
remove homosexuality as a disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual's (DSM)
section on Sexual Deviancy. John Gonsiorek, The Empirical Basis for the Demise of the
Illness Model of Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY 116 (1991). A year later, a majority of the general APA membership confirmed this
decision, voting to replace the diagnosis with a milder category of sexual orientation
disturbance. The DSM-III, in turn, replaced this diagnosis with "ego-dystonic
homosexuality," which was deleted in 1986 in the DSM-III-R. Gregory M. Herek, Facts
About Homosexuality and Mental Health, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/
rainbow/html/factsmental health.html (last visited June 3, 2008). The APA now classifies
"persistent and marked distress about [one's] sexual orientation" under "Sexual Disorders Not
Otherwise Specified." AM. PSYCHIATRIC. Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 582 (4th ed. 2000).
This shift has been followed in many parts of the world, including the British Gov-
ernment in 1994, the Ministry of Health in the Russian Federation in 1999, and the Chinese
Society of Psychiatry in 2001. See Michael Kirby, The 1973 Deletion of Homosexuality as a
Psychiatric Disorder: 30 Years on, 37 AusTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 674, 675 (2003); Nigel
Warner, The Russian Federation Has Dropped "Homosexual Orientation" from Its New
Classification of Mental and Behaviour Disorders, ILGA EUROLETrER 75, Nov. 1999,
http://www.france.qrd.org/assocs/ilga/euroletter/75.html; John Balzano, Toward a Gay-
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studies showing that sexual orientation affects a person's ability to parent or
raise an emotionally and physically healthy child.33 Indeed, the American
Academy of Pediatrics has taken the position that sexual orientation is not a
relevant determinant of parenting ability, and has opposed governmental
distinctions between gay and non-gay parents and prospective parents.34
The dearth of factual evidence to support distinctions between gay and
non-gay people thus poses a challenge both for governments and courts that
would prefer to sustain sexual orientation-based distinctions, whether in mar-
riage, adoption, the military, or other contexts. What is a judge or govern-
ment lawyer to do? This is where arguments based on intuition and morality
come in-they fill the gap left by the absence of demonstrable and relevant
factual differences related to sexual orientation.
Consider for example, the Eleventh Circuit's decision sustaining Flor-
ida's ban on adoption by gay adults.35 Two rationales played a prominent
role. First, the court embraced Florida's contention that it could restrict
adoption to heterosexuals because "the marital family structure is more sta-
ble than other household arrangements. ' '36 And, second, the court agreed
with Florida "that children benefit from the presence of both a father and
mother in the home. 37
Turning first briefly to the marital stability point,38 two flaws bear not-
ing. For one, no reputable support exists for the court's proposition that mar-
Friendly China?: Legal Implications for Gays and Lesbians, 16 LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 36
(2007). At the supranational level, the World Health Organization has not classified
homosexuality as a mental illness since the early 1990s. See WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES & RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS V
(10th rev. 2007), available at http://www.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icdl0online/.
33. See E.C. PERRIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT HEALTH 110-30
(2002) (reviewing studies and finding no material disparities in mental health and social ad-
justment between children of gay and non-gay parents); Melanie A. Gold et al., Children of
Gay or Lesbian Parents, 15 PEDIATRICS IN REv. 354, 357 (1994) ("There are no data to sug-
gest that children who have gay or lesbian parents are different in any aspects of psychologi-
cal, social, and sexual development from children in heterosexual families."); see also Brief
for Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Respondents at 36, Her-
nandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 86), 2006 WL 1930166; Brief for Child
Rights Orgs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1), 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598.
34. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Co-parent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Par-
ents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339, 339 (2002).
35. Lofton I, 358 F.3d 804.
36. Id. at 819.
37. Id.
38. Although the court in Lofton I acknowledged the marital stability argument, it fo-
cused primarily on the mother/father claim. Id (describing the state's interest in "plac[ing]
adoptive children in homes that have both a mother and father" as more important).
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ied mothers and fathers have more stable relationships than partnered moth-
ers and mothers or fathers and fathers. All of the credible studies showing
the relative stability of marital relationships when children are in the home
encompass only heterosexual couples.39 At most, those studies demonstrate
that couples that have the option to marry and choose not to marry are less
likely to stay together than those that marry. However, for same-sex couples
that lack that option, studies comparing the duration of heterosexual relation-
ships do not provide accurate comparative information. Second, the marital
stability rationale begs the question whether the state can justify one dis-
criminatory rule, the adoption law, by pointing to another discriminatory
rule, the marriage law.4°
The Lofton court's disregard of the serious weaknesses in its reasoning
can be explained, I believe, by the court's strong sense-we can call it intui-
tion-that marriage really does hold families together, at least more so than
non-marital commitments. The power of that intuition led the court to disre-
gard both the facts and the law just mentioned, which, if given a fair hearing,
would have rendered the state's marital stability argument untenable.
The court's response to the state's childrearing rationale, which the
court characterized as even "[m]ore important[]",41 than the marital stability
claim, was even more misplaced as a result of the court's deference to intui-
tion. First, the constitutional question in the case was not, as the court put it,
whether children do well with a mother and father in the home.42 That de-
termination, which amounts to a choice among policy preferences, falls clas-
sically within the legislature's domain. Children, after all, do well with
many things: more money, better education, more loving, committed, and
capable parents.
The proper approach in this case would have been, instead, to apply the
run-of-the-mill equal protection inquiry to the classification at issue: Can the
39. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the
United States: A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607 (2006); see also
Brief of the Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Conaway v. Deane, 903 A.2d 416 (Md. 2006) (No. 44) (mem.), available at
http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/27253g120061019.html; L.A. Kurdek, Are Gay and
Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different from Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 880 (2004).
40. Because this question does not bear on this essay's intuition-based argument point, I
will simply note it here rather than discussing it in full. For further discussion of this point,
see, for example, Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riage: Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 247,252 (2007).
41. Lofton 1, 358 F.3d at 819.
42. See id. at 819-20.
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state legitimately choose sexual orientation as a basis on which to distinguish
between prospective adoptive parents?
If it were true, counterfactually, that sexual orientation was relevant to
parenting ability and that gay adults posed a particular danger to children, the
analysis would have been easy. The danger could have reasonably explained
the state's exclusion of gay people from the pool of prospective adoptive
parents. But because no factual support exists for the proposition that an
individual's sexual orientation correlates either positively or negatively with
parenting ability, the state and the court had to look elsewhere.
In the absence of persuasive facts, the state contended that children
"benefit" from the presence of a male and female parent, and the court ac-
cepted that argument as a sufficient justification for the adoption law's sex-
ual orientation-based line.43 And here lie the analytic errors. Most basically,
stating that different-sex parents confer a particular benefit does not, in itself,
show that same-sex parents do not confer either the same benefit or another
that is equally important."
But even if we infer, as intended by the state, that different-sex parents
provide a benefit not provided by same-sex parents,45 we have restated, but
not responded to, the equal protection inquiry. That is, the adoption law it-
self states that the government prefers adoptive parents to be heterosexual
rather than gay.46 Equal protection requires something more than repetition
of those preferences. Government must, at a minimum, have a legitimate
explanation for why it drew the challenged line.47 If it does not, equal protec-
tion review would be effectively meaningless because a state could always
justify its distinction between two groups of people by stating that group A
offers benefits that group B does not-or more simply, that it prefers group
A to group B and has, therefore, drawn a line between them.48 Something
more than mere reiteration of the classification is required.49
What, then, is the equal protection-sanctioned explanation for why Flor-
ida can constitutionally prefer straight adults to gay adults when deciding
who can adopt? The Eleventh Circuit sought to fill that gap, but lacking de-
monstrable evidence of differences between gay and non-gay parents, as
43. Id. at 819.
44. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't. of Children & Family Servs. (Lofton I), 377 F.3d 1275,
1297-1301 (11 th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
45. Lofton 1, 358 F.3d at 820.
46. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(c)(3) (2007); Lofton 1, 358 F.3d at 806-07.
47. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (stating that classifications must "bear
a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end").
48. See id. at 632-33.
49. See id. at 632 (ruling that "the link between classification and objective gives sub-
stance to the Equal Protection Clause").
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noted above, it invoked intuition instead." The state's premise, the court
wrote, was "one of those 'unprovable assumptions' that nevertheless can
provide a legitimate basis for legislative action."'" It added that "[a]lthough
social theorists from Plato to Simone de Beauvoir have proposed alternative
childrearing arrangements, none has proven as enduring as the marital family
structure, nor has the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human
experience discovered a superior model., 52 "Against this 'sum of experi-
ence,"' the court concluded, "it is rational for Florida to conclude that it is in
the best interests of adoptive children, many of whom come from troubled
and unstable backgrounds, to be placed in a home anchored by both a father
and a mother."53
Before turning to the merits of this reasoning, I want first to make a
simple, descriptive observation. In most cases, as discussed earlier, parties
and courts do not rest decisions explicitly or exclusively on intuitions, un-
provable assumptions, moral judgments, or similar rationales that are not
susceptible to ordinary methods of proof. It is difficult even to imagine a
court opining that "we have no real evidence for limiting the rights of group
B-but we have our intuition, based on history, that limiting group B's rights
is rational and permissible." Or that "we have no evidence to show that the
relationships of A couples and B couples are different in their day-to-day
existence, but we know that there is a moral or commonsense difference be-
tween them, and that difference justifies granting more rights to A couples
than B couples." Yet, in Lofion v. Secretary of the Department of Children
and Family Services54 and numerous other sexual orientation-related cases,
55
the opposite is true. Courts in these cases proceed as though they are free
from the norms of legal conversation that lead them to offer evidence-based,
accessible reasoning in other kinds of cases.
50. Lofton I, 358 F.3d at 819-20.
51. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton to support the
"unprovable assumption" proposition. Id.; see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 62-63 (1973). Paris, however, did not rest its decision solely on "unprovable assump-
tions" but instead pointed to public safety and health rationales to support its ruling sustaining
Indiana's nude-dancing ban. 413 U.S. at 58, 61, 63 (referring to reports of"an arguable corre-
lation between obscene material and crime" and noting the "social interest in order," and
describing that interest as a concern with "antisocial behavior" that might flow from the "crass
commercial exploitation of sex"). For further discussion of the limitations of Paris Adult
Theatre I on this point, see generally Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications, supra note 5, at
1269-70.
52. Lofton I, 358 F.3d at 820 (citing PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Bk. V, 459d-461e; SIMONE
DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1949)).
53. Id. at 820 (quoting Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 63).
54. Lofton 1, 358 F.3d 804.
55. See supra note 30.
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My point is not that moral concerns, and unprovable assumptions and
intuitions are absent from government action and judicial reasoning. Surely
they are present regularly and perhaps even inevitably, at least to the extent
they shape individuals' capacity to understand and interpret information. 6
My point, instead, is that those concerns, assumptions, and intuitions are not
typically the major-and almost never the sole-stated factor in legal con-
versation about what a government can or cannot do. Yet, in cases involving
sexual orientation-based distinctions, we see that governments and courts
advance these types of reasons explicitly." This move begs the question
whether references to intuition or morals are constitutionally sufficient,
without more, to support state-sponsored distinctions between social groups.
III.
Even if we agree that moral commitments, intuitions, and unprovable
assumptions play an unusually strong role in legislative and judicial analysis
related to sexual orientation, we need not necessarily conclude that this role
should be cause for concern. Some would argue that the overt presence of
intuition- and morals-based arguments is the sign of a healthy decision-
making process, given what we know about how decision-makers use em-
pirical evidence to justify decisions that were really made based on intuitive
or moral priors.58 Indeed, the argument could be made that the legal conver-
sation around gay and lesbian rights should be emulated in other subject ar-
eas because it is more honest than most other public policy and law-related
conversations.
To take the point a step further, some would argue that reliance on intui-
tion is precisely within the domain of states. If the Constitution ties the gov-
ernment's hands from acting on intuitions or moral views about what is good
for the populace, some would say we disserve the state and its constituents.
Lord Devlin sought to shore up this point by maintaining that society would
56. For discussion of the ways in which cognitive biases shape information processing
more generally, see, for example, David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social
Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
188 (Mariano Tomassi & Kathryn leruli eds., 1995). Also see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995), for a review of the effects of cognitive biases on
individuals' interpretation of information.
57. See, e.g., Lofion I, 358 F.3d at 819-20.
58. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights,
Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006) (discussing
the ways in which courts rely on facts to stand in for normative judgments about social
groups).
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"disintegrate" if basic moral norms went unenforced. 9 In this vein, some
argue that if we do not allow the government to safeguard the populace's
moral well-being-by either reserving marriage to heterosexuals or barring
gay people from adopting-we are endangering our community's well-being
as much as if we prevent the government from developing licensing stan-
dards for teachers or punishing people who write graffiti on buildings, drive
through stop signs, or commit violent acts. How, these advocates might ask,
can we have a government that cares only about insuring our physical well-
being and protecting our property, when so much of what makes for a good
society is the society's moral health?
Yet, much as honesty might be desirable as general policy, honesty
alone does not convert intuition and moral commitments into credible legal
arguments. The problem, broadly put, is that rationales and decisions based
on intuitions and moral values are not contestable.6' Either you agree or you
do not, and even examples and evidence that undermine the proffered intui-
tion or moral position cannot provide conclusive disproof. When my morals
and intuitions are pitted against yours, what, really, can an adjudicator do?
One person's claim that her intuitions and moral commitments require Flor-
ida's legislature to bar same-sex couples from marriage leaves the decision-
maker with no more basis for a reasoned determination than another's asser-
tion that her moral commitments and intuitions mandate the converse result.
While this tension between competing intuitions and moral positions
may make for engaging social conversation, its centrality in legal conversa-
tions about gay and lesbian rights raises serious concerns for courts. Faced
with a government's intuition-based rationales and moral claims, courts have
three choices, none of which is ideal: 1) they can accept the assertions as
reflective of majoritarian sentiment; 2) they can accept the assertions because
they share them and find them to be correct; or 3) they can disagree with the
assertions and reject them.6' Yet embracing majoritarianism elides the im-
portant judicial screening function to insure that the intuitions are not merely
stand-ins for bias.62 And making independent judgments about the intui-
tions-whether for or against-runs the risk that courts will appear to be (or
actually will be) substituting their own preferences for those of the majority.
59. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965).
60. I develop this point at length in Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications, supra note 5.
61. An additional option might be to categorically reject any rationale that relies explic-
itly on intuition without considering the argument's merits.
62. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (stating that the obligation of courts
conducting equal protection review is to "ensure that classifications are not drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law").
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Legal realists and critical theorists might say that this description does
no more than track the usual way in which outcome-oriented courts work.
But, even if that is the case, we ought still take note of the effect that open
reliance on intuition and morals has on the decision-making process.
In the usual case, we expect some evidentiary support to justify the
state's actions. We expect, for example, to hear about national security
needs, effective school disciplinary practices, public health, or sound educa-
tional or economic theory. Then, in our legal conversation, we can agree or
disagree with the proffered evidence by critiquing the methodology, the au-
thors' biases, or the analysis.
But, when ordinary norms of legal argument give way to intuition and
moral judgments, without even the expectation of demonstrable evidence, the
possibilities for rigorous contestation of the government's interests drop off
sharply. With this drop comes a substantially increased risk that courts will
substitute majoritarian preferences for meaningful legal analysis, and that
those in disagreement will be able to do little, at least in litigation, to over-
come the intuitions and moral judgments that have been deemed decisive.
IV.
Finally, two closing thoughts on why sexual orientation-related legal
conversations are so often dominated by intuition when others are not.
First, longstanding biases tend to remain strong even in the face of con-
travening evidence. To elaborate briefly, individuals who hold biases toward
a social group frequently see the disliked or feared group as deficient in some
demonstrable, factual way. Consider, for example, the demonization of Jews
in Nazi Germany and the dehumanization of African and African-American
slaves in the United States.63 Powerful cartoons and stories portrayed mem-
bers of those groups as sexual predators, disloyal, untrustworthy, and general
menaces to society.' 4 We can see this as well in depictions of lesbians and
gay men in the past century as mentally ill, sexually predatory, and otherwise
unfit to participate in society. 65 As the "facts" about Jews and African
Americans gave way in the face of reality, so too have the similar "facts"
63. See Colored Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1860, at 2; see also Anti-Jewish Boy-
cott Flares Up in Munich, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1935, at 9. For an overview of this topic, see
Jeffrey Herf, Ideologies in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on Nazi Germany and the
Pro-Slavery South (2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.yale.edu/glc/events/herf.pdf).
64. Herf, supra note 63.
65. See, e.g., EDMUND BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE, OR WAY OF LIFE? (1956).
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about lesbians and gay men-not everywhere, of course, but in many quar-
ters in the United States.66
This changed understanding of "facts," however, does not necessarily
result in the immediate eradication of bias. Instead, at least in some in-
stances, courts and legislatures permit intuitions, unprovable assumptions,
and even moral positions to do the justificatory work that was once accom-
plished by belief in the demonstrable deficiencies of the targeted group.
The current lack of credible facts to justify burdens on lesbians and gay
men thus helps explain the contemporary invocations of intuition and morals
by judges and lawyers who would sustain sexual orientation discrimination.
These intuitions and moral commitments are actually the residual-though
reframed-negative sentiments that were previously expressed as facts.
The second explanation for the relatively high concentration of intui-
tion-based arguments in sexual orientation matters is more particular to the
treatment of sexuality in society. Our own legal history shows Americans to
be-or at least to have been-especially anxious about sexuality and sexual
identity.67 Indeed, just as gay people were beginning to publicly demand
legal rights during the early 1970s, many governments responded by tighten-
ing prohibitions against sexual relations between same-sex partners.68 In
addition, even as popular sentiment was turning against laws that criminal-
ized the sexual relations of consenting adults, the Supreme Court concluded,
in 1986, that moral disapproval of homosexuality was sufficient to justify
Georgia's ban on oral and anal sex.69 Recall that the Court reached this con-
clusion notwithstanding a long line of its own cases reinforcing that the Con-
stitution's privacy and liberty guarantees protect individuals' most intimate,
formative decisions.7 °
Although the Court invalidated "sodomy" laws in 2003 as violating the
Constitution's liberty guarantee, 7' the nearly twenty-year survival of Bowers
66. By contrast, myths that are styled as facts about transgender people are only now, and
only in some communities, starting to be destabilized in this way. See generally Paisley Cur-
rah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle To Achieve Judicial And Leg-
islative Equality For Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (2000).
67. See generally PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND
COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000); DAVID J. GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994).
See also Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law and Its Consequences in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
America, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 43, 44-45 (2007).
68. CAIN, supra note 67, at 36.
69. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
70. See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
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v. Hardwick72 in the wake of the sexual revolution, based on nothing more
than presumed moral judgments, sharply illustrates the way in which discom-
fort related to sexual orientation has influenced the course of legal conversa-
tion. It should not be surprising, then, in light of this pervasive discomfort,
that popular intuitions and moral commitments have played an especially
strong role in shaping sexual orientation law and policy when similar argu-
ments would have been disregarded in other regulatory contexts.
Once we recognize the particular leeway given to unprovable rationales,
we can then begin to ask whether legal conversation can and should tolerate
the relatively high concentration of intuition and morals-based rationales
associated with sexuality-related restrictions. I hope you will join me, per-
haps in my skepticism toward intuition as a sufficient rationale for govern-
ment action, but at least in asking whether intuition, moral claims, and un-
provable assumptions should be taken as seriously as they are in our contem-
porary legal conversations about the rights of lesbians and gay men.
72. 478 U.S. 186.
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A PUBLIC LECTURE: IT Is TIME TO TELL THE TRUTH
DAvID B. MIXNER*
Good Evening. First of all thanks to Bill and Anthony for being two of
the most gracious hosts that any speaker could possibly hope for on this
campus. Thanks to you for turning out tonight. I promise you I'll get done
in time for the World Series. Go Rockies!
Yes, I've been in jail fifteen times. My friends are a little confused
whether that is for human rights or a fetish that I might have for handcuffs.
I'm honored to be here, and I value that word very much because honor is so
important. You see, I was a liar for the first years of my life. For thirty
years. I lied about who I was. I made up names. I made up girlfriends. I
even lied about states I lived in and professions I had. Anything I could do
so they would not find out who I was. This in a nation that teaches us from
our very early years that honesty is one of the most prized American virtues:
George Washington never told a lie. A father to his son: "I don't care what
you did son; just tell me the truth." People go to jail for perjury more than
they do for the crimes they commit, except if you are a member of the LGBT
community. And in our churches and our faith-based institutions and our
synagogues and our mosques, mother and father, our family, the Grange
Hall, the Union Hall, Corporate America says to us in the community:
* This essay is based on a recorded verbatim transcript of David B. Mixner's public
lecture on October 25, 2007 as part of the Eleventh Annual Leo Goodwin, Sr. Lecture Series
at Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center. The author has made minor
revisions for clarity.
Mr. Mixner has been involved in public life, policy, and business for nearly forty
years. A prolific writer, he is the author of the critically acclaimed memoir Stranger Among
Friends and the number one bestseller Brave Journeys. His screenplay, co-written with Rich-
ard Bums, Dunes of Overveen won the Outfest MTV Award for "Best New Screenplay," and
another screenplay, co-written with Dennis Bailey, Fire in the Soul, is being considered by a
number of production companies. The Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University recently
created the "David B. Mixner Collection" of his papers spanning over forty years. He is Ex-
ecutive Producer of the award-winning documentary, House on Fire, about HIV /AIDS in the
African American community. Mr. Mixner has worked on over seventy-five campaigns as a
campaign manager, fundraiser and strategist, including Bill Clinton's presidential campaign.
He has raised over $30 million for candidates and charity organizations and well over $1
million for openly gay and lesbian candidates across the country. Mr. Mixner is currently a
successful international public affairs/strategic-planning consultant with an expertise in
HIV/AIDS. He is working tirelessly to bring worldwide attention to the ongoing health and
political crises in Africa. In addition, he continues to fight for HIV/AIDS awareness here in
the United States.
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"You're so bad David. What you are, please lie to us. You have the exemp-
tion. We don't want to know who you are."
I remember trying to figure out how I knew at an early age that I
couldn't talk to anyone about this and I remember reading in LIFE Magazine
in the 1950's during the McCarthy period-yeah you can add up age; it
won't take you long; sixty-one, I'll save you some trouble-reading in LIFE
Magazine an article where there was a shortage of space in certain mental
institutions because families were committing their sons and their daughters
to have forced lobotomies because they were gay, lesbian, bisexual, or trans-
gendered.' They were cutting our brains open in order to change who we
were. I got the message. I got the point. I remember when young Freddie
Davis, who-I will always remember his name-went to my school and was
known as the "town queer." He was bright. He was handsome. He was
articulate. But I didn't stand up for him. He committed suicide at sixteen;
and I remember my father at our kitchen table, evening meal sitting there and
telling my mother, "the family is better off with him dead." I got the point. I
got the message a lot.
And so for the first thirty years of my life, I lied to everybody. I lied to
my mom and dad. I lied to my sister and my brother. I lied to the guys on
the football team that I played with. I lied to my schoolmates. I lied to my
best friends! I lied to everybody in politics about who I was. I lied to every-
body in the anti-war movement and the civil rights movement while fighting
for justice.
I had a heroine, a woman named Fannie Lou Hamer.2 In 1964-I know
many of you will find this a little more difficult to believe in reality-Mrs.
Hamer lived in Sun Flower County, Mississippi, and she was a pig farmer
with a number of children. In Mississippi, in 1964, African Americans were
not allowed to vote.3 In Sun Flower County, when you went to register to
vote, if you were Caucasian, the criteria to vote was that you had to com-
pletely memorize the Constitution of the United States before you could reg-
ister.4 Now, amazingly, every Caucasian in this county completed that amaz-
ing task, and obviously, every black, African American failed it, except one,
1. Del Martin & Phyllis Lyon, eNotAlone.com, Wanting More, http://www.enota-
lone.com/article/4763.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (reviewing DAVID MIXNER & DENNIS
BAILEY, BRAVE JOURNEYS (2000)).
2. National Women's Hall of Fame, Women of the Hall: Fannie Lou Hamer,
http://www.greatwomen.org/women.php?action=viewone&id=72 (last visited May 28, 2008).
3. See Visitmississippi.org, African-American Heritage Timeline, http://www.visit
mississippi.org/itineraries/themesafricanamericantimeline.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
4. See Spartacus Educational, Voting Rights Act, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/
USAvoting65.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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an elderly man who was a field hand all of his life who memorized the entire
Constitution of the United States to vote. And I was sent down to Missis-
sippi one summer when I was about seventeen or eighteen, with hundreds of
students who went south to fight for justice and register people to vote. I
was there three days and I was put in jail for thirty days in Indianola, Missis-
sippi with a group of freedom fighters, which had, like the "Klan," come out
and tried to talk in front of us about which one of us they would take out and
hang from a tree.
I got out of jail and Mrs. Hamer had become disabled. Because she had
walked up the main street of Indianola, Mississippi time after time up the
court house steps to try to register to vote. And every time she walked up
those steps they beat her to the ground until they made her permanently dis-
abled. She got out of the hospital just after I got out of the jail. She said,
"Well, let's go David." And I said, "Where are we going Mrs. Hamer? I
want to go home. I want my mommy." She said, "Well, I'm gonna go regis-
ter to vote." I said, "Mrs. Hamer, you can barely walk." "Well," she said, "it
will take us a little longer." And I said, "Where do you get the courage to do
this? I am so afraid." And she came over and gave me a big bear hug and
said, "Honey, courage is just a lack of options, just a lack of options. I can't
look at my children in the face and not walk back down that street." She
said, "One, I've got to vote, my children got to vote and, number two, I can
never let violence win, ever. And, if I succeed in letting them beat me into
the ground and I don't walk up that street again," she said, "they win." So
we walked up the street one more time. But this time, as she pulled her right
leg behind her, like the Red Sea, the police parted and she walked up the
county court house steps and she became the second African American regis-
tered in Sun Flower County.
Now let me tell you, I recently went back for a reunion-we now have
reunions of those days-and her grandson is county supervisor of Sun
Flower County, having been elected to office. And I learned a very powerful
lesson, as Andrew Jackson said: "One [person] with courage makes a major-
ity." ' A person with values, a person with principles, a person with honor
and integrity can't be touched.
And so I threw myself in the civil rights movement and the Vietnam
peace movement because I didn't yet have the courage to deal with who I
was. But at least I could help others who were crying out for help in the
struggle for freedom and justice. You know how I got involved against the
Vietnam War? There were four of us. We had $125 between us and, in
5. WorldofQuotes.com, Andrew Jackson, http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/An-
drew-Jackson /1/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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March of 1969, we held a press conference. And we said that on October 15,
1969, we were going to have a nationwide day-long moratorium, called the
Vietnam Moratorium. And on that day we would ask all the universities and
schools to shut down and not to do anything except discuss the war, no mat-
ter what you felt about it. Now, we had $125 and one phone line in one of-
fice for the four of us. We said, as we walked into that press conference,
"What in the hell are we doing?" Then, on October 15, 1969, six hundred
universities and colleges closed down.6 The United Automobile Workers
and AFL-CIO all wore black armbands.7 Troops in Vietnam wore black
armbands and three million people across the country took the day off to
discuss the war in Vietnam.8 It just takes an idea, a dream, a vision. But I
had to come to terms with myself.
You exported-and I lived in California at the time-a wonderful ex-
port choice and we want to thank you-Anita Bryant. In the mid seventies,
she started her rampage against homosexuals and put on those ballot initia-
tives and we lost in Miami and we lost in St. Paul and we lost in Wichita and
we lost in Eugene-and we lost hope. And I was in the closet and I had a
partner, Peter, who I loved more than I love life. And our community de-
cided that they didn't want to fight it; that we shouldn't spend any money
because we would just lose again. I said I can't let that happen. I don't care
if we lose, but we've got to fight. You know I came out of the South and the
Vietnam movement; I know how to fight. So I came out of the closet! I was
banished from my home for three years. But we took it on and I became,
with Harvey Milk, a campaign manager for the "No On Six Briggs Initia-
tive."9
When Harvey and I took over, sixty percent of the state approved an ini-
tiative in California that would have made it against the law for school teach-
ers to be homosexuals.' 0 If they were discovered, they would be put on trial
before the local school board, and if found guilty of being a homosexual,
6. See War and Protest: The U.S. in Vietnam (1969-1970), BBC News, Apr. 17, 2002,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A715042.
7. See generally Strike Against the War, TIME, Oct. 17, 1969, available at http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840217,00.html
8. See Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2007, Vietnam War, http://encarta.
msn.com/text_761552642_34/vietnamwar.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). See also Kalei-
doscope of Dissent, TIME, Oct. 17, 1969, available at http://www.time.com/time/maga-
zine/article/0,9171,901564-2,00.html
9. See generally THE HuMAN TRADITION IN AMERICA: 1865 TO THE PRESENT 294
(Charles W. Calhoun ed.) (2003).
10. See id at 294-95.
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would lose their teaching credentials for the rest of their lives." And sixty
percent of the people of California supported it.' 2 Well, I'll tell you a funny
story-I have two funny stories about that. We got it up to forty-five percent
of the vote against in the last weeks. We couldn't figure out how to get that
last six percent and we were four weeks out and we had come so far, so hard.
And that six percent was driving us crazy. So I said I wanted to see Gover-
nor Reagan. Harvey said, "You're nuts. Number one-he's not going to see
you, and, number two, there is no way in hell he is going to come out against
Anita Bryant!" I said, "I want to see him." What happened, and I know this
will shock many of you, there happened to be some "closeted" Republicans
that I knew, and I made some calls and, through a very circumspect way, I
got fifteen minutes with Governor Reagan. So my partner Peter and I,
walked in and he said, "Well boys," and we were in our thirties, "what can I
do for you?" And I said, "We are here to get your opposition to Proposition
Six." He said, "You know I'm gonna support it. You knew that when you
came in here, but I wanted to extend a courtesy because so and so asked me
to." And I said, "I just need you to listen to one line, one line." And he said,
"What's that?" "Why are you supporting anarchy in the schools?" He said,
"Anarchy in the schools?" I said, "Well Governor, that is what you are sup-
porting when you support that initiative." And he said, "What do you
mean?" And I said, "Governor, all a child who is getting a failing grade has
to do is accuse his teacher of being a homosexual and they would have to be
put on trial. The kids will run the classrooms. There will be total anarchy.
Our teachers will live in fear of giving a failing grade. Discipline will disap-
pear in our schools." "By God, you're right young man!" The next day he
printed a column in all the newspapers coming out against the initiative, and
we carried every county in California and won by fifty-eight percent of the
vote.13
I have to tell you my favorite story from the campaign. Clive Kearns
and Jim Lantry, who were two of the most famous interior designers in Los
Angeles at the time-both have passed away from AIDS now-came in and
we got a headquarters. It was your typical store front headquarters. And so
Julian Dixon, an African American Congressman from Los Angeles, prom-
ised to give us some furniture for the office. So I called Clive and Jim and I
said, "Can you get a truck from your design firm and go over and pick it
11. See Nan D. Hunter, Comment, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695,
1703-04 (1993).
12. See HUMAN TRADiTIoN, supra note 8, at 295.
13. Don Romseburg, 20 Years Ago - Briggs Initiative Defeated- Failed 1978 California
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up?" So they said yes and they went over in their truck and came back and
there was no furniture in their truck. I said, "Where is the furniture from the
Congressman?" They said, "It was so ugly, there was no way we were going
to bring it into the headquarters." I said, "Guys, we need desks!" He said,
"Don't worry, we've called every designer in the city; tomorrow it will be
taken care of." I opened the door at eight o'clock. At nine o'clock, truck
load after truck load of the best designer office furniture you have ever seen
arrived from all over the city.
And just one more story. There was a woman named Gail Wilson who
pioneered fundraising for women in this country.14 She was a lesbian real
estate broker, quite wealthy and she came out, like I did, to help defeat this
initiative. And she raised hundreds of thousands of dollars and was the first
woman in California to become a really powerful fundraiser. An extraordi-
nary woman and she had raised tons of money. And then in the last week,
the Beverly Hills Chamber of Commerce decided that they would support the
Briggs Initiative. And she came to me and she said, "David, look at this;
look what they are doing." And I said, "Gail, the polls show that we've
pulled ahead; they're not going to cost us any votes in Beverly Hills, don't
worry about it." But then she looked at me and in the deepest voice she
could muster, she said, "You don't understand, I shop there." I said, "Do
with it what you want." The next day at noon, through Gail's organization,
every hairdresser left their clients in the chair and walked out of their salon
refusing to cut hair until they changed their endorsement. The second day,
Norman Lear, Cher, and Donna Summer did a full page ad with Gail Wil-
son's name in the L.A. Times saying "Don't shop in Beverly Hills."' 5 The
third day, the Beverly Hills Chamber of Commerce unanimously agreed to
reverse their vote. 16
It's only our own imagination that calls us and limits us. I helped form
the first gay and lesbian political action committee in the history of the world
called MECLA, Municipal Elections Committee of Los Angeles.17 Now, let
me take you back to those times so that you understand. This was the first
one in history. The police were still raiding our homes, raiding our dinner
parties, raiding wherever gay and lesbian people gathered. So we met in a
bar called the Carriage Trade, where you went down a long alley and you
14. EXPERTS TALK: AIDS Out of Control, REUTERS ALERTNET, Mar. 10, 2005,
http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/11 1045354777.htm.
15. See generally The Race That Did Not Happen, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 21, 1989.
16. Narda Zacchino, Beverly Hills Chamber Does a Quick Switch on Prop. 6, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1978, at C1.
17. Bettina Boxall, L.A. 's New Gay Muscle with Big Bucks and Connections, the Local
Gay Community is Changing Politics Nationwide, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at 27.
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had to knock on the door, and they look through a peep hole and let you in.
But we were afraid to walk in as a group, so we went in one by one-thirty
of us-every five to ten minutes. Then another one of us would go in, so
that our meeting would not be raided. We divided up the membership list,
and each of us hid them so in case the police raided our home they could not
find our membership list.
We held our first event. We raised $40,000 which was an all-time re-
cord in California at that time. We sent out checks to candidates in the De-
mocratic Party, to liberal Democrats, and they sent them back to us and said
we cannot afford politically to accept any money that comes from a gay per-
son. These are people that I worked with side by side. But I looked at the
group and I said, "You know I don't think it's a question of when they accept
our money; I just think it's a question of how much we offer." And eventu-
ally they took our money, and we were given credit for turning around a race
and suddenly we had black tie dinners that were raising a hundred to two
hundred to three hundred thousand dollars a night. And it was being dupli-
cated and eventually a national organization emerged from it called HRC.18
We thought we were on the top of the world. We thought the freedom land
was in sight. We were doing it right. There was a great grassroots activity.
Harvey Milk and Elaine Nobel got elected to office. 9 And then suddenly, in
a span of three years, the world came crashing down on us. Elaine received
so many death threats-she was the first openly gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans-
gendered person in the country elected to office-she had to have two full-
time state troopers by her side at all times to protect her from being shot.
Her car windows were smashed out and her tires were slashed. She stopped
owning a car because it didn't make sense anymore. Then Harvey was as-
sassinated in San Francisco.2 ° We bounced up again and said we can pick
ourselves up and we can continue. And then came AIDS.
This is always a difficult part for me. I've lost 292 friends to AIDS. I
gave ninety eulogies for young men under forty years of age in two years,
18. See generally Human Rights Campaign, Who We Are, http://www.hrc.org/
about us/2514.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
19. See Dan Allen, Mixner Goes to Yale-at Least on Paper, ADvoc., Nov. 22, 2005, at
44, 2005 WLNR 19079463. Harvey Milk was the first openly gay man to be elected to any
office. John Cloud, The Time 100: Harvey Milk, TIME, June 14, 1999, available at
http://www.time.com/time/timel00/heroes/profile/milk0l.html. Elaine Nobel was the first
openly lesbian woman to be elected to any office. Larry Nichols, Noble Woman: An Interview
With Elaine Nobel, D.C. METRO WEEKLY, Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://www.
metroweekly.com/feature/?ak=3032. She was elected to the Massachusetts House of Repre-
sentatives in 1974. See id.
20. George P. Fletcher, Justice and Fairness in the Protection of Crime Victims, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REv. 547, 556 (2005).
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1989 and 1990. Every other week, I gave a eulogy to bury a young man. I
lost my partner of twelve years and you have got to know what it was like.
No one would touch us. Doctors wouldn't treat us. Undertakers wouldn't
bury us. We had to dig our own graves. Dentists wouldn't take us as pa-
tients. Nurses refused to serve us on the floors of the hospitals. Health care
workers wouldn't come into our homes. We had to sell everything we had
because health insurance companies wouldn't insure because they said we
were gay and we brought this on ourselves. Politicians wouldn't speak the
name. No one would speak and we were left alone. Most people collapsed
under such discrimination.
I remember the most humiliating moment of my life. Peter was the first
co-chair of AIDS Project Los Angeles. We were raising money. We were
invited to a liberal entertainment dinner party on the west side of Los Ange-
les. We were very excited because we thought we could come out with a lot
of money to fight AIDS and to help people. And we went and we dressed
up. I went to Neiman's and got a new suit. We walked in and it was very
elegant. People were passing trays and we felt very welcome. We sat down
to dinner and everyone else got a plate of china and they put paper plates in
front of us. I don't know what was more humiliating, the paper plates or the
fact that we did not walk out. But we knew we needed money and we knew
that compared to our young friends who were dying, sitting there and being
humiliated was a price we were willing to pay.
This community was not defeated. We did not hide. We did not bend
down any longer after that humiliation. We discovered a new meaning for
the word "truth" and a new meaning for the word "honor." We built our own
health care clinics. We found our own dentists. We found our own under-
takers and we listed those who would bury us. We found people and organi-
zations that would walk people's pets as they lay dying in their beds. We
found organizations to do their laundry. We had organizations that would do
their grocery shopping or bring them their meals-sometimes their one meal
that day-and with Project Angel Food or God's Love, we delivered. We
did all of this, plus took care of our friends and partners who were sick and
dying, plus earned a living, plus manned the barricades of liberty, fighting
for our freedom and fighting for our lives. That is honor, that is justice, and
that is nobility, and I found myself, finally, in that struggle against AIDS
discrimination. It is a hard way to find it, but the only way I could possibly
dishonor those that gave their lives so we could be in this room tonight, is to
forget that they gave their lives so we could have that honor and that dignity
to gather without fear of police raids and paper plates and that we were
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While gay men lay dying, lesbians stepped up to the plate and took over
the leadership of the organizations, took over the fundraising, and then came
and sat by our sides and held our hands as we laid in the beds. They were
magnificent. They were magnificent and they proved themselves to be great
leaders-State Senators Sheila Kuehl and Carole Migden, HRC's Elizabeth
Birch, the Task Force's Tory Osboume. I can go through a litany of people
who did not abandon us and stepped forward to assume leadership. What a
magnificent moment with all of us working together. And out of that came
power. I remember I went to Mike Dukakis, and we offered to raise him a
million dollars in 1988, and the campaign told us that they could not accept
the money. It was too controversial. So we lost. Bill Clinton didn't make
that mistake. I know many of you are perhaps disenchanted with the politi-
cal parties. I am certainly disenchanted with this President. I certainly can
tell you that.
I know you think it wasted time to go and vote, but I want to tell you a
story that is hard for me to tell. My partner died in 1989, May 13th. During
the 1988 elections, he had been in a bed in a coma and we didn't think he
was going to pull out before Election Day. I, of course, did not get him an
absentee ballot. I didn't think he would be alive on Election Day. And be-
fore Election Day, he asked to see his parents-a Texas family-who neither
knew he was gay nor had AIDS. So I had to call these parents and tell them
their son both was lying and dying from AIDS and was gay. And the re-
sponse I got from his parents was not "we're coming right away," but "I
hope he dies soon." And I had to go in and tell my partner that his mom and
dad were not coming to see him before he died. It was OK. He wasn't
alone. There were dozens of friends in that room when he passed. He was
very loved and very respected.
But on Election Day, he had come out of his coma and asked, "When
are we voting?" I said, "Peter, I didn't get you an absentee ballot; you can't
walk." He said, "I am voting against the people who have done this to me."
I said, "Peter, you can't," and he said, "I am voting against the people who
have done this to me." So three of us carried him to the car, put the seat
down, and loaded him in the back of the car. We got to the polling place
which was in a garage at the end of a driveway, and he pushed us aside and
walked on his own to the voting booth to vote against the people that had
done this to him and collapsed by the voting booth when he was done.
So don't ever tell me that you are too busy or too indignant to vote.
You really don't want my reaction after seeing what people will go through;
not only Peter but people all over the world who risk machine gun fire, long
lines, beatings, to vote and change this world for a better place. I don't care
how you vote-that's a lie, that's just a lie; I've stopped lying but I just
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caught myself-what's important is that you vote because people have paid a
terrible price so that you can.
You know we have come a long way. In 1992, it was considered a ma-
jor victory to have Bill Clinton at the Democratic Convention just to say the
word gay in his acceptance speech. And we all cheered and we considered it
a victory. Now, we are fighting for marriage equality. Now, I'm going say a
few words about marriage and then I'll wrap this up and give you freedom.
You know, I want to make clear a couple of things. A lot of gay people
said to me, "David, why do we pick marriage now to do this battle; now is
not the time." As if like ten of us got in a room and said, "OK, now here are
the issues: we are gonna go with this in '86, this one in '90, and this one in
'92. We have a grand plan here." I had nothing to do with it. What had
something to do with it was the Massachusetts Supreme Court who said we
should not be treated this way.2' It was Mayor Gavin Newsom giving a li-
cense to Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon-who had been together fifty years-
and suddenly he found six thousand people in the pouring rain waiting for
licenses.22 They decided now is the time, not "us." No one promised us that
this battle would be easy. Do any of you know of a struggle for freedom in
this world that has been easy? High school students in Birmingham faced
fire hoses, dogs, and jail. People marching to vote in Selma were beaten to
the ground by troopers on horses. Of course, this battle is tough. It's be-
cause there is so much at stake. Now I know, God Bless 'em-bless their
heart as we used to say at home-that the politicians are uncomfortable. I'd
like them to be comfortable but not at the expense of my freedom. I know
they are looking for every conceivable word, model, contraption, legal loop-
hole to try and give us the same rights without using the word marriage.
Separate but equal does not work.
We are finding in state after state that has adopted civil unions that we
are excluded from many rights, privileges, and protections granted to every
other American citizen. Now, you might say, "Let's stay quiet this year 'cuz
we want so-and-so to win; let's tip-toe through so that they don't notice us
this year." If you want that strategy, we can do it. But please stand up if you
are willing to give up your social security rights. Please stand up if you
would like not to be by the bedside of your partner when they die. Please
stand up if you would like to pay more taxes because you are gay. Please
stand up if you would like to see your lover from another country deported
because you can't get married. Please stand up for thirteen hundred rights,
21. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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privileges, and benefits granted to every other American citizen and denied
to us. I'm not willing to surrender one of them.
They talk about us "asking" for marriage. It's not a religious thing. No
faith-based, religious institution is obligated to marry us. It's a civil law.
They act like we're asking, like we're lobbying, like we're pleading to be
heard. It is not their's to give me. It is mine already, and I am just stepping
up to claim my constitutional rights. And you have to do .the same. Never
go hat in hand. We've discovered honor. We have discovered integrity. We
have proven ourselves worthy in the '80's of the great gifts we are capable of
giving this world. Because of our struggle, because of our magnificence, this
troubled world needs us and we have a moral obligation to offer our gift. So
throw it back. I can stand in front of you today and say, "I am David Mix-
ner; I am a gay man; and I am proud and I don't have to lie to anyone ever
again." Thank you very, very much.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION23
Q: [Inaudible] long the history of our country marriage became both a
religious institution and legal institution, and they have become intertwined.
You made the point that it's strictly a legal issue, so how do we convince
people that it's strictly a legal issue and de-emphasize the religious part of it?
A: Well, I think there are two parts to that question. There is the stra-
tegic, political one, which is, we keep talking and we keep making it clear
and we train people who are running for office, especially the young people.
It's the old folks like me that have a problem with marriage. If you're thirty-
five, forty years, or older, almost by a two-to-one margin, people are op-
posed to marriage. Forty or younger by a two-to-one margin, they're in fa-
vor of marriage. We live in a changing world. You know I grew up in my
time, in a town where there were signs for white and colored drinking foun-
tains. And there were white and black sections in the movie theaters, and at
the bus stations and so forth, and everyone assumed that that's just the way it
was, and it was going to be that way forever. Guess what, they were wrong,
and they were wrong because people refused to accept the deformation that
they had for us. And no matter how many times they say in my ear that it is
a religious institution in their mind-it is a civil law of the land. It has noth-
ing to do with religion. Now, politicians want everybody to be comfortable.
A lot of people in our gay community had this disease, what I call "the com-
23. Mr. Mixner took questions from the audience after presenting his lecture. The tran-
script was made from an audio/video recording of the entire session, and unless otherwise
noted by brackets "[ ]", represents a verbatim transcription of the entire session.
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fortable disease." "Let's not make anybody uncomfortable by pushing too
hard." Now I want people to like me, and I think I give a pretty good dinner
party, especially if Steve's doing the cooking. I know I have better china
then most of them, but if they're not comfortable they have to seek help. It's
not my problem. Because, you see, in the Constitution-nowhere in that
document, does the word "comfortable" appear as a criteria for freedom. In
fact, the document says we're supposed to protect an unpopular minority
from the tyranny of a majority. If you read the Madison Papers, or the Fed-
eralist Papers. So it actually protects us, and I hope people become more
comfortable. I hope the work I do in Africa, and Russia-I hope the work I
do in getting people out of jails, will make people look at me in a way, that
will make them want their children to grow up and do the same things in the
world. But if not, that's their problem. It is their problem. I've paid my
therapy bills, they can go get theirs'.
Q: You're very plainly a political animal all of your life-why have
you not sought political office at some stage, and, at sixty-one, it's one of the
few industries and few professions, where you're still not over the hill?
A: God bless you-can you come around wherever I speak, and make
that point. Well, when I was growing up, I wanted to be president. Those
were the days we had presidents we wanted to be like, like John Kennedy
and people like that I mean. It was interesting, in my day and age, you
know, if you wanted to be president you thought of Franklin Roosevelt, or
John Kennedy, and everyone in the class raised their hand. Now if you ask a
group of first graders if they want to be president, all they answer is "are you
kidding?" But I wanted to be president. I wanted to be a senator. I wanted
to be an ambassador-I worked very hard. I started doing what everyone is
supposed to do. But we weren't allowed to run for office. We could run in
some places where ballot access was easy as a third party, but if people
found out you were gay-with a few exceptions until the late 70's-I got the
message real clear-that we were not allowed to run for office. We weren't
allowed to work for campaigns openly. They wouldn't accept our checks.
You know, running for office was quickly driven out of my mind. I
never thought it was a great law until we got this president, and I thought,
gosh, I'm about his age, you know, I think I could have done better, I could
have had those troops home from Iraq by now. Yeah, I mean it's... I want
to take a minute and I'll come right back to you.
I'm going to take a minute though, because I don't feel right having said
that without acknowledging that I am a pacifist. I'm a Quaker, a pacifist,
Buddhist, Gandhi follower-a Gandhi king--do a little chanting, a little
drum circles here and there. But I found myself ironically fighting for the
rights of the LGBT community who serve in the military. And through that
process I have gotten to know many of the fine men and women of our
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community who serve our country and they're in Iraq, dying. Now I'm emi-
nently opposed to this war and I know that's no surprise to you. And they're
dying, and their partners don't get the letters, and their partners don't get the
flag, their partners have to watch out since their emails are screened. They
can't say I love you with all my life no matter what happens to me. Now,
don't ask don't tell-no matter that candidates tell you it was a good pro-
gressive step-it has destroyed the careers of eleven thousand LGBT mem-
bers of our community. Eleven thousand completely destroyed. Many
committed suicide, many were court marshaled, many lost their benefits. I
have talked to people who have served in Iraq who are now living their
dreams of flying planes and leading the military. So I just want to acknowl-
edge their heroism, their willingness to serve no matter what your political
beliefs are, and their courage because no one else remembers them and hon-
ors them, so I think that's the least we can do, and I want to acknowledge
that tonight.
Q: I'm curious, obviously the gay culture has really been advanced.
People like yourself have done so much to stand up for our rights, but on an
international level, on the face of statements made by the President of Iran-
I just read a recent statement by a. . . it was attributed to the chief of police
in Iran-all around the world, that there are statements that are saying the
rise of the gay movement in America are leading the doomed. What is the
responsibility, or how do you access, everything that you've done and what
the gay community has done to face that?
A: Well, I think that it is our moral obligation to offer what we've
learned in thirty, forty, fifty years of struggle-and by the way, no place that
I go in the world where there are activist organizations, whether it be Poland
or Russia, or even in Iran where we have an underground operation working
to help to get people out, or get them political asylum once they do get out-
do I not run into an openly gay man or lesbian working in those teams and
projects no matter where I go, who are from America. And that's what I was
referring to earlier, we have so many gifts. We know how to organize a
healthcare system; we created one for ourselves. We can go into these vil-
lages and these towns and offer these magnificent gifts and help these peo-
ple. Thirteen countries have the death penalty for being gay. Increasingly,
we are seeing a trend in Africa for life imprisonment.
Now, I was sent by the Dutch government to Kenya, with two of the
hottest French bodyguards you have ever seen in your life-I have a picture
this big of them on my wall at home-I'm sorry. Whoa, as I was saying, I'm
sorry. I was sent to Kenya to document. Kenya had passed life imprison-
ment for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual gender people. Six hundred
had been rounded up. So we went to get their names, and I went up into the
northern villages to collect data on who they were so the Dutch government
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could have a list, with documentation, to formally protest to the Kenyan gov-
ernment. What we found was that only half of the people rounded up were
from our community, about half, and they were rounded up in case anyone
came asking. What the oppressive forces in Kenya had figured out was this
was a way to aggress their opposition supporters because they knew that the
United States would never protest if they just said they had arrested gay peo-
ple. So they found out a way to round up the political opposition by saying
they were gay or lesbian, put them in jails, and surround them by enough
members of our community to prove their case in case anyone came asking;
and our government has yet to issue a protest.
You know, I've got to say something-we have a moral obligation to
do all we can, and we are. We just replaced a government in Poland that
encouraged people to beat the participants in the gay pride parade in Warsaw
and our community was intricately involved in replacing that government
through Michael Cashman of the European Union and getting money from
all over the world through to the opposition. We are working in other na-
tions, including Russia, to make life more tolerable. The Middle East is a
very difficult process and we have to work very discreetly and very quietly
and that's all I'll say. But, we're working on it. But I want you to under-
stand it's not just a moral obligation to help ourselves.
I want you to raise your hand if any of you have talked to anyone else
about Congo. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. In the last five years, in
the Congo, four million people have died. I have been there. It is a geno-
cide. It is four times more then died in Rwanda. It is twice the amount that
died in Poppa, in Cambodia. I have walked down roads where there have
been hundreds of bodies on each side of the road-of women and children. I
have entered villages where seventy-two percent of the women had been
raped. Children, thirteen, fourteen, have been forced into trafficking and are
made drug addicts, and are given AK-41s or 47s or whatever-you can tell I
am a pacifist. I don't know guns from hell. It is a crisis calling out for every
one of us. It's fifty-eight million people, we have three hundred million. We
lost three thousand in the World Trade Center, and we know the impact that
had on us as a society. Among the fifty-eight million people, they are losing
three thousand people a day-three thousand people a day. They are having
a World Trade Center every day among their women and children in the
Congo. Today, another truce broke down, and this week, another seven hun-
dred and fifty thousand new refugees. In one day almost the entire refugee
number for Darfur. Has anybody here called their congressman? The order
of official policy in this war-I dare you to find a policy paper. Have we
sent any troops? Have we sent any humanitarian aid as a nation? Have we
sent counselors for those women? Have we tried to put those children back
together who have drug addictions and guns? No. Zero.
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So our moral obligation, so we don't become narcissists and say how
magnificent we are-because we are-but because of that magnificence
there is a moral obligation to take the gift to a greater world, and not just
ourselves. And that will speak more highly to the world than anything else
we can do.
Wherever I go, whatever country I am in-I've been in Sierra Leone,
the Congo-wherever I go, I say I'm David Mixner, I am a gay man and I
am here to help, and so do others. So we have that obligation, and I promise
you by the time I help with the healing and I help put things back together
and I help people get out of jail, they will think differently of the LGBT
community. So the battle is us, this planet is crying for leadership, your
community needs you, the women and children of the Congo need you, and
nation after nation needs you. I hope that twenty years from now that the
future generation of married gays and lesbians come to you and they say tell
us what it was like during the great battle and tell us the stories. And that
you don't have to look down at the ground and have to tell them you were
too busy or too scared to fight.








Thank you-it is a tremendous honor to be here with you this evening.
I went to law school in the late 70s, was a member of what was then a
pretty well-established gay and lesbian law students association, and helped
organize the first national conference for law students on gay issues-it was
called "Law and the Fight for Gay Rights." I bring this up not to show my
age, which is increasingly evident, but rather as a time marker for my re-
marks tonight.
I'm not sure how far others thought we would be now, nearly thirty
years later, but I thought that full equality was just around the comer.
Straight America was singing along with the Village People's "YMCA" and
"In the Navy," our movement's leaders were invited to meet in the White
House, we had a huge national march on Washington, and gay issues were
everywhere in the media, or at least it seemed that way to me.
We were convinced that the courts and the Constitution would be there
for us. The political and religious rights-people like Anita Bryant's crusade
in Miami-Dade-were just beginning their assault on gay America, and they
seemed destined to be quickly relegated to the reactionary fringe. The right-
ness of our cause and the slogan so many of us espoused-that gay was in-
deed good-seemed unstoppable. I was clearly wrong.
While we have, indeed, made enormous progress-perhaps more pro-
gress more quickly than any other social justice movement in the history of
the world-we are not where we should be by any stretch of the imagination.
While we have won many important court cases and state and local legisla-
* Matt Foreman has been a leader in the gay rights movement for more than 25 years.
He is currently leading the Gay & Lesbian and Immigrant Rights programs for the Evelyn &
Walter Haas, Jr. Fund, a San Francisco, California based private family foundation that has
awarded more than $300 million in grants since its founding in 1953. From May 2003 to
March 2008 he was the executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. Be-
fore joining the Task Force, he served as executive director of the Empire State Pride Agenda
and the New York City Gay & Lesbian Anti-Violence Project. He is a founding member of
Heritage of Pride, the organizer of New York City's annual LGBT Pride events, where he
orginated many of its hallmarks, including the "lavender line" down Fifth Avenue, the mo-
ment of silence in honor of those lost to AIDS, and the annual Dance on the Pier and fire-
works display. He is a 1982 graduate of New York University School of Law where he was
the Student Bar Association president and lead organizer of the 1979 national conference,
"Law and the Fight for Gay Rights." He is a 1976 graduate of West Virginia Wesleyan Uni-
versity, where he was student body president and an anti-stripmining activist.
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tive victories, and while public opinion has changed dramatically over the
last thirty years, we also have lost ground in profoundly important and, I
think, long-lasting ways.
We are caught in a bizarre reality, an era of utter national schizophrenia
when it comes to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people,
where completely different standards are applied when an issue involves our
people or our families. Where public perception is that we are on top of the
world or nearly so, while the legal, socio-economic, and political realities are
quite the opposite. Let me share some examples.
The public myth is that we live in an age of political correctness, yet
schoolyards and blogs and public discourse are awash with the faggot epi-
thet. When Ann Coulter called John Edwards a "faggot" last year,' leaders of
"respectable" conservative organizations howled with approval and no one
seriously suggested that she be banned from her frequent TV appearances.
Similarly, for more than a decade, Don Imus made overt anti-LGBT jokes
with no repercussion of any kind.' Compare that to the justifiable firestorm
that erupted when he denigrated the Rutgers University women's basketball
team.3
Last winter, Ellen DeGeneres hosted the Oscars and received rave re-
views,4 while Melissa Etheridge acknowledged her wife on the show and
barely raised an eyebrow. Within days, here in Florida, a screaming mob of
hundreds called for the literal and figurative head of the city's much-
respected, long-tenured city manager because he disclosed he was transition-
ing to be a woman. The response? The city commission capitulated to their
howling.'
Over the summer, two "family values" Republican senators were caught
with their pants down. Senator David Vitter of Louisiana admitted to using
1. See Kerry Laureman, Freak Speech, SALON.COM, March 3, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/ent/video-dog/politics/2007/03/02/coulter/index.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2008); see also Michael Scherer, The Republican Candidates-and Ann Coulter-Try Out
Their Acts, SALON.COM, March 3, 2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/03/03
/cpac/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
2. See, e.g., Matthews Cited Savage's "Bareback Mounting" Characterization of Broke-
back Mountain; Imus Cited Producer's "Fudgepack Mountain" Remark, MEDIA MATTERS
FOR AMERICA, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://mediamatters.org/items/200601200002. On
the January 18, 2006 edition of Imus in the Morning, Don Imus refers to the award-winning
film Brokeback Mountain as "Fudgepack Mountain." Id.
3. See CBS Fires Don Imus over Racial Slur, CBS NEWS, Apr. 12, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/12/nationallmain2675273.shtml.
4. See Ellen DeGeneres Looks Comfortable as Oscar Host, FOX NEWS, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,254579,00.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
5. See Mitch Stacy, Transgender Fla. City Manager Loses Job, ABC NEWS,
http://www.abcnews.go.com/print?id=2978322 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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the services of the "D.C. Madam, ' 6 and other sources said Vitter's relation-
ship with prostitutes was well known to insiders when he ran for the U.S.
Senate in 2004.' Paying for sex is a felony in both D.C. and Louisiana.
Then, Senator Larry Craig of Idaho was entrapped in a foot-tapping
public restroom episode in the Minnesota-St. Paul airport, and pled guilty to
misdemeanor disorderly conduct. 8 The Vitter revelation faded from public
view in days, while the Craig episode went on for weeks. More tellingly,
Senate Republican leaders immediately called for and are now conducting an
ethics investigation into the Craig incident-but none for Vitter. 9 And even
more tellingly, when Vitter returned to the Senate after his confession, he
received thunderous applause from his Senate GOP colleagues while Craig
has been shunned.'°
One thing that these relatively disparate examples say to me is that the
issue of how people see sexual orientation morally is the biggest challenge
we face in moving forward. I will go so far as to say that we consciously and
unconsciously allowed our opponents to seize and hold the issue of moral
values around our lives and that we are paying for that now. To move for-
ward and go on the offensive we must create a new moral values frame.
This evening, I'd like to propose three ways to do that. First, I think we
need to be much more aggressive in talking about the immorality of homo-
phobia. Second, I believe we must stop avoiding talking about the morality
of homosexuality by using "moral bracketing" to advance our civil rights.
And finally, I'd like to lay out a way for us and others to articulate that acting
on our sexual orientation or gender identity is not only not bad or morally
neutral, it is a moral imperative.
THE IMMORALITY OF HOMOPHOBIA
Let me start with some of the ugly facts about the immoral results that
discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people
6. See Scandal-linked Senator Breaks a Week of Silence, CNN, July 17, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/20O7/POLITICS/07/16/vitter/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
7. See Shailagh Murray, Senator's Number on 'Madam' Phone List, WASH. POST, July
10, 2007, at A3.
8. See John McArdle, Craig Arrested, Pleads Guilty Following Incident in Airport
Restroom, ROLL CALL, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/l_1/break-
ingnews/19763-1.html.
9. See Craig Admonished over Men's Room Incident, MSNBC, Feb. 13, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23154082.
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inflicts. I bring this up because I don't believe any thinking or feeling person
can say these results are good from any moral values perspective.
Here we go:
- Still today, young LGBT people are at least three times more likely
than their heterosexual counterparts to attempt and commit suicide."
m Up to forty percent of homeless youth in this country are LGBT,
thrown out of their homes simply because of who they are.
12
w Survey after survey shows widespread anti-gay discrimination in em-
ployment, with between two-thirds and three-quarters of us hiding our sexual
orientation on the job or on the street for fear of discrimination or violence. 3
Yet, discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations and
credit is perfectly legal in thirty states and in thirty-seven states if you are
transgender. 4
w An analysis of FBI statistics-which notoriously undercount anti-gay
hate crimes-shows that gay and bisexual people (they don't track anti-
transgender crime, unfortunately) are more likely to be a victim of hate vio-
lence than any other minority in this country. 5
n And, as I'm sure you are aware, Florida is hardly immune to this epi-
demic. Earlier this year, Ryan Skipper of Polk County was stabbed more
than twenty times, his body was left on the side of a road, and the two assail-
ants bragged to their friends about savagely killing him. 6 Anti-gay hate
crimes are at their highest level ever in Florida, and according to the Florida
11. Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE 3-110, at 115 (1989), available at
http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/23
/15/84.pdf. See generally WARREN J. BLUMENFELD & LAURIE LINDOP, GAY, LESBIAN &
STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER YOUTH SUICIDE (1994),
http://pactsnetwork.org/grace/docs/Youth%20Suicide.pdf.
12. See NICHOLAS RAY, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL'Y INST., LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 1, 166 (2006),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/HomelessYouth.pdf (citing the National Network of
Runaway and Youth Services which estimates "that 20-40% of youth who become homeless
each year are lesbian, gay, or bisexual").
13. See generally M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., BIAS IN THE
WORKPLACE: CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/
Bias%20in%20the%20Workplace.pdf.
14. Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., (Jan. 8,
2008),http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/non-discrimination_01_08
_color .pdf.
15. William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical
Analysis, 78 TUE. L. REV. 1213, 1229 (2003).
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Attorney General's office, hate crimes targeting LGBT Floridians have in-
creased thirty-three percent in the most violent categories during the two
most recently reported years. But, there's been near silence by Florida's reli-
gious and political leaders.
a And, of course, the examples of injustices in the area of partner and
family recognition are too many to list-from grossly disparate taxation to
partners of twenty or thirty years being denied pension or line of duty death
benefits to the unending stories of someone not being able to say goodbye to
his or her partner of forty or fifty years in a hospital Intensive Care Unit be-
cause they're not "family."' 7
I do want to emphasize that each of these injustices-as with the rest of
society's ills-fall hardest on LGBT people of color and poor LGBT people.
And, contrary to popular wisdom, studies and U.S. Census data show that on
average LGBT people and our families are significantly poorer than others. 18
No, we're not all Will & Grace or L Word people, not by a long shot.
I could go on and on with other examples, but you get the picture.
Clearly, LGBT people are targets, victims--or whatever word you choose-
of discrimination. Again, what thinking or feeling person can believe that
these injustices are moral? Indeed, even our most ardent opponents have
backed away from such a position.
Yet, our own movement has often shied away from talking directly and
forcefully about all of these problems. We have not wanted to sound like
whiny victims, or that we are trying to compare and rank our problems over
those of other minorities. We have been afraid that the facts--data that show
high rates of substance abuse in our community, for example-will be used
17. See generally Dayna K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, U.S. General Accounting
Office to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (identifying the 1,138 federal statutory provisions
in which "marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privi-
leges").
18. See M.V. LEE BADGETr, THE POL'Y INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE
& THE INST. FOR GAY & LESBIAN STRATEGIC STUD., INCOME INFLATION: THE MYTH OF
AFFLUENCE AMONG GAY, LESBIAN, AND BISEXUAL AMERICANS i, 14 (1998), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/IncomeInflationMyth.pdf (examining
data from seven different surveys and concluding that none support the stereotype that GLB
people are an economic elite insulated from discrimination by their wealth and disconnected
from society at large by a privileged status). See generally JUDITH BRADFORD ET AL., THE
NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL'Y INST., THE 2000 CENSUS AND SAME-SEX
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by others to argue that we are, in the words of the current Pope, "intrinsically
disordered." "9
These have all been legitimate concerns because, in fact, our opponents
skillfully attack us using these points, including the charge that we are seek
to expropriate-indeed equate-our own struggles with the long, brutal and
still unfolding civil rights movement to end racism and the still much-alive
legacy of slavery in this country.
This ugly canard has been a deliberate and focused strategy of the anti-
gay industry in America for more than twenty-five years. But, that does not
mean we cannot speak the truth that anti-gay discrimination shares a com-
mon source and a common language with racism, anti-Semitism, and other
forms of religious and ethnic bigotry our nation knows all too well. Indeed,
the parallels in the rhetoric behind the current attack on LGBT Americans
and past attacks on others are too striking to be ignored.
In 1871, Pope Pius IX said that Jews, "'owing to their obstinacy and
their failure to believe, they have become dogs,"'2 adding that "' [w]e have
today in Rome unfortunately too many of these dogs, and we hear them bark-
ing in all the streets, and going around molesting people everywhere."' 2'
This is the Pope beatified by John Paul II in 2000.22
Today, a justice of the United States Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia,
says that ending the criminalization of gay adults having private, consensual
sex calls into question laws banning bestiality.23 In the 1880's and beyond,
interracial marriage was an effort to "destroy western civilization itself."24
19. See Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Persona Humana: Declaration
on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/ congre-
gations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc19751229_persona-humana en.html. The Dec-
laration maintained that according to scripture, "homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered."
Id. Eight years later, the Vatican's Congregation for Catholic Education, acknowledging the
role of physiological or psychological factors in homosexuality, drew the same conclusion.
Id.
20. DAVID I. KERTZER, THE POPES AGAINST THE JEWS 130 (2001).
21. Id.
22. See John W. O'Malley, The Beatification of Pope Pius IX, AMERICA, Aug. 26, 2000,
available at https://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article id=2118.
23. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia J., dissenting).
24. See Robert Patterson, Protect Arizona Now Selects White Supremacist
Leader to Chair National Advisory Board, CITIZENS INFORMER (Council of Conser-
vative Citizens, St. Louis, Mo.), Fall 1994, at 3. "Western civilization with all its might
and glory would never have achieved its greatness without the directing hand of God and the
creative genius of the white race. Any effort to destroy the race by a mixture of black blood is
an effort to destroy Western civilization itself." Id.; see also Steve Rendall, A Sex-Free
Scandal, EXTRA! (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (Fair), New York, N.Y.),
Mar./Apr. 1999, available at http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=145 1.
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Today, James Dobson says that due to our campaign to win the freedom to
marry "[b]arring a miracle, the family as it has been known for.., five mil-
lennia will crumble, presaging the fall of [w]estern civilization itself."'25
One hundred fifty years ago, the Bible was used to justify slavery and
the moral superiority of white people. Just 47 years ago, 41 states had anti-
miscegenation laws on the books and their rational was simple and absolute,
as exemplified by the Virginia Supreme Court in holding that "Almighty
God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed
them on separate continents .... The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix. 26
Today, seven of the more than one million verses in the Bible are delib-
erately misinterpreted to justify anti-gay animus, and the airwaves are full of
preachers misquoting Leviticus and Saint Paul, railing against the abomina-
tion of homosexuality.27
In spite of what I see as a near perfect alignment between the justifica-
tions offered for past, immoral treatment of other minorities and women and
today's anti-gay movement, many of our opponents say-and I think a ma-
jority of Americans believe-that prejudice and discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity are profoundly different. Indeed,
that it's understandable and in some way justified. Why? Because of moral
values.
That is, while most religions and most people are now to the point of
saying-but perhaps not really believing-that sexual orientation by itself is
morally neutral, acting on it-and let's be straightforward here, gay sex-is
immoral. Why? The Bible tells us so. And, pundits say there is an "ick"
factor-that the thought of gay sex revolts non-gay people, as if it were an
innate, visceral reaction-and that reaction is proof positive that there is
something wrong with homosexuality.
I actually sort of get this argument because ever since I can remember
and to this very day, the thought of heterosexual sex makes me queasy. But
I've actually never thought that meant straight people were intrinsically im-
moral.
25. See James C. Dobson, In Defending Marriage-Take the Offensive! (Focus on the
Family, Colo. Springs, CO), Apr. 2004, http://www.focusonthefamily.com/docstudy/newslet-
ters/AO00000334.cfrn.
26. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
27. See generally DANIEL A. HELMINAK, WHAT THE BIBLE REALLY SAYS ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY (1994); MEL WIHTE, SOULDFORCE INC., WHAT THE BIBLE SAYS-AND
DOESN'T SAY-ABoUT HOMOSEXUALITY, available at http://www.soulforce.org/pdf/whatthe-
biblesays.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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Here again, this "ick" rationale-prejudice based on another commu-
nity's behaviors-is not unique to gay people, but has past parallels, includ-
ing European immigrants to this country merging racial and sexual ideology
to differentiate themselves from Indians and Blacks; to strengthen the
mechanisms of social control over slaves; and to justify the appropriation of
Indian and Mexican lands through the destruction of native peoples and their
cultures. But, again, past parallels have little persuasive value in today's
discourse.
The sad thing? Not only have we and liberals not talked about the im-
morality of anti-gay discrimination, we have constructed an alternative to
morality-based politics, a practice called "moral bracketing."
MORAL BRACKETING
According to Georgetown Law Professor Chai Feldblum and Michael
Boucai-from whom I am borrowing heavily tonight, to engage in moral
bracketing is to ask voters, policy-makers, judges, and other political actors
to set aside their moral views on the political or legal question before them
and try to decide, as "neutrally" as possible, what is best for a society in
which people subscribe to many different moral systems. The essence of
moral bracketing is that it should not matter if we do not like someone-or if
we do not like something that someone is doing-as long as that person
and/or his behavior does not hurt anyone else.28
This moral bracketing started eclipsing "gay is good" early on.29 We
have been saying to straight people: you don't have to like us or approve of
what we do or even consider us fully human, so long as you share some of
your rights with us.
Polling information underscores how effective this moral bracketing has
been. Even today, a majority of Americans believe that sexual relations be-
tween two adults of the same sex is "always wrong" 30 or "morally
wrong" 3"-depending on how the question is asked-while only one-third
are willing to state unequivocally that gay sex is not wrong.32 Yet, since
28. See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & MICHAEL BouCAI, THE MORAL VALUES PROJECT:
DEPLOYING MORAL DISCOURSE FOR GAY EQUALITY 26-27 (2006).
29. Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING
CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 149 (John D'Emilio et al. eds.,
2000).
30. See KARLYN BOWMAN & ADAM FOSTER, AM. ENTER. INST., ATTITUDES ABOUT HOMO-
SEXUALITY & GAY MARRIAGE 2 (2006), available at http://www.aei.org/research/politicalcor-
ner/publications/publD. 14882,projected. 14/pubdetail .asp.
31. Id. at4.
32. Id. at 2.
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1996, public opinion polls have found that more than eighty percent of
Americans believe "homosexuals should have equal rights in terms of job
opportunities."33
So what's so wrong with moral bracketing? First, it completely cedes
the moral argument to the other side. We say right up front, "it doesn't mat-
ter what you believe about me, you just shouldn't discriminate against me."
But even more important, once we start moving away from basic nondis-
crimination protections and push for broader human rights such as adoption,
the freedom to marry, equal benefits and the like, public and legislative sup-
port declines precipitously. Why? Because, as Feldblum and Boucai state,
these matters "connote approval of homosexuality-in an explicit manner., 34
Legislators and many in the public are simply not ready for laws that pre-
sume a moral equivalence between homosexuality and heterosexuality.
It is precisely because we have avoided the moral issue, made moral
bracketing the cornerstone of our discourse, and refused to insist on our fun-
damental goodness and equality as human beings, that when we push into
these core areas, such deep-seated unease arises from even our closest
friends and family members. You feel that push back, that hesitancy, that
unwillingness to go there. Why? Because so many people still believe deep
down that heterosexuality is fundamentally and morally superior to homo-
sexuality and that gay people are fundamentally inferior to straight people.
This, I believe, also explains the depressing and shocking societal toler-
ance and acceptance of the many tentacles of anti-LGBT discrimination and
the appalling harm it inflicts on our people. It explains how in just over a
decade, forty-one states have passed laws or state constitutional amendments
to prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriage 35-that is, to deprive a tiny
minority of a right the majority sees as a fundamental human right. And yet,
almost never, were these attacks framed in morality. It was as if the public
and legislatures were voting on property tax measures, not the lives and fu-
tures of other human beings. This explains the string of state Supreme Court
decisions-New York, New Jersey, Washington State, and Maryland-
refusing to extend the freedom to marry to same sex couples. It is as if the
majority opinions are talking about alien species.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Feldblum, supra note 29, at 12; see FELDBLUM & BoucAl, supra note 28, at 12.
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TOWARD A NEW MORAL FRAMEWORK
The final thing I want to talk about is how to move away from moral
bracketing and start talking about a new framework that advances the moral-
ity of being gay from a secular point of view. We need to reach back into
beginnings of our movement and reassert the fundamental principle that be-
ing gay-and that means acting on one's gayness-is, indeed good, morally
good. And, second, because being gay is good, actions which other people
or society take to hurt gay people, and to keep us from being openly gay, are
wrong, morally wrong.
Getting back to "gay is good" does not require moving the needle as
much as some might think. First off, only right-wing extremists are willing
to publicly defend the objective harms that homophobia inflicts on LGBT
people that I cited earlier-hate violence, job discrimination, homelessness
among LGBT youth, and on and on. Second, many of our most ardent oppo-
nents do not assert that being gay is immoral, only that acting on our orienta-
tion is. In other words, and as I mentioned earlier, most people are neutral
about our existence, and the growing understanding of the impact of homo-
phobia on LGBT people, I believe, sets us up to move them into forward
gear.
How do we move people from neutrality to the fundamental concept
that gay is good? Feldblum and Boucai identify four principles that even our
most vocal opponents cannot dispute that a good society embodies. These
four moral understandings are: 1) it is good for people to feel safe; 2) it is
good for people to be happy; 3) it is good for people to give and receive care;
and 4) it is good for people to live a life of integrity.36 These understandings
are not tied to any particular religious belief.
If these understandings are valid-and I would challenge anyone to ex-
plain how they are not-then it is clear that anti-gay attitudes and discrimina-
tion are not only objectively wrong, but so is the position that it is fine for
LGBT people to be, so long as they do not act on their orientation or identity.
In other words, forcing LGBT people to live in the closet; and life in the clo-
set is wrong and damaging.
A. Safe ty
Let's start with safety. Whenever I speak at an anti-violence rally, I
start by asking people to raise their hands if they have been beaten, chased,
36. FELDBLUM & Boucml, supra note 28, at 25. See generally ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR
JUSTICE (1997); ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF
FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003).
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or otherwise physically harassed because of their sexual orientation or gen-
der identity. Nearly everyone raises their hand. I then ask if someone they
know and love who is LGBT has been beaten, chased, or otherwise physi-
cally harassed because of who they are. At that point, every hand is up.
Clearly, hate violence, and fear of it, is a near-universal experience of gay
people. The hate crimes statistics I discussed earlier underscore this fact.
But physical violence is on the far side of the safety continuum.37
Along the continuum are all the other things that contribute to a person's
sense of safety-the ability to get and hold a job, rent an apartment, or get
service in a restaurant or hotel. Even today, LGBT people face daily and
difficult choices about whether they should try to hide their orientation or
identity to escape overt or subtle discrimination, and many LGBT people
could not hide who they are even if they wanted to.
Most victims of anti-LGBT discrimination in employment, public ac-
commodations, credit, and education will not find a safety net in the law.
Here in Florida-and twenty-nine other states-it's still perfectly legal to
fire, evict, or deny services to someone because of their sexual orientation,
and in forty states on account of one's gender identity.38 This lack of legal
recourse undermines the ability of LGBT people to feel safe in almost every
aspect of life.
The impact of this discrimination cannot be denied, and here are just
two examples. Even though academia is known for attracting large numbers
of lesbian and gay people into its ranks, there is only one openly gay law
school dean in the nation, and only two openly gay or lesbian college presi-
dents.39 Similarly, even though so many LGBT people are actively involved
in politics, less than one-tenth of one percent (0.08%) of all elected officials
in this country are openly LGBT.4° Clearly, LGBT people do not see their
out colleagues breaking through lavender ceilings, which only leads to
LGBT people continuing to hide their orientation and identity in hopes of
keeping their jobs and moving ahead, which leads to the lavender ceiling
remaining intact, and on and on.
Some might say LGBT people encounter discrimination when they
"flaunt" their orientation or identity. For many of us, it is simply not possi-
37. FELDBLUM & BoucAu, supra note 28, at 26.
38. Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S., (Jan. 8,
2008), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issues-map/nondiscrimination01_08
_color.pdf.
39. See Paul Fain, And Now There Are 3, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 10, 2007, at
A18.
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ble to hide one's sexual orientation or gender identity, no matter how hard
one tries, and, as discussed below, for those who can, passing or hiding ines-
capably involves deceit and loss of personal integrity-hardly a morally de-
fensible outcome.
B. Happiness
Happiness is defined as "feeling or showing pleasure or contentment." 41
It's obviously difficult-if not impossible-to feel happy when you don't
feel safe at work, or on the street, or when you are bombarded by anti-LGBT
jokes from all sides, or when you're worried about or unable to protect your
family. Happiness isn't only the absence of fear or harm. Feldblum and
Boucai say: "[h]appiness may mean being in a relationship that you can
share and celebrate with others and have formally recognized." Or it can be
as simple as putting a picture of your lover on your desk at work, just like
your straight colleagues.42
Sadly, data indicate that because of all the challenges they face, LGBT
people experience rates of depression that are significantly higher than het-
erosexual people,43 and, of course, for many people-if not most at one time
or another-happiness comes from sex.
Yet, the way so many of us are raised-again because of moral val-
ues-is to believe that gay sex is wrong and harmful. It takes enormous
work to overcome that and many never do completely. In fact, the House of
Representatives voted a huge increase for the utterly discredited abstinence-
only programs, which say to gay young people "no sex until you're married,"
and, by the way, that means no sex your entire life because you can't get
married!'
41. OxFoRD AMEICAN DICTIONARY 297 (1980).
42. See FELDBLUM & BoucAI, supra note 28, at 26.
43. SPENCER COX, MEDIUS INST., LIVING ON THE EDGE: GAY MEN, DEPRESSION AND
RISK-TAKING 6 (2007), available at http://mediusinstitute.org/Living%200n%20
The%20Edge.pdf. The most reliable "estimates suggest that gay men are about three times
more likely than the general population to experience depression." Id. "In a study of depres-
sion and gay youth, researchers found depression strikes homosexual youth four to five times
more severely than their non-gay peers." Parents, Friends and Family of Lesbians and Gays
(PFLAG), Welcome, http://www.pflag.com/pages/0022.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
44. See H.R. 3043, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). On July 19, 2007, the United States House
of Representative passed, by a vote of 276 to 140, the Labor-HHS Appropriations Bill which
included an unprecedented $27.8 million increase for abstinence-only-until-marriage pro-
grams. Id. Ultimately, the spending bill that Congress passed contained flat funding for ab-
stinence-only programs at $113.5 million. A total of over $1.5 billion in government funding
has been spent on abstinence-only programs since 1982. This is despite repeated publicly
funded and private studies that have shown that these programs are ineffective, do not de-
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Some gay and lesbian people deal by forcing themselves into abstinence
or sex with people of the opposite gender, which explains high rates of preg-
nancy among young lesbians, or gay and lesbian people get married to
straight people that they truly love, but not sexually, which frequently causes
tremendous hurt and harm to that person's spouse and children.
But this issue-gay sex-is where the rubber hits the proverbial road
when it comes to moving people from being neutral to positive about our
lives. It's remarkable to me that straight people cannot imagine living their
lives without having sex-but that's what so many of them expect of us.
This view isn't restricted to those who think we "choose" to be LGBT, but
even religious leaders, who admit there might be some genetic basis to sex-
ual orientation or gender identity, still say we need to commit to a life of
abstinence.
There's no sidestepping this fundamental point and the question needs
to be posed directly: If you can't imagine living your life happily without
sex, how do you demand abstinence from gay people and still expect them to
be happy?
C. Give and Receive Care
The third moral principle that Feldblum and Boucai posit is that it is
good for people to give and receive care. Gay people certainly know what it
is like to care for our families of birth and of choice. When the AIDS crisis
hit, lesbians and gay men rallied to care for our own when the government
and so many blood relatives turned their backs. Gay and lesbian siblings
even assume disproportionate responsibility for caring for their aging par-
ents.45
On the other hand, we also know about not being able to take care of
those we love in times of sickness and trouble.46 The broad protections we
have won under state law through marriage equality-in Massachusetts-
and civil unions-in Vermont, Connecticut, California, New Hampshire and
New Jersey-are not recognized by the federal government and effectively
vanish the minute we cross state lines. Contrary to popular wisdom, we can-
not get the same protections, benefits or peace of mind through legal con-
crease pre-marital sex or unsafe sexual practices and often contain religious doctrine, and
propose inaccurate medical information and harmful stereotypes about LGBT individuals.
45. See, e.g., MARJORIE H. CANTOR, ET AL., NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL'Y
INST., CAREGIVING: AMONG OLDER LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER NEW
YORKERS (2004), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/re-
ports/CaregivingAmongOlderLGBT.pdf.
46. See Feldblum, supra note 29, at 26; FELDBLUM & BoucAi, supra note 28, at 26-27.
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tracts or wills and even these second-rate options are out of the financial
reach of most of us. Second parent adoptions, for example, run as high as
$25,000 and, of course, are illegal here in Florida. After we die, we want our
partners to get our social security and pension benefits and our estate pass
without taxation, but that doesn't happen. When our partners die, we want
their remains treated the way he or she wished, but that too is all too fre-
quently not the case.
Our opponents cannot have it both ways. They cannot preach family
values, monogamy, family responsibilities, and life-long commitment and
then fight tooth-and-nail any law or policy that promotes these things for gay
families.
D. Integrity
Finally, and most importantly, is the value of integrity. All too many
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people know what it is like to feel
forced into lying and hiding who we are and what we do. For many, even
the simple question posed by work colleagues on a Monday, "What did you
do last weekend" becomes a daunting exercise in evasion. In this reality, it's
virtually impossible to live a life based on internal and external integrity.
This isn't abstract or a rare occurrence for many of us. I've had the pri-
vilege of leading three gay organizations over the last eighteen years, but
even I have to weigh how to respond to the questions, "What do you do?" or
"Are you married?" depending on where the question is asked and who is
doing the asking. Even weighing how to respond makes me feel ashamed.
Professor Kenji Yoshino discusses this experience in terms of "cover-
ing," which refers to an increasingly prevalent norm in society and anti-
discrimination law, which tells gay people that it is acceptable to be gay as a
matter of fact, but that it is unacceptable for gay people to act out that iden-
tity. In other words, while it is acceptable to be gay, it is not acceptable to
show same-sex affection, to discuss gay sexuality in any significant way, or
to engage in behaviors that are perceived as "gay." As Yoshino argues, this
denial of integrity, this severing of the self, can exact significant physical
damage on gay people and their relationships, and is ultimately stifling and
harmful to society as a whole.47
This takes us back to the "flaunting" argument. How does simple hon-
esty with friends, family, and colleagues get turned into flaunting? I'm al-
ways struck by the low threshold that triggers this insult. Straightforward
47. See Feldblum, supra note 29, at 27-28; FELDBLUM & BOuCAI, supra note 28, at 27-
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statements that have nothing to do with sex-"I spent the weekend with my
boyfriend" or "We went to X club dancing"--are somehow interpreted as
"forcing one's 'lifestyle' down someone else's throat."
Here again, the issue is that if we believe it is good for people to live
lives of integrity, isn't it wrong to force LGBT people to live lives based on
lies and half-truths? Of course it is.
The inescapable conclusion of all of this is that our society and our gov-
ernment fail to support the ability of LGBT people to uphold these moral,
good-society principles. Indeed, our society and its institutions work over-
time--overtly and covertly-to deny them to LGBT people. This is wrong,
morally wrong.
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A PUBLIC LECTURE: WHY RELIGION MATTERS IN THE
CIVIL RIGHTS DEBATE FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS
V. GENE ROBINSON*
What an honor it is to be named a Leo Goodwin Distinguished Visiting
Professor and to be invited to address you this evening! I'd feel a little more
confident if the word "distinguished" were added by you following my lec-
ture and based on its merits, rather than being attached right up front-but
there it is. You have already been addressed by some wonderful-and dis-
tinguished-authorities and activists in this movement for full civil rights for
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people. I am honored to be in-
cluded among them and hope to be able to add some small contribution to
their reflections on this issue facing American culture.
Let me set out some questions I hope to answer in this time with you:
Why are we here in this particular moment, struggling with this particular
issue? Why does religion play such a central role in this debate, and is that
an appropriate role in public discourse? Who are the loudest, strongest voic-
es coming from the religious community, and why are they so strident, unre-
lenting and passionate? What does the Bible really say about homosexuality,
what does it NOT say, and why does it matter in a secular State? What IS
the rightful role of religion in public discourse in a secular State? How does
this debate about the civil rights of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans-
gendered) people relate to the other "isms" of our culture, and what is the
broader context for discussion of human rights for all our citizens? How do
we move forward in the never-ending search for the common good? As I
contemplate trying to accomplish all this in the allotted time, as well as leave
time for some questions, I'm glad that I'll be here for several days for some
follow up with you!
* The Right Reverend V. Gene Robinson was elected Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese
of New Hampshire on June 7, 2003, consecrated a Bishop on All Saints Sunday, November 2,
2003, and invested as the Ninth Bishop of New Hampshire on March 7, 2004. He holds a
B.A. from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee, a Masters in Divinity from the
General Theological Seminary in New York, and several honorary Doctor of Divinity degrees.
As the Episcopal Church's first openly gay Bishop, his election and consecration has been at
the center of the worldwide Anglican Communion's debate over the full inclusion of gay and
lesbian people in the life and ministry of the Church. This essay was the basis of his public
lecture on November 27, 2007 at Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center
for the Eleventh Annual Leo Goodwin, Sr. Lecture Series. It is followed by a transcript of the
recorded question and answer session that followed the lecture.
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Permit me to own up to the biases and limitations I bring to this task.
Let's just note for the record that I am male. I will never know what it is like
to live my life as a female, and if this were a lesbian delivering this lecture,
that would be wholly authoritative perspective different from mine. I am a
white man. The experience of being gay in a community of color is different
than mine, especially in the fact that these people have experienced a double
discrimination I can but only imagine. I grew up in a family that was poor,
uneducated, and deeply religious, in rural, largely segregated Kentucky,
where we were tobacco tenant farmers, living without running water and
central heat, but rather unaware of how poor we were. All of that colors who
I was, who I came to be, and how I understand my own story. And believe
me, not in my wildest dreams did I ever imagine a world in which we would
be talking openly about homosexuality, nor a debate in which often I would
reluctantly find myself at the center.
I am a Christian. The fact that I am tempted to add "but not that kind of
Christian" speaks to the powerful role the conservative Religious Right has
come to play in this country and in this debate-but more about that later.
While I believe Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah, the Christ, long hoped
for by the Jews, and for Christians fulfilled in this itinerant preacher and re-
former, I do not believe that Jesus is the sole revelation of God's self to the
world. Such a God, capable or willing to reveal God's self in only one way,
seems like a God too small to be worthy of worship. And so, despite the fact
that I believe Jesus to be God's perfect revelation of God's self, I respect and
revere all those who have come to know God through other faith journeys. I
can only speak out of my own context as a Christian, and I will trust you to
make the connections and translations into the understandings of your own
faith communities, as well as those of you who hold no particularly religious
beliefs at all. After all, the challenge before us as citizens of this country is
to define our rights and responsibilities to one another no matter what our
faith beliefs are.
Finally, let me own up to the fact that I am not a scholar, and while I
may talk for much too long a time, I will not be thinking of this as a lecture.
A lecture implies that I know something that you don't know, and if you just
sit there, quietly absorbing all that I have to say, at the end the knowledge in
my brain will have been transferred into yours, for good or ill. Rather, I
would merely like to think out loud in your presence, in the hopes that some-
thing I say might assist you in your own thinking about these issues.
Why are we here in this particular moment in the history of this country
and in the struggle for human rights? Thirty years ago, as the title of this
series suggests, we were in a different moment. Anita Bryant was the poster
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child and spokesperson for a movement to squelch any forward movement in
the fuller inclusion of gay and lesbian people in the life of the citizenry.'
And while we may now look back on her and the views she represented as
being outdated, course and even a bit quaint, let's not forget that thirty years
ago, those views had a huge following and were racking up huge victories
against those who would more widely accept the participation of gay and
lesbian people in the benefits of citizenship.2
Thirty years ago, even twenty years ago, most Americans would have
told you-honestly-that they did not know any gay or lesbian people. If
pushed, they might admit that there was weird Uncle Harry, a lifelong bache-
lor whom everyone knew to be a bit different, or those two spinster ladies
who have lived together down the street for as long as anyone remembers.
But did they know any out, proud and self-affirming gay and lesbian people?
No, probably not.
Fast forward to today, and is there ANYONE left who doesn't know
some family member, co-worker, or neighbor who is gay? The reason, of
course, is that the last two decades have seen the unprecedented movement
by gay and lesbian people to make themselves known-AS gay and les-
bian-to their families, co-workers and friends.3 This has, of course, pro-
ceeded at differing rates based on geography, demographics, and culture.
Certain regions of the country seem more accepting than others; metropolitan
areas, to which many gay and lesbian people have gravitated because of both
anonymity and generally more liberal attitudes, were the vanguard of such
public admissions of sexual orientation; and more secular, less religious,
settings have provided more open and accepting environments for coming
out.4 But the REAL shift in the culture has been the quiet, largely private
admissions by sons and daughters, cousins, and aunts and uncles, in families
from Birmingham to Boise, that "yes, I too am gay."
Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man to serve as Supervisor of the San
Francisco City Council-and who was assassinated in 1978 by an anti-gay
colleague on the Council--once said that "coming out is the most political
1. See Tina Fetner, Working Anita Bryant: The Impact of Christian Anti-Gay Activism
on Lesbian and Gay Movement Claims, 48 Soc. PROBS. 411, 411, 414-15 (2001).
2. See id. at 415.
3. See Evan Wolfson, Book Review: Ian Ayers & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Straight-
forward: How to Mobilize Heterosexual Support for Gay Rights, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 733, 733 (2005-06).
4. Gaiutra Bahadur & Andy Alford, A New Haven for Gay Couples: The Suburbs Cen-
sus Shows Lesbians Lead Exodus from Cities to Newly Accepting Areas, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Aug. 22, 2001, at Al.
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thing you can do."5 He was right, and I believe it was the countless dramas,
one at a time, of gay and lesbian people courageously sharing who they real-
ly were at their core with those they loved or worked with, which has liter-
ally changed the world and brought us to this moment.
The change that we see occurring is happening in the same way change
always happens. One has a world view that seems to work pretty well at
interpreting reality. Then something happens to us that doesn't fit into that
world view-indeed, something for which our old world view is insufficient
to explain. We are thrown into a bit of chaos and confusion, when it seems
like nothing is certain anymore. And then our old world view is reshaped in
such a way as to accommodate this new truth.
That's the way it happens for families of gay and lesbian people. A
parent believes the traditional view that homosexuals are immoral, sick, dis-
ordered, and misguided in their choices. Then a beloved child comes and
says, "Mom, Dad, I'm gay." Now the parent is plunged into the chaos of
knowing their beloved child, and knowing that he or she is NOT immoral,
sick or misguided, and yet they've always been told this about homosexuals.
Then, over time, they come to understand that their child is the same child he
or she has always been, only now happier and healthier. The child who nev-
er seemed able to maintain a relationship is now hopelessly in love. The old
world view about homosexuality undergoes an overhaul and is changed to
incorporate a new understanding of sexuality that allows them to continue
loving their child. They may not be out there beating the drum for marriage
equality-although many of them are-and they may not be bragging to all
their friends about their son's new boyfriend, but something deep and impor-
tant has changed, some significant piece of ground has shifted, and the world
is never again the same as it was. THAT is happening all over America as
we speak.
There is not a single nation, culture, or religion that is not dealing with
the issue of homosexuality.6 Even those religions which are absolutely clear
and unswerving in their condemnation of homosexuality are being chal-
lenged by their gay and lesbian members to take another look at that con-
demnation.7 Some estimate the percentage of Roman Catholic priests who
are gay to be between forty and sixty percent.8 The Southern Baptist Con-
5. Serena Nanda, Getting Away with Murder: Cultural Diversity and the Criminal
Justice System, 5 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 117, 117 (1994).
6. See George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religioius
Freedom, 95 Ky. L.J. 533 (2007).
7. See id. at 555.
8. US. Research Survey: Younger Priests Are Generally More Orthodox, AD2000,
Aug. 2003, available at http://www.ad2000.com.au/articles/2002/aug2003p7_1404.html.
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vention, which values congregational autonomy as almost sacred, has ex-
pelled some congregations for offering blessings to same sex couples or call-
ing a gay minister.9 Conservative Jews have finally admitted gay and les-
bian, bisexual and transgendered rabbinical students to their seminaries.'0
Evangelical Christians have been rocked by revelations that some of their
leaders have had secret affairs with people of the same sex.l"
Who would have thought any of us would live long enough to see legal
civil unions and even marriage for gay and lesbian couples? Who would
have thought that a country like South Africa would write gay and lesbian
civil rights explicitly into their constitution, 2 or that a Catholic country like
Spain would permit marriage to same sex couples? 3 Many Anglicans from
around the world continue to call on me to resign my position as bishop, na-
ively believing that if I went away, this issue would go away, and the Church
would return to its quiet, peaceful existence-a peaceful existence, which, by
the way, the Church has never enjoyed. In fact, this is an issue that is not
going to go away, even for those who most oppose it.'4 Simply put, this
toothpaste is not going back into the tube!
Why does religion play such an important role in this debate? Religion,
of course, has always played a role in the debates and public discourse of
nations-and certainly so here in the United States, which is probably the
most religiously fervent of all the Western nations. 5 But why the particu-
larly virulent and passionate stances on this issue? And why can't we simply
ignore the religious argument in this secular debate?
Religion makes its beliefs known on a variety of issues-from abortion
to stem cell research, from environmental stewardship to capital punishment.
But most religious faith communities have people on BOTH sides of these
issues within their ranks-at least in part because these positions can only be
extrapolated from sacred texts. 6 There is no seemingly overt "adherence to"
or "proscription against" to be found in scripture for these issues. One can
9. Keith Hartman, Congregation in Conflict: The Battle Over Homosexuality, 47-48
(Rutgers Univ. Press 1996).
10. Neela Banerjee, Conservative Jewish Seminary Will Accept Gay Students, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A14.
11. Board Forces Evangrlical Leader Out of Church, BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE, Nov. 5,
2006, at A11.
12. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(3).
13. Jennifer Green, Spain Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at
A14.
14. Mike Hudson, The Future of Gay, THE ADvoc., June 22, 2004, at 59.
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read Genesis 1:28, for instance--"Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth
and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds
of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth."-and argue
for good environmental stewardship OR total exploitation of the environment
using the same verse, but interpreting it differently, depending on the mean-
ings of the words "subdue" and "dominion!' ' 17 Abortion can be defended on
the basis of our God-given personal conscience or opposed on the basis of
the sanctity of life.
But unlike these other moral questions, the issue of homosexuality at
least seems to be explicitly condemned. At first reading, Leviticus seems to
condemn quite specifically male homosexuality: "You [men] shall not lie
with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination;" and "If a man lies with a
male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they
shall be put to death."' 8 The absence of same sex proscriptions for women in
these texts is a subject for later discussion. The fact that the Bible seems
specifically to name homosexuality as repugnant to God and worthy of capi-
tal punishment makes religion particularly relevant to our discussion of this
issue, in ways that are more compelling than with other hot button issues.
This Biblical proscription also has an effect on gay and lesbian people.
I was once present for a discussion among a group of gay and lesbian teen-
agers discussing their sexual orientation. Not one of them had grown up in a
religiously observant household; not one of them would have particularly
identified themselves as religious Jews or Christians. But every single one of
them thought they knew what God thought of them, and they all knew the
word "abomination." Now these kids could not have found the Book of Le-
viticus in the Bible if their lives had depended on it, yet each was confident
that God condemned them for their sexual orientation. The fact is, at least in
American and Western culture, God's condemnation of homosexuality is
assumed. It's in the air we breathe. And because of that, religious belief IS
relevant in our discussion of how to achieve civil rights for gay and lesbian
people.
Let's be honest. The vast majority of the discrimination experienced by
gay and lesbian people has come at the hands of religious people, and the
greatest single hindrance to the achievement of full civil rights for gay, les-
bian, bisexual, and transgendered people can be laid at the doorstep of the
three Abrahamic faiths: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. And it is going to
take religious voices and religious people to undo the harm, devastation and
discrimination wrought at the hands of religious people.
17. Genesis 1:28 (New Revised Standard Version [hereinafter NRSV]).
18. Leviticus 18:22 (NRSV); Leviticus 20:13 (NRSV)
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So, what does the Bible really say about homosexuality? This is a topic
which could and should be the subject of a lengthy lecture, all on its own,
and I am happy to address it more fully in the subsequent time we have to-
gether. But let me at least make several points about why I believe our tradi-
tional understanding of the Biblical-and hence God's-attitude toward ho-
mosexuals is flawed and in need of reinterpretation.
First, the philosophical and psychological construct of sexual orienta-
tion is a modem phenomenon. 9 It was only at the very end of the nineteenth
century that the notion was first posed that there might be a certain minority
of us who are naturally-oriented, affectionally and sexually, toward members
of the same gender.0 In Biblical times, and until the last 100+ years, it has
been assumed that everyone is heterosexual.2 ' And therefore, any who acted
in a homosexual manner were acting "against their nature. 22 In other words,
homosexuals were "heterosexuals behaving badly."23 Indeed, many recent
evangelical translations of the Bible use the word "homosexual" to translate
certain Greek and Hebrew words which are actually somewhat obscure and
puzzling as to their meaning, and most likely related to sexual exploitation
and abuse of underage boys, quite common in Roman and Greek culture, and
to temple prostitution in neighboring heathen cultures, rather than to homo-
sexuality per se.24 Yet, reading one of these translations using the word
"homosexual," one would assume that the ancient Hebrew and Christian
communities were talking about precisely the same thing we are talking
about today. Such is not the case. One cannot take a twentieth century word,
insert it back into an ancient text and proclaim that it means precisely some-
thing that was totally unknown to the authors of that text.
Second, our understanding of the word "abomination" is different from
its original use. According to the Holiness Code of Leviticus, many things
were an "abomination" to God, including the eating of pork.25 That was not
to say that eating pork was innately wrong, but that it was to be one of the
19. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).
20. Brent Pickett, Homosexuality, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Nov. 29,
2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/homosexuality/.
21. B.A. Robinson, The Bible and Homosexuality: An Introduction, ONTARIO
CONSULTANTS ON RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE (Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom-bibi.htn.
22. Andy Mapstone, The Bible and Homosexuality, COURAGE (Dec. 2003),
http://www.courage.org.uk/articles/Bible.shtmil.
23. QUEST, QUEST CONFERENCE 2001: A REPORT (2001),
http://www.questgaycatholic.orguk/conferences/conf2001 report.asp.
24. See The New Testament and Homosexuality, Robin Scroggs, Fortress Press, 1983.
25. The Holiness Codes are contained mostly in Leviticus 11-16 and 17-26. The prohi-
bition of pork as being unclean is found at Leviticus 11:7.
2008]
64
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ways Jews were constantly reminded that they were different, a separate cho-
sen people of God, and in so observing these dietary laws, would be re-
minded of this special relationship to God.26 Likewise, they were not to eat
shellfish, plant two kinds of seed in the same field, or wear two kinds of
cloth simultaneously. 27 Tatoos were forbidden;28 those who cursed their par-
ents were to be put to death. One does not hear leaders from the Religious
Right upholding these "abominations" nor urging their compliance - yet
these all occur within the same Holiness Code of Leviticus along with the
proscriptions of men lying with men.30 Even with the proscription against
male same sex behavior, most fundamentalists stop short of demanding death
as the penalty, as prescribed by Leviticus.3'
Third, the science of reproduction and sexual activity of the ancient He-
brews was different from what we know today.32 Male sperm was thought to
contain all of nascent life.33 The only contribution made by women in the
reproductive process was a place for the fetus to incubate. A man's sperm,
or "seed," contained everything necessary for human life, and therefore any
"spilling" of male seed was tantamount to murder." Ancient Hebrews were
a small minority, living in a hostile heathen environment, struggling to re-
produce and build its population for survival purposes.36 Therefore any kind
of waste of male sperm was antithetical to that survival and synonymous
with murder - whether that be same sex activity, masturbation, or even coi-
tus interruptus in heterosexual copulation (the so-called "sin of Onan") -
because it wasted male seed and squandered the possibility of new human
life." Today, we understand that both sexes contribute to the process of hu-
man reproduction and over-population, not under-population, is a problem.
We believe sexuality to have purposes far beyond reproduction.38 Yet, these
few verses of scripture are quoted as if nothing has changed in our under-
26. Elijah L. Milne, Protecting Islam's Garden From the Wilderness: Halal Fraud Stat-
utes and the First Amendment 2 J. FOOD L. POL'Y 61 (2006).
27. Leviticus 19:19 (NRSV)
28. Id.
29. Leviticus 20:9 (NRSV)
30. Leviticus 18:22 (NRSV); Leviticus 20:13 (NRSV)
31. Leviticus 20:13 (NRSV)
32. Faith & Social Justice: In the Spirit of Richard Overton and the 17th C.,
http://levellers.wordpress.com/category/hebrew-biblect/.
33. Seventh-Day Adventist Kinship, Homosexuality: Another Adventist Point of View,




37. Genesis 38:9 (NRSV).
38. See the "Celebration and Blessing of a Marriage," Book of Common Prayer
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standing since Biblical times. Note, of course, that all the other references to
the "spilling of seed" have been reinterpreted to be acceptable, but not the
proscription against same sex behavior.
The study of hermeneutics, the methodologies by which we interpret a
text, has yielded rich information about the culture in which these texts were
written and heard. Much of the Biblical scholarship in the past fifty years
has focused on the sociological cultures which formed the settings for these
scriptural texts, both the cultures of the ancient Hebrews and the early
Church, as well as the competing and often hostile cultures which sur-
rounded them. We have come to know the meaning of these sacred texts
because we have become so much more knowledgeable about the cultural
situations to which they were responses. Conservative Christians often act as
if none of this scholarship has occurred or makes any difference in a 2 1st
century understanding of those texts.
But let me be clear, I believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments to be the Word of God. But that is different than believing them
to be the "words" of God, virtually dictated by God through human media.
And let's not forget that the real "Word" of God is Jesus himselft. "In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God," begins the Gospel of John. The Jesus "event," - his life, death and
resurrection - is believed by Christians to be the perfect revelation of God,
NOT the Bible. The Bible is perhaps the best and most trustworthy witness
TO that event, but it neither replaces Jesus as the Word nor does it take pre-
cedence over Christ's continuing action in the world through the Holy Spirit.
To elevate the words of scripture to a place higher than the revealed Word of
God in Jesus is an act of idolatry.
Indeed, Jesus says a very interesting thing to his disciples, on the night
before he is betrayed. According to the Gospel of John, Jesus tells his disci-
ples: "I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.
When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth."39 It
sounds to me as if Jesus is saying: "You are not ready to hear everything I
have to teach you - things you cannot culturally comprehend right now. So I
will send the Holy Spirit to guide you and teach you, over time, those things
which you need to understand." And as a Christian, I believe that the Holy
Spirit has done just that.
Less than a century and a half ago, "good" Christian people were still
using scripture to justify slavery.4" In the 1950's and 60's "good" Christian
39. John 16:13 (NRSV)
40. The Bishop of Vermont, in 1864 - AFTER the Emancipation Proclamation - pub-
lished a scripture-based defense of slavery.
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people were enforcing Jim Crow laws and blocking entrances to their schools
to black children." I believe that the Holy Spirit led us into a deeper truth,
about the equality, worth and dignity of every human being, regardless of
race. And the culture changed. Not enough, of course, because racism is
alive and well among us in the culture and in the Church. But many of us
learned.
It is almost inconceivable to me that the Episcopal Church first allowed
women to be deputies to our national General Convention in 1970, and only
began ordaining women to the priesthood 30 years ago.42 And yet, the larg-
est Christian denomination in the world still does not open the ranks of the
ordained to the women who form its core. Scripture passages from St. Paul
about the inappropriateness of women holding leadership positions or mak-
ing their voices heard in the Church are still being used to subjugate women
all over the world. All in the name of God as revealed in scripture. But the
Holy Spirit unrelentingly keeps teaching and guiding us to the full inclusion
of all of God's children.
Indeed, those who believe that the 2,000-year tradition against homo-
sexuality argues against change forget that the Church has changed its under-
standing of some very important teachings that it has held for countless cen-
turies. For instance, the Church for nearly 2,000 years took seriously Jesus'
words that remarriage after divorce was adultery.43 Until the early days of
my own ministry as a priest, divorced people were not welcome to take
communion, and if one of them decided to become married to someone else,
that second marriage could not be solemnized in an Episcopal Church. And
then, two things happened. We perceived that we were denying communion
to people at one of those times they most desperately needed it. And we
noticed that these second marriages were turning out to be a blessing to the
couple and to the community. Indeed, GOD seemed to be showing up in
those marriages and relationships and families. And so, in spite of the ex-
plicit injunction against it from the mouth of Jesus himself, we began to offer
the Church's blessing upon these marriages. I believe it was the work of the
Holy Spirit, guiding us into the truth, just as Jesus promised the Spirit would.
All of this may seem hopelessly off-topic for issues related to gay and
lesbian people, but I would assert that such is not the case. We are talking
about how we change our minds - as a culture, a nation and a Church - about
something we've been very sure about for thousands of years. To some, it
41. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
42. Episcopalians Elect First Woman to Head US. Church, PBS NEwsHOuR, June 19,
2006, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/jan-june06/episcopal_06-19.html.
43. Matthew 5:32 (NRSV)
[Vol. 32
67
: Nova Law Review 32, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
WHY RELIGION MA TTERS
seems like the height of madness, and a willy-nilly discarding of ancient
truths. To some, it seems as if nothing is certain anymore, or that the Church
doesn't know what it believes. But to others of us, it seems like it's nothing
to be fearful of, but rather merely the kind of change that the Holy Spirit is
promised to inspire. Only through such a gentle and comforting understand-
ing of the continuing work of God will people find the courage to change
their minds about this issue.
Why is the resistance to this change so vehement, so vitriolic, so deep?
In the nation, why would two people who want to pledge their love and fidel-
ity to one another for their mutual benefit and the benefit of society be such
an issue? Why wouldn't conservatives applaud the pledge of faithful mo-
nogamy in gay marriage for the people they have always accused of being
promiscuous and irresponsible? Why wouldn't conservative Christians sup-
port the end to a gay person feeling like they have to enter a usually-
disastrous heterosexual marriage in order to be happy and accepted? Why
can the Republicans use gay marriage as such an effective wedge issue in
political campaigns?
Or, in the Church, why would my election as bishop of a reasonably
conservative, rural and small town diocese in New England become such a
huge thing? How could such an event spawn thousands of hateful letters and
emails? Why would I, a Christian elected by the clergy and people of a dio-
cese to be their bishop, receive numerous death threats from other religious
people, and have to wear a bulletproof vest for my own consecration as bi-
shop? Why would people debate my fitness for such a calling, based not on
my skills, experience and faithfulness, but solely on my sexual orientation -
not just in metropolitan churches, but in a small theological school deep in
the bush of Kenya and on the remotest of Pacific islands? Why would some
leaders in the Anglican Communion consider it dangerous even to meet with
me, talk with me or be seen with me?
Allow me to speculate about why I believe the upheaval has been so
widespread and the resistance so great to the full acceptance of gay and les-
bian people into the life of the nation, and in doing so, perhaps set this debate
in a larger context. There's not enough time to explore each of these dynam-
ics in depth, but let me file some notions by title, and we can discuss them
later.
First, these are issues about sexuality - and we have never been very
comfortable talking about such things. I'm not sure we were ever comfort-
able talking about sexual matters, but the Puritans in our own culture didn't
help. We all were influenced by the Victorian Age with its often duplicitous
sensibilities. While sexual escapades were rampantly going on behind the
scenes and below the surface, all the talk was about chastity, fidelity and
monogamy. It's no wonder we find these things hard to talk about. The re-
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alities of our sexual lives are perhaps too frightening to bring to the light of
day.
And yet, many of the moral issues that face us today involve sexuality.
Abortion, fertility therapies, alternative methods of reproduction, the role of
men and women, and the appalling crisis of the American family all involve
sexuality. We need to be talking about these things, and yet we have little
experience in doing so. Parents still falter over what to tell their children
about sex and when,to tell them. By the time most parents get around to it,
their children are already knowledgeable about (and sometimes are partici-
pating in) practices the parents won't even get close to in their "birds and
bees" speech. I'm not at all sure that our near-obsession with homosexuality
isn't a group denial mechanism for heterosexuals not to talk about their own
sexual issues. If we can talk about them, then we don't have to talk about us.
If we can focus on their problems, then we don't have to talk about our own.
In addition, most people resist seeing the treatment of homosexuals as
"their" problem. Gay and lesbian people have known for a long time that the
problem here isn't gay and lesbian people's sexuality, but their ill treatment
by a hostile society.
You may notice that I have not once used the word "homophobia." I
think it exists in some people, but I find it to be a word that acts as a conver-
sation stopper. Some will claim that they are not fearful of homosexuals and
are therefore "not guilty" of homophobia. But aside from the hatred of ho-
mosexuals, which does exist, the further sin against which we need to speak
and act, of which the secular society is guilty, is "heterosexism."
You know what an "ism" is: a set of prejudices and values and judg-
ments backed up with the power to enforce those prejudices in society. Ra-
cism is not just fear and loathing of non-white people; it is the systemic net-
work of laws, customs and beliefs that perpetuate prejudicial treatment of
people of color. I benefit every day from being white in this culture. I don't
have to hate anyone, don't have to call anyone a hateful name; never have to
do any harm to a person of color to benefit from a racist society. I merely
have to sit back and reap the rewards from a system set up to benefit me. I
can be tolerant, open minded and multi-culturally sensitive. But as long as I
am not working to dismantle that system, I am racist.
Similarly, sexism is not merely the denigration and devaluation of
women; it is the myriad ways in which the system is set up to benefit men
over women. It takes no hateful behavior on my part to reap the rewards
given to men over women. But to choose not to work for the full equality of
women in this culture is to be sexist.
So, the sin we are fighting in this country right now in the secular
sphere is the sin of heterosexism. More and more people are feeling kindly
toward gay and lesbian people-probably not the majority yet, but a growing
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number. But that will never be enough. It will never be enough not to hate
gay people (although that's a good beginning!). What is needed is the dis-
mantling of the system which rewards heterosexuals at the expense of homo-
sexuals. That is why equal marriage rights are so important. That's why
"don't ask, don't tell" is such a failure and such a painful thing for gay and
lesbian people, even those who have no desire to serve in the military. They
are ever present reminders that our identities, our lives, our relationships are
second class - because the very system of laws that govern us discriminates
against us and denigrates our very lives. Over one thousand rights are auto-
matically granted to a couple who marries. Britney Spears received those
one thousand rights on the night she decided on a lark to get married in Las
Vegas, yet the gay couple who has been faithfully together for 30 years has
none of those rights.
This systemic heterosexism affects gay and lesbian people in countless
ways, large and small. Because my partner's parents were not accepting of
our relationship, we had to draw up documents which would prevent his par-
ents from making all his medical decisions if he became sick and incompe-
tent, or from taking his body away from me if he were to die. He and I just
returned from overseas, and while every other family on the plane had to fill
out just one immigration and customs form, we had to fill out two, as if we
were strangers, or merely friends, as if the twenty years we've been together
doesn't qualify as family. It's a little thing, but it's mightily symbolic of the
way the system is set up to devalue us as people and as families. The prob-
lem here is not just homophobia, it is heterosexism.
Lastly, let me try to put this into an even larger context. I believe with
my whole heart that what we are up against in this struggle is the beginning
of the end of patriarchy. At their root, heterosexism and homophobia are
expressions of misogyny, the hatred of women. The "sin" of a "man lying
with a man" (remember Leviticus?) is in the next few words: "as with a
woman." The sin is that a man, favored by his status as a man, would allow
himself to be treated "like a woman." The classic defense in a gay bashing
case is "he made a pass at me." Can you imagine how empty the streets
would be if we locked up every man who had ever made a pass at a woman?
That's "normal." But for a man to allow himself to be treated like a piece of
meat by another man is to defy the gods, and to defy the privilege that comes
with being male. In recent times, before people knew many gay couples,
people (mostly men) would often inquire as to which one was the "woman"
in the relationship. In other words, which was allowing himself to be deni-
grated "like a woman?" In ancient times, it was not uncommon for one ar-
my, when it had prevailed over another army, to rape the vanquished sol-
diers. In the ancient mind, nothing was so degrading, nothing was so sym-
bolically victorious over another, than to treat another man like a woman.
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And with respect to those passages in Leviticus, there is even some evidence
that the punishment meted out in ancient Biblical days for defying the pro-
scription to same sex behavior (which is only a proscription between men, by
the way, not women) was administered only to the receptive partner in anal
intercourse, not the insertive partner, because only he was acting like a wom-
an. At least the insertive partner was still acting "like a man." It seems that
the reason female same sex behavior is only mentioned once, in the New
Testament, is that women are already at the low end of the status totem pole.
It is the usurping of male privilege and status that seems to be the "abomina-
tion."
If you doubt the currency of this misogynistic attitude, go to the video
store and rent any movie about football. At some point, in every single one
of these movies, when the team is about to lose the big game, and the coach
needs to pump them up, the coach will belittle, anger and presumably em-
power the team by calling them a bunch of girls. Why does that work? Be-
cause nothing could be worse!
All of this is to say that what I think we see going on in our society and
in the Church is nothing short of the beginning of the end of patriarchy. For
a very long time now, most of the decisions affecting the world have been
made by white, heterosexual, educated, Western men. Ever so gradually,
people of color have been invited to that table; then women, and now gay
and lesbian people. And things will never be the same when the oppressed
have a voice. But it's no wonder the resistance is so fierce, given that we are
changing a patriarchal system that has been in place almost forever.
How do we now move forward? And what is the rightful role of relig-
ion in this public discourse? Unlike some issues that have faced us in the
past, the movement forward in the civil realm is tied intimately to moving
forward in the religious realm. There is perhaps no other prejudice, en-
sconced in the laws of the land, so based on sacred scripture, so entwined
with our theological understanding of the nature of humankind and the sexu-
ality which proves to be both its blessing and its curse. No other attitude in
the body politic is so tied to an attitude stemming from a particular Judaeo-
Christian teaching. Change in no other social attitude in the secular culture
is so tied to change in religious belief.
I believe that it will take religious people and religious voices to undo
the harm that has been done by religious institutions. While we are seeing a
decline in the number of people who experience and express their spirituality
in and through a formal religious institution, it is still a powerful force within
the culture, generally working against progress in the inclusion and full civil
rights for gay and lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people. It is time that
progressive Christians rescue the Bible from the Religious Right which has
held it hostage and claimed it as its own private territory for far too long. It
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is time that Christians and Jews actually read the holy scripture they claim is
the basis for their beliefs, instead of simply believing what they are TOLD it
says by others. It's time we use reputable scholarship, sound reason, and
thoughtful exploration to understand what the words of scripture meant to the
person who authored them and what it meant to the people for whom they
were written, before deciding whether or not those words are binding on
those outside that cultural context. It's time that progressive religious people
stop being ashamed of their faith and fearful that they will be identified with
the Religious Right, and start preaching the Good News of the liberating
Christ which includes ALL of God's children.
But if the Religious Right has gotten it wrong in inserting their view-
point into the public debate, what is a good, positive and appropriate way to
voice one's religious convictions in public discourse. It is, I believe a simple
shift in focus from the public to the private in these expressions. I am per-
sonally guided by my faith. My belief in God, my understanding of God's
vision for humankind and God's will for us as children of God shapes my
opinions about the way our secular culture, institutions and government
should be run. I am even free to express my own personal and religious rea-
sons for coming to the opinions I express. But the minute I start making the
argument that YOU must come to those same opinions because MY religious
truth is not only MY truth, but also YOUR truth, indeed THE truth, then I
violate that divide between private and public. James Dobson or Pat Robert-
son are perfectly free to tell me about their religious beliefs which compel
them to oppose acceptance of gay people; but they cannot make the claim
that their beliefs are right and true for all of humankind, and therefore must
be MY beliefs and guide MY thinking as well. That is to move from democ-
racy to theocracy - a movement not at all opposed by many on the Religious
Right.
Similarly, if I am going to make arguments for the full inclusion of gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people in this society, I must do so on
their own merits, not on any claim that my understanding of God is right and
true and therefore must be compelling to everyone. I must make those ar-
guments based on decency, compassion, democratic principles, the Constitu-
tion and a notion of the common good - not on any reading of any sacred
text to which I might subscribe.
I think we need to separate, as best we can, the civil realm from the re-
ligious. This is especially important in the struggle for equal civil marriage
rights for all our citizens. Clergy have long acted as agents of the State in the
solemnization of marriages." Because a priest, or rabbi, or minister acts on
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.07 (2007).
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behalf of the State in signing the marriage license and attesting to the proper
enactment of the marriage, we have lost the distinction between what the
State does, and what the religious institution does. In fact, the State effects
the marriage.45 Then the Church goes on to pronounce its blessing upon that
union. 6 In France, everyone is married at the mayor's office; then those who
are religious reconvene at the church for the religious blessing of that mar-
riage.47 Those who are not religious or do not desire such a blessing are, of
course, are still fully married according to the laws of the State.4 In such an
arrangement, it is clear where the State's action ends and the Church's action
begins.
I have argued that we need to make a clear distinction between civil r-i-
g-h-t-s and religious r-i-t-e-s. It may take many years for religious institu-
tions to add their blessing to same sex marriages, and no church or syna-
gogue should be forced to do so, but that should not slow down progress
toward the full CIVIL right to marriage as executed by the State for the bene-
fit and stability of the society. Because New Hampshire will have legal civil
unions beginning in January, my partner of twenty years and I will enter into
such a legal union next June. On the steps of the State capitol, our legal,
civil union will be solemnized by our female Jewish lawyer. That's the civil
part, accountable to the State. Then we will walk across the street to St.
Paul's Church for prayers of thanksgiving and blessing for that union, which
is the purview of the Church. Such a separation of the roles of Church and
State might be helpful in lots of ways. Perhaps it is a separation that ought to
made for all couples, heterosexual and homosexual alike.
I am actually very hopeful about the future. Christians are hopeful by
nature - not because we have any special confidence in the desire of human
beings to do the right thing, but because of our confidence in God to keep
prodding, inspiring and calling us to do the right thing. My faith tells me that
God is always working for the coming of the kind of Kingdom in which all
are respected, all are valued, all are included. My faith tells me how all this
is going to end: it's going to end with the full inclusion of gay and lesbian
people in the society and in the life and leadership of the Church. I believe
that the Holy Spirit is working within the Church and within the culture to
bring that full inclusion about, and in the end, God will not be foiled. In the
45. See, e.g., id. § 741.08.
46. See, e.g., id. § 741.07.
47. See The American Cathedral in Paris: Weddings http://www.americancathedral.org/
en/ourcath/weddings.html (last visited May 28, 2008).
48. See Americans in France: Classic French Wedding, http://www.americansinfrance
.net/Culture/ClassicFrenchWedding.cfin (last visited May 28, 2008).
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meantime, we need to work with all our might, intellect, and dollars to bring
that new world into existence.
What an exciting time to be alive! What an amazing thing to have lived
to see! How unimaginable all this was for that geeky gay kid growing up in
rural Kentucky in the 50's. I may not see full acceptance and inclusion in
my lifetime, but that's okay. It is enough to be a part of the journey.
One of my favorite places on earth is the National Civil Rights Museum
in Memphis, Tennessee. It is built into the old Lorraine Hotel, where Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated. At the entrance to the museum is
a huge, black marble monolith. As you get closer to it, you see, in bas relief,
a spiraling procession of African-Americans rising ever upward, progressing
toward their destined freedom - and every single one of them is standing on
someone else's shoulders. That's the way it is with the struggle for human
rights. It's a long hard journey, but we are not alone. We are always pre-
pared for our roles by those who have gone ahead of us; and we are always
making it possible for others to stand on our shoulders. But in the end, it's
being in that ascending parade that counts; it's playing whatever role we can,
courageously doing what we can do to move the march forward, that makes
the pain bearable and life worth living. And, as a person of faith, I also know
we are not alone because God is beside us, comforting, encouraging and sus-
taining us along the way toward a world which values ALL of God's chil-
dren.
I invite you to join in this glorious march upward and forward. You
will meet some astounding people, gay AND straight, who know that the
love of God knows no bounds, and that ALL of us are loved beyond our
wildest imagining by the God of all that is. As the chorus of the song about
Harriet Tubman's underground slave railroad says, "Come on up, I've got a
lifeline. Come on up to this train of mine." This train is bound for full
equality and acceptance of ALL of God's children. Welcome aboard!
Thank you.
TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH BISHOP ROBINSON49
Bishop (B): Thank you for being here.
Questioner 1 (Q1): Yep, and I don't know, I'm stunned. The number
of arguments, frankly you're very articulate, I was begging to be able to re-
spond. I hope that the institution will allow some formal or even informal
49. The Bishop took questions from the audience after presenting his lecture. The tran-
script was made from an audio/video recording of the entire session, and unless otherwise
noted by brackets "[ ]", represents a verbatim transcription of the entire session.
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way to respond to this because there are a lot of responses to your assertions
that are not being heard and for those who may not be initiated I am a minis-
ter so I, I know some of the inside stuff that you were alluding to if you go to
Leviticus all of the things that you were referring to so I was a little disturbed
that maybe people who are not initiated might not understand or hear some
other side. I thought of a question and I'd like to, if you don't mind, make a
comment, refer to a quote that you made and then ask you a question.
B: Okay
Qi: You said that the bible teaches and that the church has historically
confessed that God is absolutely perfect and does not change and we call this
the doctrine of immutability, everybody should know that and because of
that the, the foundation of morality was built upon that the fact that because
God does not change His moral law does not change so the church believes
that human nature hasn't changed either we are still ostensibly the same kind
of people so the answers to the bible they have for us whether it was revealed
Moses for a thousand years ago or through Jesus two-thousand years ago
their still applicable because God hasn't changed and human nature hasn't
changed. Now this is what you said in an article in the UK Guardian dated
November 4th, it said we worship a living God, not one locked up in scrip-
tures of 2000 yrs ago, it referring to homosexuality is not something of
which I should repent and I have no intention of doing so I've been led to
understand that I love my God just as I am so here's my comment or ques-
tion. This seems to imply that you've, you have departed and you did refer
to that in your comments from the Bible and from historic Christian theology
and ethics and believe that God is free, He is no longer locked up by His
scripture he is free to change His moral law and if change means anything it
means either progress or regression right? Change by definition means
change so He's either getting more moral or He's getting more immoral so
why did over 2,000 yrs ago in Christ or 4,000 yrs ago in Moses did God not
get it right when He censured the act of homosexuality?
B: Hey, thanks for your question.
QI: And maybe, a couple of follow ups if you don't mind.
B: Well, actually, we are going to give other people a chance to do that
but let me try to respond. I would agree with most everything that you said if
in fact I thought that humanity's comprehension of God's goodness, God's
love, God's intention, God's will, were perfect. I understand Holy Scripture
to be this kind of magnificent story of a love affair of God with human kind.
It's not God that has changed-but I do believe that our apprehension, our
comprehension, of God's will for us is constantly changing. Hopefully, as
you say, we are progressing instead of regressing - that is to say, that we are
able to apprehend and comprehend God's Will for us better all the time. So I
would say that the law as perceived by Moses and by a countless panoply of
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saints and prophets and martyrs were doing the best they could do to com-
prehend all that God is, and that's exactly what I'm trying to do.
Q 1: How can we ignore that....
Background: One question, one question is all we can do.
B: So, you know, come see me, come see me another time, while I'm
here, and we'll talk about that. My point is that God isn't changing but our
ability to apprehend God and God's will for us is always flawed because
we're not God. Just because God is perfect doesn't mean that we perfectly
understand God and so my sense is that the church is doing the best it can. It
did that 2,000 yrs ago, it did that 1,000 yrs ago before the Reformation, it did
it after the Reformation and we're still working at it. Let me just add one last
thing: I want to be in the church with you. I don't know if you want me to
be in your church, but I want you in my church. That is to say, I am not sure
that we have to agree about all of these things in order to find our unity in
our faith. We are both Christians and believe in Jesus as the Christ and trust
that a loving God will take care of whatever those differences are. Yes sir,
wait for the microphone.
Q2: Yes, I am Father John McNeil and it's a great privilege to be on
this side
B: Actually, this is one of the great hero's of my life, John McNeil.
Q2: There is a statement by the disciples of Emmaus, "were not our
hearts burning within us" when we heard the words of exchange? My heart
was burning tonight. I want to thank you. I have had a gay ministry for 40
years and to have you come along and do such a beautiful job, it fills my
heart with gratitude just to die. Thank you.
B: Thank you. Just a personal note here, when I was struggling with
whether or not I could claim who I was, I was still married, and my wife and
I were talking about all this, as we had talked about it during most of our
marriage. I went off to Kirkridge Conference Center, to a retreat led by Fa-
ther John McNeil. You inspired me then; you continue to inspire me. Thank
you for all that you've done, really.
Q3: Thanks for being here. I'm a Christian as well, I was baptized
when I was 16, tutored by a Christian missionary and his wife, and I took the
Bible very seriously, I obviously still do and me and my wife took it so seri-
ously that when we dated we abstained from sexual relations until our wed-
ding night and we did that because we have great respect for this book, the
Holy Scriptures, because that's what it told us to do, and it told us that sex is
between a man and a woman within marriage and anything outside of that is
un-Christian that is what Christianity teaches in this book and I don't believe
anyone rationalizing and saying other things.
Is there a question?
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Q3: And the reason this book is so important, you talked about the Je-
sus event being more important than the actual Holy Bible, okay, and Im'a
tell you why you're wrong.
Is there a question? Sir, is there a question?
Q3: You lay the premise, then you ask the question.
B: Sir, go ahead, go ahead.
Q3: There are a lot of things you said that I think are incorrect but I'll
limit it to this and then maybe we can talk later.
B: Great.
Q3: But I'm glad you're here. Really. Thank you for coming.
B: You're welcome.
Q3: When Jesus fasted for forty days and forty nights, remember that?
And as Satan took him up the mountain and three times Satan tried to get
Jesus to sin.
B: mm hmm.
Q3: Each time, Jesus refuted Satan and you know how he did it? He
said to Satan, in reply Jesus said, excuse me, it is written lets not live on pro-
tocol and again He said it is written, Jehovah your God, your holy God, let's
not put to the test. Then Jesus said to him go away Satan for it is written as
the Lord our God alone we must worship. So Jesus refuted Satan by referring
to the written word which is this book okay so that's what...
B: Well that book [the Bible] didn't exist actually. But that's all right.
Q3: Well, Jesus is quoting Deuteronomy, yes the Old Testament.
B: Yes.
Q3: Now quickly...
B: No, no, you have to --- now it's time for a question.
Q3: Okay, here's my question. True Christian teachings are found in
the written word okay and it says clearly in other scriptures which you won't
let me finish that marriage is between a man and a woman and Jesus defined
marriage as between a man and a woman in Matthew 19:45 when he quoted
and Genesis 1:28 that you alluded to earlier so my question to you is, why do
you know better or more than Jesus and the apostles did?
B: That is a little bit of a loaded question. Not stated quite fairly, but
let me try to respond. First of all, I don't know better than anybody in this
room and I would never claim that. I was invited here to tell you what I
think and that's what I've tried to do. Second of all, I don't, I don't think
any of us knows completely the Will of God, I mean, I would be very nerv-
ous around anyone who claimed to know what God thinks-so that's why
I'm nervous around you. Let me, let me...
Q3: ... this book, that's how you know Jesus, so respect this book.
B: Listen, I owe my... listen to me, listen to me.
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Q3: He does, he believes about Jesus because he knows from this book,
that's why he should respect this book.
B: Would you listen to me? I owe my life to that book because when I
was growing up in my quite fundamentalist church, I heard God's voice
through that book despite what my church was doing with that book. My
church was using that book to beat me up and demean me, and God's voice
came through that book, saying to me exactly what God said to Jesus at his
baptism, saying to me, "You are my beloved, in you I am well pleased." So
don't make assumptions about what I do and don't think about that book. I
owe my life to that book! I would probably be physically dead because I
would have committed suicide were it not for God's voice coming through
that book, so nobody takes that book any more seriously than I do. However,
however, I do not believe that that is the only way that God reveals God's
self. I believe in a living God who is constantly interacting with you, and me,
and anyone else who is open to it and that is also a source of revelation. And
while I believe that book to be the best witness to the perfect revelation of
God in Christ Jesus, I do not believe it to be the only witness to the reality of
God.
Audience: Amen.
Professor Niedwiecki: At this time, I'd like to [inaudible] ... because at
this point we've run well over our time. At this time, I'd like to continue the
dialogue and everyone is welcome to the reception which is down the hall-
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2007, Stephen Dunne learned that he would not be allowed to
practice law in Massachusetts because he had failed the state's bar examina-
tion.' On June 25, 2007, Mr. Dunne filed a lawsuit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts naming the Massachusetts Board
of Bar Examiners and others as defendants.2
According to Mr. Dunne, he failed the exam because he refused to an-
swer a question that would have compelled him "to write an affirmative re-
sponse explicitly and implicitly accepting, supporting, and promoting homo-
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. I am
grateful to Professor Elena Marty-Nelson for her thoughtful and helpful comments, and to
Corrine Lincoln and Christine Barzola for research assistance. Finally, I thank Angela Wal-
lace for her support.
1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 3-4, Dunne v. Mass
Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. 07-11166-DPW (D. Mass. June 25, 2007) [hereinafter Complaint].
2. Id. at 1.
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sexual marriage [and] homosexual parenting., 3 Mr. Dunne has stated that
answering the question "would have violated his Irish Catholic beliefs."4
The question that Mr. Dunne refused to answer involved Mary and
Jane, a married couple, and their children, Philip and Charles.' Applicants
were asked to sort out the rights of Mary and Jane, as individuals, regarding
parenting, property, and otherwise, upon the termination of their marriage.6
Mr. Dunne believed that his failure to answer the Mary and Jane question,
motivated by his Catholic faith, prevented him from becoming a lawyer.'
Subsequently, Mr. Dunne filed a motion to dismiss his lawsuit8 which
was granted by the court.9
On January 3, 2008, Bay Windows, a New England newspaper serving
the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender communities, published a letter
from Mr. Dunne.1" In the letter, Mr. Dunne apologized to the gay commu-
nity for being "an instrument of bigotry and prejudice."'"
3. Id.
4. Donna Goodison, Bar-exam Flunker Quits Suit over Gay-Wed Question, BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 8, 2007, at 8.
5. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint at 2, Dunne v. Mass. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. 07-11166-DPW (D. Mass. July 30,
2007).
6. Mass. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, Massachusetts Bar Examination 4 (Mar. 1, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.mass.gov/bbe/essayquestionsfeb2007.pdf.
7. Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
8. Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Complaint, Dunne v. Mass. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No.
07-11166-DPW (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2007).
9. Order of Dismissal, Dunne v. Mass. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, No. 07-11166-DPW (D.
Mass. Oct. 9, 2007).
10. Laura Kiritsy, 'I'm Embarassed at What I Did,' BAY WINDOWS, Jan. 3, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.baywindows.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=glbt&sc3=&id=54304&pf=l.
11. Id. The letter from Mr. Dunne, titled "Apology to Gay Community" reads:
I am writing this letter to apologize to the gay community for been [sic] an instrument of big-
otry and prejudice. By filing a misguided federal lawsuit against the State of Massachusetts in
respect to the legitimacy of same-sex marriage, I have regrettably perpetuated intolerance and
animosity towards my fellow Americans. My religiously based discrimination of gay people
was callous and diametrically opposed to America's core principles of freedom and equality.
In hindsight, my opposition to same-sex marriage based on purely religious grounds was cate-
gorically and indisputably wrong. I am deeply sorry for the hurt that I have caused the gay
community as a whole and I am particularly regretful of my actions towards those gay and les-
bian friends that I befriended and studied alongside during my three years of law school. You
are all wonderful people and loving parents and I am profoundly sorry for having insulted you
and your families. Please accept this letter as a sincere apology for my lashing out as a result
of failing the bar exam. The only correct answer is to stop demonizing gay people on the
grounds of religion and embrace and love all members of the American family, regardless of
sexual orientation.
At the end of the day, we are all fellow citizens, we are all are equals, sharing the same hopes,
troubles, and dreams. I hope you have room in your heart to accept my apology.
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Not discounting Mr. Dunne's religious objections to the Mary and Jane
question, perhaps he was also unable to answer the question because his first
opportunity to think about and discuss the intersection of sexual orientation
and the law was when he was taking the Massachusetts Bar Examination. If
so, that is a shame. Legal issues involving sexual orientation are present
throughout the traditional law school curriculum and should be covered in
the appropriate courses. This essay addresses the way I incorporate such
issues into my first year property law course, and encourage other professors
to do the same.
During discussion of several of the topics included on the syllabus for
my property law course, I ask the students to think about the ways in which
certain seemingly neutral laws may have a disparate impact on individuals
who are gay, lesbian or bisexual.' 2 I do this in an attempt to provoke discus-
sions about the intersection of property law and sexual orientation. Some
years, the attempt has been incredibly successful. Students have visited my
office and e-mailed me to tell me how much they appreciated the classes.
Other years, my attempts have been less successful. Students have been re-
luctant to participate in the discussions, and I have been unable to persuade
them to do so beyond a perfunctory level.
The classes, however, are always rewarding for me. Sometimes the
classes are rewarding because the students' reluctance to engage forces me to
think of different ways to encourage class participation. Other times, the
students' questions and comments propel me to think about the issues in
ways I have not contemplated. Being forced to "think on my feet" or do
additional research to address the concerns of students helps to keep the ma-
terial fresh.
As this essay will show, there are several intersections between property
law and sexual orientation. Accordingly, part II of the essay demonstrates
how issues of sexual orientation can be incorporated into a property law
course. Part III of the essay raises concerns a professor must consider when
determining how to incorporate these issues into her course. Part IV of the
essay explains the importance of including such issues in the law school
classroom. Finally, the essay concludes.
Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays.
Id.
12. During the course, I also ask students to think about the ways in which property laws
intersect with issues of race, class, and gender. This paper, in keeping with the theme of the
Goodwin lecture series, focuses on sexual orientation issues. I have not asked my students to
think about the ways that property laws intersect with the issues of gender identity and gender
expression. However, as a result of writing this piece, I have realized that it is a topic that I
need to include. See infra note 30 for how I intend to do so.
2008]
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II. INTERSECTION OF PROPERTY LAW AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Recently, the Task Force on Real Property Law School Curricula, cre-
ated by the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law ("Task
Force"), evaluated the basic property law course offered by most U.S. law
schools. 13 The Task Force found that four topics are covered in nearly all of
the schools that devote at least four credit hours to property law: adverse
possession, concurrent ownership interests, servitudes, and possessory es-
tates and future interests. 4 A substantial majority of the schools, greater than
ninety percent, also allocate time to landlord-tenant law in the basic property
law course." Land use regulation, which typically includes topics such as
nuisance, servitudes, zoning, and eminent domain, is covered by more than
seventy-five percent of U.S. law schools. 6 Topics less likely to be addressed
in a property law course include natural resources and intellectual property.' 7
When choosing which topics to address, property law professors, like
all professors, have to make difficult choices regarding coverage. These
decisions are generally made in light of institutional and course objectives.
For example, at some schools, a primary concern is student bar passage
rates.18 Professors at these institutions may choose to resolve course cover-
age issues in favor of topics that are more likely to be tested on a bar exam.'9
Preparation for legal practice may be the primary objective for other
professors.2" These professors may choose to include topics that students are
likely to face as practitioners.2 In fact, the Task Force was created in part to
investigate and address concerns that new lawyers are not "sufficiently fa-
miliar with the essential concepts of real estate practice that had previously
13. Roger Bernhardt & Joanne Martin, Teaching the Basic Property Course in U.S. Law
Schools, PROBATE & PROP., Sept./Oct. 2007 at 36.
14. Id. at 37.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar Exam: A
Look at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 69, 69 (2007).
19. See id. at 111. Professor Trujillo writes:
[L]aw schools should encourage students to take and master bar courses for a grade. It should
be stressed that mastery of these courses is vital to passing the bar exam. In fact, students who
do poorly in these courses should be advised to lighten their course load in order to master the
basics of the bar courses.
Id.
20. See Suellyn Scamecchia, Serving the Most Important Constituency: Our Graduates'
Clients, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 167, 167 (2005).
21. See id. at 169. In this article, Dean Scamecchia tells law schools that "[o]ur pro-
grams are a vital step in the licensing process for practicing law. All of our graduates need to
be competent to practice law, whether they decide to or not." Id.
[Vol. 32
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been learned in law schools. 22 Other schools may be more focused on pre-
paring students to think critically about legal issues in preparation for ad-
vanced courses.23 Regardless, however, of a particular professor's focus or
perspective, the results of the Task Force's study show that property law
professors have numerous opportunities to integrate issues of sexual orienta-
tion into the property law course. The next few sections of this essay high-
light three areas where a professor can do so.
A. The Law of Leaseholds
The law of leaseholds is the law that regulates the relationship between
landlords and tenants. 4 The landlord's rights when selecting tenants for res-
idential real estate is one of the key topics in this area of the law.25 Histori-
cally, landlords were free to discriminate when selecting tenants. 26 However,
the enactment of federal, state, and local fair housing acts made illegal cer-
tain discriminatory acts on the part of landlords.27
In the section of the course devoted to the law of leaseholds, I present
the students with a simple hypothetical fact pattern. In the fact pattern, the
students are told that a client of the law firm where they are clerking has just
purchased an unoccupied, twelve-unit apartment building. The client does
not have any tenants yet, but wants to know whether a lease must be entered
into with every financially qualified person who wants to rent a unit. The
students are then given a list of individuals that the client does not want as
tenants. The list always includes a lesbian or gay man.
The Federal Fair Housing Act is clear-sexual orientation is not a pro-
tected classification.2' However, I am regularly surprised by the number of
22. Bernhardt & Martin, supra note 13, at 36.
23. See Press Release, Harvard Law School, HLS Faculty Unanimously Approves First-
Year Curriculum Reform (Oct. 6, 2006), available at__http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/2006/10/06_curriculum.php. For example, Harvard Law School has redesigned its first
year curriculum to, among other things, provide "a foundation to enable any student who
wishes to pursue an advanced Program of Study." Id. The new first year curriculum devotes
fewer hours to traditional first year courses such as property law and adds courses that focus
on international and comparative law, legislation and regulation, and complex problem solv-
ing. Id.
24. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 437 (2d ed. 2005).
25. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 376 (6th ed. 2006).
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000). Subsection (a) provides:
it shall be unlawful... [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to re-
fuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
2008]
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students who think that the landlord cannot discriminate against lesbians and
gay men. The right to rent an apartment, according to some of my students,
is very different from the right to marry, which they may not support for les-
bians and gay men. This distinction makes it difficult for them to understand
why landlords are allowed to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
Discussion of the fact pattern easily segues into discussion of the policy
behind the Federal Fair Housing Act, and discussion of the differences and
similarities between discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
discrimination based on the classifications protected by the Federal Fair
Housing Act.29 Also, because several states and many municipalities have
instituted protections against housing discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, this area provides an opportunity to review the differences be-
tween federal, state, and local laws and ordinances.3"
B. Concurrent Ownership Interests
"[P]roperty is [often] owned by more than one person at a time.",3' In
fact, many types of co-ownership, including tenancy in common, joint ten-
ancy, and tenancy by the entirety, are recognized by modern law.32 The
rights and responsibilities of the co-owners depend upon the type of co-
ownership that binds the co-owners together.
33
In this part of the course I often read a hypothetical fact pattern to the
students. The hypothetical involves two individuals who together purchase
Greenacre, a piece of real property. Unfortunately, one of the two individu-
Id. § 3604(a). Section 3604(0(1) makes it illegal:
[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that buyer or renter; (B) a person residing in
or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any
person associated with that buyer or renter.
Id. § 3604(0(1).
29. See id.
30. SINGER, supra note 24, at 611. At least eleven states and 100 municipalities prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. This is also the perfect part of the course
for a discussion about discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression. Many
states and municipalities prohibit discrimination on such grounds. See Transgender Law &
Pol'y Inst., U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Gender
Identity or Expression, http://transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm#jurisdictions (last visited
Mar. 18, 2008). In fact, on February 12, 2008, Broward County, Florida, the county where
my law school is located, made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of gender identity and
expression in housing. Scott Wyman, Transgenders Gain Protection: Broward Expands
Human Rights Ordinance to Include Gender Identity, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 13, 2008, at lB.
31. SINGER, supra note 24, at 352
32. JAMES CHARLES SMITH ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 419 (2004).
33. See SINGER, supra note 24, at 352-53.
[Vol. 32
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als dies during the hypothetical and the students are asked to sort out the
resulting ownership interests in Greenacre. This exercise requires the stu-
dents to determine the type of ownership interest the two individuals ac-
quired in the property. In the hypothetical, the two individuals are identified
by name. I do not, however, provide the students with the relationship of the
individuals or their gender. In my notes, the individuals are named Gene and
Claude. The students, at least initially, hear "Jeanne" and Claude. They then
presume that "Jeanne" and Claude are married. This provides us with a
wonderful opportunity to discuss the "heterosexual presumption" that so
many students bring to law school.34 Students who presume that "Jeanne"
and Claude are heterosexual and married erroneously apply the rules of ten-
ancy by the entirety to the ownership of Greenacre, which is a type of owner-
ship interest available only to married couples. This discussion also provides
us with an opportunity to talk about client interviewing and avoiding the
pitfall of the "heterosexual presumption" in instances where the sexual orien-
tation of the parties may affect their legal consequences.35
Furthermore, the current edition of the casebook I use36 includes Good-
ridge v. Department of Public Health,37 the Massachusetts same sex marriage
case. The discussion of Gene and Claude, and of the different types of con-
current ownership interests, easily leads to a discussion of the property rights
that are provided to married couples and the access that same sex couples
have or do not have to marriage.
C. Land Use Controls
Both private and public land use restrictions can be imposed upon the
ownership of real property. Private restrictions, such as those imposed by a
developer of a residential community, typically take the form of covenants
that run with the land.38 Public restrictions, on the other hand, are found in
34. See Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76,
109 (2000). According to Professor Carbado, "The normativity of heterosexuality requires
that homosexuality be 'specified, pointed out.' Heterosexuality is always already presumed."
Id. (quoting Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDU. 47,
48 (1983)).
35. For example, an attorney in Florida who is advising a client about adoption needs to
know whether the client is a lesbian or gay man because Florida law expressly prohibits ho-
mosexuals from adopting. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007). Section 63.042(3) of the Florida
Statutes provides that "[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person
is a homosexual." Id.
36. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 25.
37. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
38. See generally SINGER, supra note 24, at 230.
2008]
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the zoning laws adopted by local government bodies. 39 Both covenants and
zoning ordinances can be used to restrict the use of real property to single
family residential use. My casebook includes cases in both areas that require
students to consider whether a collection of individuals who live together are
a family."
Hill v. Community ofDamien of Molokat is the case that is included in
the section of the casebook devoted to covenants that run with the land.42 In
Hill, the court had to determine whether a group home for people living with
AIDS and other terminal illnesses was a permitted use in Four Hills Village,
a planned subdivision in Albuquerque, New Mexico.43 A covenant imposed
upon the homes in Four Hills Village provided in relevant part that "[n]o lot
shall ever be used for any purpose other than single family residence pur-
poses."44 The word "family" was not defined in the covenant.45 The court
rejected the claim that family members had to be related by blood or mar-
riage' and found that the residents of the group home were a family, in part
because their activities were "communal in nature" and they provided moral
support and guidance for one another.47
During the zoning law portion of the course, we discuss Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas.4 In Boraas, six unrelated individuals lived in a house in a
village with a zoning ordinance that limited use to one-family dwellings.49
The zoning ordinance defined a "family" as
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, liv-
ing and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive
of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding
two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed
to constitute a family.50
39. See id. at 637.
40. See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 25.
41. 911 P.2d 861 (N.M. 1996).
42. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 25, at 773.
43. Hill, 911 P.2d at 864.
44. Id. at 865,
45. Id. at 867.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 869.
48. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 32
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The Court was asked to determine whether the ordinance's definition of
family was constitutional.5 The Court found that it was, and that the Village
of Belle Terre could determine that no more than two unrelated individuals
constituted a family.5"
The two cases discussed above, plus the notes in my casebook that fol-
low Village of Belle Terre,53 open the door for discussion of hypothetical fact
patterns involving blended families. A blended family that consists of a
man, his biological children, a woman, her biological children, and the bio-
logical child of both the man and woman who are married to each other, is
readily recognized as a family. However, when the collection of individuals
is a woman, her biological children, her lesbian partner, and her partner's
biological children, they may not be recognized as a family, at least accord-
ing to traditional definitions of family. Discussing the hypothetical blended
families after the class has discussed the nuts and bolts of covenants that run
with the land and zoning ordinances provides an opportunity to talk about the
intersection of sexual orientation and property law. The fact patterns raise
issues about how zoning ordinances and covenants may disadvantage fami-
lies where the adults are same sex partners. The fact patterns also encourage
discussion about whether the law should be able to overrule the decision of a
group of individuals to consider themselves a family. Additionally, the fact
patterns raise issues about contract interpretation-what did the parties in-
tend for the covenant to mean?-and legislative intent-what did the legisla-
tive body that enacted the zoning ordinance intend?
III. PREPARATION FOR INCLUDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION ISSUES IN THE
PROPERTY LAW COURSE
Once a professor has decided to include issues relating to sexual orien-
tation in her property law course, she must determine how to do so. The next
few sections of this essay discuss some of the issues she must consider as she
prepares her course.
A. Considerations
One consideration regards the text selected by the professor to teach the
course.54 Presumably, the text allows the professor to teach the substantive
51. See id. at 3.
52. Id. at 3, 8-9.
53. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 25, at 908-11.
54. See generally Eric L. Muller, A New Law Teacher's Guide to Choosing a Casebook,
45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 557 (1995).
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areas she considers most important. Additionally, the professor must con-
sider whether it contains materials that will assist in the discussion of issues
of sexual orientation. If it does, are the issues contained in the major cases,
or in the notes that follow the cases? If the preferred text does not contain
material that allows the professor to discuss property law issues that relate to
sexual orientation, should she choose a different text or prepare a supplement
or handouts that contain such material?
After the professor has resolved the issues regarding the materials she
will use, she must also decide whether she will share personal stories or an-
ecdotal accounts of incidents involving the intersection of property law and
sexual orientation. Personal stories and narratives are often very powerful
ways of making the law come alive for law students. 5
The professor must also think carefully about how to involve students in
the discussions. 6 These discussions may engage students in ways that other
property law topics may not, which can lead to some very robust discussions
of the material. Many students, however, do not know how to talk about the
issues, especially in a legal context-something the professor must consider
when determining how to conduct the class. The topic may also make some
students uncomfortable and less willing to participate during class. Students
may also raise religious, political, and personal concerns during the discus-
sions, and the professor must decide how she will determine what is relevant
to the class discussion and how to keep the students focused.57
55. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating
the Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 941, 953-54 (2006). Professor Barnes writes,
"[i]t is also squarely within the tradition of feminist and critical legal scholars to use narrative
to expose discrimination and illuminate how the law often fails to account for the voices of
outsiders." Id.
56. See Curtis Nyquist et. al, Using Students as Discussion Leaders on Sexual Orienta-
tion and Gender Identity Issues in First-Year Courses, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535, 535 (1999).
The authors discuss how Professor Nyquist used upper-level law students to integrate issues of
sexual orientation into his first year contracts class. Id. at 536. Initially, Professor Nyquist
intended only to bring comments from the members of his school's lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender student group into the classroom. Id. However, he ultimately decided to bring
two members of the group to his class to discuss sexual orientation issues in one of the cases
he covered. Id. The authors noted that the participation of the upper-level students in the
class "empower[ed] the [upper-level] students [who taught] the class [and] encourage[d] dia-
log [about LBGT issues] between students and faculty." Id. at 544.
57. See Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual
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The professor must also be prepared to deal with any discomfort she
may feel when teaching the course. 8 Teaching issues of sexual orientation is
not the same as teaching, say, the rule against perpetuities. While the profes-
sor may feel strongly about "dead hand control," the rule is unlikely to raise
the personal, religious, and political issues that sexual orientation issues may
raise. When preparing the course, the professor should be clear about her
positions and what, if any, bearing they will have on the class discussions. 9
Perhaps most importantly, the professor must think about how to ensure
that the class is ready to discuss issues that are related to sexual orientation.6 °
Because we have gay, lesbian and bisexual students in our classes, discus-
sions about sexual orientation may affect them personally. Therefore, as
professors, we have to make sure that students, regardless of their personal
opinions, will treat the discussions with respect. Worse than not including
these issues in a property law course is to include them in a way that leaves
students feeling vulnerable or under attack. Additionally, the professor must
remember that she is teaching property law, a required course often taught to
first year law students, and not an upper-class elective course that students
have chosen to take.6' Thus, the students' familiarity with, and exposure to,
the issues is unknown to the professor. This calls for careful thought about
how to present the material and engage students in the conversation.
The professor who decides to include these issues in her course must re-
alize that she takes a risk that the course may be criticized by colleagues,
58. Id. Professor Dark notes that the professor's own feelings of vulnerability on these
issues may make it difficult for the professor to have these kinds of discussions with her class.
Id. at 559.
59. See, e.g., Angela Mae Kupenda, On Teaching Constitutional Law When My Race Is
in Their Face, 21 LAW & INEQ. 215, 216-17 (2003). In this piece, Professor Kupenda writes
movingly about teaching constitutional law after September 11, 2001. Id.
I knew that if I initiated the discussion, I would have to be true to myself. That meant I would
have to facilitate a discussion of terror in a broader sense which would include the terror many
racial minorities, and their ancestors, have experienced, and still do experience, even in Amer-
ica. The terror of slavery and continuing hate crimes would have to be addressed. Whether
our country is ready to address all terror, or whether the racist terror of some groups will con-
tinue to be considered protected speech would have to be posed for discussion. Would not it?
These topics were being discussed in many people of color circles, surely my overwhelmingly
white class of future lawyers should be challenged to think more broadly.
Id.
60. See Dark, supra note 57, at 559-60. Professor Dark insightfully notes that it is cru-
cial that a professor "pay attention to his or her relationships with individual students and the
class." Id. According to Professor Dark, "[i]nvesting time and energy into developing a solid,
respectful, and approachable relationship with the students in the classroom will put the teach-
er in the best position to" ensure a supportive classroom environment. Id.
61. See Nyquist et al., supra note 56, at 544. "Issues of diversity are too important to be
discussed only in Constitutional Law and upper-level specialty courses. They need to be part
of the first-year curriculum." Id.
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deans, or students.62 Property professors, especially those who teach at
schools that have reduced the number of credit hours dedicated to property
law, may have already made choices that eliminated or reduced coverage of
topics that many may consider fundamental. Adding issues of sexual orien-
tation to the course may subject the professor to the criticism that she is
wasting time on issues that are not central to property law.63 Forewarned is
forearmed.
B. One Professor's Approach
While not ignoring the ways in which issues of sexual orientation are
different than other property law issues, I make every effort to treat them the
same as I treat all of the other issues I introduce in class. My text allows me
to discuss these issues with my students, so I have not prepared any addi-
tional written materials for the course. Using the text as a starting point, I
present the students with hypothetical fact patterns where the sexual orienta-
tion of the parties is relevant. Because I regularly give my students hypo-
thetical fact patterns to analyze, they do not consider it unusual when I do so
in this context. Additionally, I try not to interrupt the pedagogical flow, or in
any other way signal to the students that we are about to discuss something
unconventional or nontraditional, when the fact patterns involve gay men or
lesbians.
I am also careful not to introduce issues of sexual orientation when they
are not relevant to the discussion. My goal is to show the different impact
the law may have on persons who are gay, lesbian or bisexual. When the
legal consequences do not change based on sexual orientation, there is no
reason to make an issue of sexual orientation. This does not mean, however,
that I may not have a hypothetical where some of the parties, at least in my
mind, are gay and lesbian. It just means that I do not, for example, indicate
whether the finder of lost property is a gay man or lesbian.' I am also no
62. See Dark, supra note 57, at 558. Professor Dark notes that professors who include
issues of diversity in their classes may face claims that the issues are irrelevant or that they
introduce "impermissible bias and subjectivity into an otherwise objective, neutral, and rea-
soned discussion of the law." Id.
63. See generally Bernhardt & Martin, supra note 13 (focusing on the variety of subject
matter that can be taught in a basic property law class, and examining which topics are the
most relevant and popular among ABA accredited law schools). See also Dark, supra note
57, at 557-58.
64. In this way, I am similar to J.K. Rowling, the author of the incredibly successful
Harry Potter books. After completing the last book, Ms. Rowling revealed a fact not included
in any of the books: Dumbledore, Harry's mentor and the headmaster of Hogwarts, was gay.
Greg Toppo, 'Harry Potter'Author: Dumbledore is Gay, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2007, avail-
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more likely to share personal stories with respect to this area of the law, than
in any other part of the course. I am always, however, on the lookout for
narratives and news stories that will enrich the classroom discussion in all
areas of the course.
When issues involving sexual orientation come up during the course, I
expect that students will participate as they do in all other parts of the course.
No student gets a pass, although I recognize and I make subtle accommoda-
tions, including exercising more control over the discussion because of the
ways in which the discussion affects some students personally. I may also
budget extra time for discussion because it may be the first time an issue has
resonated personally for some students. Additionally, I may spend additional
time after class or in my office continuing the conversation.
I make sure the class is ready to have these discussions by always treat-
ing my students with respect and requiring them to treat me and their class-
mates likewise. My goal is to create an environment where they are not in-
timidated to participate, so long as they are doing so in thoughtful and re-
spectful ways.
IV. IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION ISSUES IN THE LAW
SCHOOL CLASSROOM
We owe it to our students to include discussions of sexual orientation in
our courses. A property law course is not complete if students are not re-
quired to think about these issues. Property law is a "[c]ourse introducing
rights and interests in both real and personal property.65 If students have not
been required to think about whether a person's property rights and interests
are affected by that person's sexual orientation, then they have not been giv-
en the opportunity to think about one of the fundamental issues underlying
property law. Additionally, the isolation and invisibility that lesbian, gay
and bisexual students often feel in law school will be lessened if they feel
that an integral part of who they are is not ignored by, or irrelevant to, the
law school experience, especially if they have personally experienced dis-
crimination based on their sexual orientation.66 Of course, if the issues are
discussed in ways that validate the discrimination and increase the margin-
able at http://www.usatoday.com/life/books/2007-10-20-potter-dumbledoreN.htm. Accord-
ing to Ms. Rowling, "I always saw Dumbledore as gay." Id.
65. Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Course Descriptions,
http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/students/current/course descriptions.cfm?sortvtxtTitle (last
visited Feb. 17, 2008). This is the first part of the description of the property law course at the
law school where I teach.
66. See Nyquist et al., supra note 56, at 544.
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alization faced by lesbian, gay and bisexual students, they should not be
brought into the classroom.
Furthermore, by incorporating these discussions into the course, we
provide a benefit to the public.67 Our students will not always be law stu-
dents. After they graduate, they will become practicing attorneys, legisla-
tors, judges, and other community leaders. They will have clients and con-
stituents who are gay, lesbian and bisexual. Parties who appear before them
will be gay, lesbian and bisexual. Those who are making decisions and poli-
cies that affect the lives, liberty, and property of others should be informed
about the different impact those decisions and policies may have on others
because they are gay, lesbian or bisexual.
V. CONCLUSION
While there are risks to including these issues in a property law course,
they are greatly outweighed by the benefits. Issues of sexual orientation
should not be omitted from a basic property law course even if they are not
included in the textbook. Encouraging students to think about traditional
topics such as concurrent ownership interests, in nontraditional ways-what
if the co-owners are a same sex couple?-enriches the property course in a
way that benefits both the students and the professor. Discovering areas
where property law intersects with issues of sexual orientation often leads to
rewarding exchanges between the professor and her class. This essay fo-
cuses on property law because that is the course I teach most frequently, but
professors of other subjects should also consider whether similar discussions
can be incorporated into their courses.
67. See Dark, supra note 57, at 542.
Discussion of diversity issues is relevant, important, challenging, and often rewarding. Those
discussions belong in law schools and, at the very least, in law school classrooms. Diversity
issues affect and shape legal doctrine, application of the law, and judicial and administrative
processes. Consequently, students who will practice law into the next century need to be con-




Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss3/1
JUDICIAL RECUSAL & DISQUALIFICATION: IS SEXUAL
ORIENTATION A VALID CAUSE IN FLORIDA?
SANAZ ALEMPOUR*
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 609
II. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES ...................................................... 612
A . Automatic D isqualification .................................................... 613
B. M otion for D isqualification .................................................... 614
C. Sufficiency of M otion .............................................................. 614
III. PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL RECUSAL & DISQUALIFICATION ............ 616
A. When Disqualification or Recusal Is Inappropriate .............. 618
B. Recent Issues Within the Courtroom: Judicial Recusal
Based on Sexual Orientation .................................................. 619
IV. FLORIDA LAW: CURRENT POLICIES CONCERNING
JUDICIAL RECUSAL & DISQUALIFICATION .................................... 620
A . Actual Bias and Prejudice ...................................................... 620
1. Bias Tow ard the Party ....................................................... 622
2. Bias Toward the Subject Matter ........................................ 623
B . Appearance of B ias ................................................................ 625
C . Extrajudicial Activities ........................................................... 627
V. AUTHOR'S CLOSING REMARKS ...................................................... 629
V I. C ON CLUSION .................................................................................. 631
I. INTRODUCTION
An essential cornerstone of our American legal system is equality and
justice to individuals under the law.' The United States Supreme Court has
achieved this goal by continuously holding that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process."2 This concept has stood for the prem-
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center; B.S
in Business Management 2005, University of Florida. The author wishes to thank: her family;
her colleagues at NOVA LAW REvIEw; and the faculty of the Law Center especially Professor
Olympia Duhart and Professor Debra Moss Curtis, for their inspiration and guidance.
1. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 20 (1994).
2. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)) (quotations omitted).
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ise that "[a] judge [will] perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice."3
This important principal has been a major cornerstone of the judiciary since
the beginning of common law.4 There are two fundamental principals that
the law of judicial disqualification rests upon; first, "no-one should be a
judge in his own cause,"5 and second, "Lord Hewart's famous maxim that
justice should not only be done 'but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done,' [which] is evidence of the intimate relationship between judicial
impartiality and the legitimacy of the legal system."6
The law of the United States has since developed and now both indi-
vidualized states and the national government have created codes that govern
judicial conduct.' The governing codes are the United States Code of Judici-
ary and Judicial Procedure and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that
was adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates in
1972,8 stating under what circumstances a judge shall be disqualified for his
or her failure to apply the law impartially9 and diligently. ° In 1990, the
ABA revised the Code of Judicial Conduct "creating a prohibition on sexual
orientation bias in Canon 3," resulting in several states specifically prohibit-
ing judicial bias based on sexual orientation." Although many of these rules
clearly put the world on notice as to when judicial disqualification or recusal
3. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5). "The Code of Judicial Conduct establishes
standards for ethical conduct of judges." Id. pmbl. The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct's
preamble states that:
[t]he Code of Judicial Conduct is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of
judges. They should also be governed in their judicial and personal conduct by general ethical
standards. The Code is intended, however, to state basic standards which should govern the
conduct of all judges and to provide guidance to assist judges in establishing and maintaining
high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
Id.
4. Kate Malleson, Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality, 22 LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2002)
[hereinafter Malleson, Judicial Impartiality].
5. Kate Malleson, Judicial Bias and Disqualification After Pinochet (No. 2), 63 MOD. L.
REv. 119, 120 (2000).
6. Malleson, Judicial Impartiality, supra note 4, at 53 (quoting The King v. Sussex
Justices, (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259).
7. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000); FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; MODEL CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT (2004).
8. William C. Duncan, Sexual Orientation Bias: The Substantive Limits of Ethics Rules,
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 85, 86-87 (2003); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pref-
ace (2004). The Model Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted by the vast majority of
states with slight variation in certain jurisdictions. See Duncan, supra, at 87.
9. Impartially is defined as "without bias." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (8th ed.
2004).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; see also FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3.
11. Duncan, supra note 8, at 87.
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is appropriate, 2 one rule is not as clear, and that is whether a judge in Florida
should be disqualified or recused from a case because of his or her sexual
orientation, when sexual orientation is the main issue at stake.
This note will examine cases, governing rules of law, statutes, articles,
and journals that have surrounded this topic, and suggest whether judicial
recusal based on sexual orientation is expected or appropriate. The primary
purpose of this note is to determine whether society throughout the State of
Florida expects judicial recusal or disqualification based on a judge's sexual
orientation. The first section of this note will begin by explaining the general
laws concerning judicial disqualification and recusal. This section will ex-
plain the challenges that judges are constantly facing concerning motions for
disqualification, ethical responsibilities, and the expectations placed upon
each judge by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. This section is separated
into three subsections that thoroughly explain the rules governing automatic
disqualification, motions filed by parties seeking judicial disqualification,
and the legal sufficiency of these motions. The subsection concerning the
sufficiency of motions filed by parties against judges explains what motions
warrant disqualification and what motions are deemed insufficient by law.
Next, this note will explain the general principles of judicial disqualifi-
cation and recusal throughout the nation. This section will explain the rele-
vancy of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and Title 28 of the United
States Code concerning judicial disqualification and recusal. This section
also discusses a recent challenge an Oregon Supreme Court Justice, Rives
Kistler, faced when determining whether his sexual orientation presented a
conflict of interest warranting recusal.
The next section in this note will thoroughly explain Florida's law con-
cerning judicial disqualification and recusal based on case law, statutes, and
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. This section is broken down into four
subsections, each one explaining an important aspect of judicial recusal. The
first subsection is further broken down in order to more thoroughly explain
what is deemed as judicial bias towards an individual person, compared to
what is deemed as judicial bias towards a subject matter. Next, this note will
provide the author's closing remarks on judicial disqualification and recusal
based on the research concerning this topic. Finally, it will be concluded that
based on case law, statutes, articles, and journals concerning the topic of
judicial recusal and disqualification, Florida does not expect a judge to be
disqualified nor recused based on a judge's sexual orientation, even when
sexual orientation is the main issue in the proceeding.
12. See id. at 88.
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II. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The issue of judicial bias is continuously leveled at judges, whether in
the form of an attorney filing for judicial disqualification, or the media writ-
ing about a judge's bias towards a person, subject matter, or case.13 When an
attorney decides to move for judicial disqualification based on a valid allega-
tion concerning the potential violation of a particular judicial cannon, there
are many serious consequences that can result in the handling of the attor-
ney's case.'4 The "attorney moving for judicial disqualification on the
ground of bias risks alienating a judge before whom [he or] she must present
[his or] her case should the motion be denied."' 5 "[R]ecusal motion[s] pre-
sent[] difficult challenges for" attorneys involved, parties, and the judge who
has been accused of being incapable of acting impartially. 6 By filing this
motion, the moving party seeking disqualification of a judge, on the basis of
bias or prejudice, will ultimately bear the burden of persuasion. 7
In Florida, the procedures for filing a motion for judicial disqualifica-
tion, for both civil and criminal cases, are outlined in Rules 2.310"8 and
2.3309 of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The other bodies of
law that govern judicial disqualification are Florida Statutes section 38.1020
and the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.2 There are several other
statutory provisions that provide a mechanism for judicial disqualification,
such as Florida Statutes sections 38.01,22 38.02,23 and 38.05.4 Florida laws
13. See Charles Malarkey, Note, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation Cause
in California?, 41 HASTINGS L.J 695, 695 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 696.
16. Frank M. McClellan, Judicial Impartiality & Recusal: Reflections on the Vexing
Issue of Racial Bias, 78 TEMEP. L. REv. 351, 355 (2005). When a motion for judicial disquali-
fication is filed by an attorney "[t]he judge's first reaction ... is likely to be one of indignation
... [which can insult] someone who has taken an oath to resolve disputes impartially [by
alleging that he or] she cannot fulfill the oath in a particular case." Id.
17. City of Hollywood v. Witt, 868 So. 2d 1214, 1217 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(noting that the moving party will have the burden of proving that he or she has a "well-
founded fear of not receiving a fair trial" and that bias is legally sufficient to disqualify the
judge from the case).
18. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.310 (stating the rules regarding "Judicial Discipline, Removal,
Retirement, and Suspension" ofjudicial officers).
19. FLA. R. JuD. ADMiN. 2.330. Rule 2.330 was formerly Rule 2.160. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (2007). Section 38.10 provides the process for judicial disqualifi-
cation. Id.
21. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3E.
22. FLA. STAT. § 38.01 (stating disqualification of a judge is appropriate when a judge is a
party to the pending action).
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on judicial disqualification are similar to other jurisdictions, except for one
way "in which Florida is very different."25 "Whereas judges in most jurisdic-
tions are not penalized for commenting on, or responding to, motions which
have been brought to disqualify them, when a Florida judge has been chal-
lenged, he or she may generally do no more than rule upon the legal suffi-
ciency of the disqualification motion. '26 If the judge violates this rule "by
taking issue with the moving party's allegations, [judicial] disqualification..
may be mandated even when ... disqualification would not have been war-
ranted otherwise. 2 7
A. Automatic Disqualification
Prior to automatic disqualification, "[d]iscretion is confided in the...
judge in the first instance to determine whether [or not] to disqualify him-
self.''2  Once a judge has acted in such a manner where his or her impartial-
ity may be questioned, that judge is required to be immediately recused from
the proceeding. 29 This category of automatic disqualification indicates that
the courts strictly apply the definition of impartiality.3" While each state has
different statutes governing the disqualification of judges, several principals
concerning when a judge should automatically be disqualified are consis-
tent.31 However, when a judge is not automatically disqualified for his or her
bias or prejudice, a party can file a motion seeking judicial disqualification.32
23. Id. § 38.02 (stating when a party may show by a suggestion that the challenged judge,
or judge's relative, is a party or is otherwise interested in the result of the case, that the judge
is related to one of the attorneys, or that the judge is a material witness). This section states
that if the truth of the suggestion appears from the record, the judge shall disqualify himself or
herself. Id.
24. Id. § 38.05 (authorizing a judge to "disqualify himself or herself' on his or her own
motion when the judge knows of any appropriate grounds for recusal).
25. Richard C. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification in Florida, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 59.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988)).
29. FLA. CODE JuD. CoNDucT Canon 3E(l).
30. Malleson, Judicial Impartiality, supra note 4, at 55.
31. See FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDuCT Canon 3E(1)-(2).
32. See FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.330(b).
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B. Motion for Disqualification
The disqualification of a judge is appropriate as provided by the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct,33 the applicable states' code of judicial conduct,
and the states' statutes.34 The motion to disqualify a judge must: "(1) be in
writing; (2) specifically allege the facts [that indicate] . . .the grounds for
[judicial] disqualification; and 3) be sworn to by the party by signing the
motion under oath or by a separate affidavit."35 The filing of this motion
must be within a reasonable amount of time, not exceeding "[ten] days after
discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be
promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling."36 Motions made
during the course of a trial are based on the facts discovered throughout the
trial. 37 Failure of a party to comply with the requirements of Rule 2.330 is a
sufficient ground for denying a party's motion for disqualification.38
C. Sufficiency of Motion
Once the motion has been properly filed, according to the statutory pro-
cedures required, the "sufficiency of the motion" will be closely examined in
order to determine whether judicial disqualification is appropriate. 39 Florida
law measures the legal sufficiency of a motion based on whether "a reasona-
bly prudent person [would] have a well-grounded fear that he or she will not
receive a fair and impartial trial from the judge." '4 The grounds for judicial
disqualification must present:
(1) that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or
hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the
judge; or
33. See MODEL CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E (2004).
34. See FLA. STAT. § 38.01 (2007).
35. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.330(c)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). Case law clearly indicates
that if the motion is not signed by the party seeking disqualification, the motion will be
deemed as legally insufficient. Gaines v. State, 722 So. 2d 256, 256 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
36. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.330(e).
37. Id. (stating that such trial motions "may be stated on the record," filed in writing, and
immediately ruled upon).
38. See Douglas J. Glaid, Judicial Disqualification: What Every Practitioner (and
Judge) Should Know, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2000, at 28, 32.
39. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.330(f).
40. Flamm, supra note 25, at 58.
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(2) that the judge before whom the case is pending, or some person
related to said judge by consanguinity or affinity... is a party the-
reto or interested in the result thereof, or that said judge is related
to an attorney or counselor of record.., or that said judge is a ma-
terial witness for or against one of the parties to the cause.41
The legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify a judge is a pure ques-
tion of law, meaning that if the motion is legally sufficient, then the truth of
the substance alleged is irrelevant.42 This requires the court to view the mo-
tion from the perspective of the litigant, rather than from the perspective of
the judge.43 What the judge feels is not a question that is taken into consid-
eration when examining the sufficiency of the motion, and rather, it is the
"'feeling [that] resides in the affiant's mind, and the basis for such feel-
ing.""
44
Once an initial motion for disqualification has been filed against a
judge, the judge must then only determine "the legal sufficiency of the mo-
tion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. '45 This may require a
judge to "immediately enter an order granting disqualification and proceed
no further in the action;" however, if the motion is insufficient, the judge
must immediately enter "an order denying the motion. 4 6 If a recommenda-
tion has been made to the Judicial Qualifications Commission, rather than a
litigant filing a motion for disqualification, the commission will then deter-
mine whether or not the recommended action is appropriate. 47 If the com-
mission determines that removal is appropriate, an order shall be issued "di-
recting the justice or judge to show just cause in writing why the recom-
mended action should not be taken."'  This process allows a judge to re-
spond to the commission by filing his or her response showing why he or she
41. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.330(d).
42. See Jimenez v. Ratine, 954 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The legal
sufficiency is based on the premise of "whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably
prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." MacKenzie v. Super Kids
Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.
2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
43. Jimenez, 954 So. 2d at 708 (explaining that the judge's impartiality is questioned
rather than his or her ability to act impartially and fairly).
44. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State
v. Dewell, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla. 1938)) (emphasis added).
45. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.330(f).
46. Id.
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should not be removed from the proceeding before the commission makes its
final decision. 9
III. PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL RECUSAL & DISQUALIFICATION
"The Code of Judicial Conduct demands that judges conform to a high-
er standard of conduct than is expected of lawyers or other persons in soci-
ety."5 This higher standard that judges are held to has led to the enactment
of statutes concerning judicial conduct and numerous guides to judicial eth-
ics. 1 Congress' goal when enacting judicial recusal statutes was to, first,
preserve the role of judges as neutral parties, and second, to preserve soci-
ety's perception of judges as neutral parties.52 The purpose of these statutes
requiring judicial recusal and disqualification are "'to promote confidence in
the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever pos-
sible."'53 The importance of a judge remaining a neutral party was based on
"[t]he basic tenet for [judicial] disqualification [that] 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."'54 This basic tenet has been the backbone of our judi-
cial branch of government, and "must [still] be followed even when the re-
cord lacks any actual bias or prejudice."55
Currently, every state has different statutes governing judicial recusal
and disqualification for state and federal judges within that state. 6 Many of
the concepts used by various state statutes are reflected in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which was "designed to provide guidance to judges and
candidates for judicial office and to provide a structure for regulating con-
duct through disciplinary agencies. 57 There are currently two conditions for
judicial disqualification that have been established by Title 28 section 455 of
49. Id. (stating that "the commission may serve a reply [to the judge's written response]
within 20 days from service of the response").
50. State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Neb. 1998).
51. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
52. Jay Hall, The Road Less Traveled: The Third Circuit's Preservation of Judicial
Impartiality in an Imperfect World, 50 VILL. L. REv. 1265, 1278 (2005). Congress has sought
to maintain impartial judges by requiring judicial disqualification in various situations. See 28
U.S.C. § 455(a)-(c).
53. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)).
54. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. v. Cassone, 807 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
55. See id. at 143.
56. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT pmbl.
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the United States Code." First, section 455(a) provides that a judge "shall
disqualify himself [or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or her] impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned. 59  Under section 455(a), judicial
recusal is only appropriate if "'an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully
informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality. '6 Next,
section 455(b) provides that a judge shall also be disqualified "[w]here he [or
she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.' In order for
this bias to qualify as a sufficient basis for judicial recusal, "[t]he judge's
bias [or prejudice] must be personal and extrajudicial," meaning that it must
have derived from something besides what "the judge [has] learned by par-
ticipating in the case. 62
Judicial recusal is required, based on the Code of Judicial Conduct, in
cases where a judge is proven to be biased or when failure of a judge to re-
cuse himself or herself would result in a void decision being rendered.63 A
party moving for judicial disqualification "on the basis of bias or prejudice
[has] the heavy burden of [rebutting] the presumption of judicial impartial-
ity."64 Rebuttal of this presumption is especially difficult because this mo-
tion is purely a question of law; therefore, all allegations made are taken to
be true and only the judge's impartiality is questioned.65 Ultimately, in order
for a motion for judicial disqualification to be deemed appropriate, the facts
alleged "must be 'germane to the judge's undue bias, prejudice or sympa-
thy. ' 6
6
58. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (2000).
59. Id. § 455(a).
60. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (quoting Parker v. Con-
nors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988)).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
62. McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11 th Cir. 1990).
63. See MODEL CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2004); see also FLA. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT Canon 3E(1).
64. State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Neb. 1998).
65. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla.
1990) (questioning the legal sufficiency of whether a reasonable person would fear receiving
an impartial trial).
66. Hous. Auth. of Tampa v. Burton, 873 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Dragovich v. State, 492 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 1986)).
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A. When Disqualification or Recusal Is Inappropriate
The Code of Judicial Conduct, statutes, and case law state under what
circumstances judicial recusal and disqualification are appropriate and under
what circumstances judicial recusal and disqualifications are inappropriate.67
The case law concerning judicial disqualification and recusal tends to dem-
onstrate clearly under what circumstances the court should deny a party's
motion for judicial disqualification.68 Case law indicates that a judge's rul-
ings or opinions are insufficient to justify recusal, absent clear judicial bias
or favoritism that would render a fair decision impossible.69 Generally, a
judge's manifestation of annoyance, impatience, and even anger is not
enough to constitute bias sufficient to warrant a recusal motion.7 ° In Florida,
a judge is also allowed to form opinions and mental impressions throughout
a proceeding without being disqualified from the case, so long as the judge's
opinions do not lead to prejudgment of the case. 7' The objective person
standard that is used by courts throughout the nation, including Florida, re-
quires all doubts to be resolved in the favor of judicial disqualification or
recusal.72 Meaning that even if the factors do not clearly indicate there have
been substantial grounds for disqualification, courts tend to use the safer
approach in order to protect the parties involved and the integrity of the judi-
ciary.7
3
A judge has no "duty to recuse himself [or herself based] on unsup-
ported speculation., 74 The fact that a judge may also be familiar with the
facts of a case is also insufficient grounds for recusal or disqualification.75
Recusal has also been inappropriate when "characterizations and gratuitous
comments" that can, or have been, offensive to litigants have been made by
judges during a proceeding. 76 These instances, where a judge's comments or
67. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
68. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp
155, 158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1974). This case outlines the law of judicial disqualification, also
explaining the importance of examining the legal sufficiency of parties' motions for judicial
disqualification. Id.
69. See Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
70. Id.
71. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
72. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
73. See id.
74. Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Kan. 1996).
75. Id. at 1088.
76. Wargo, 669 So. 2d at 1124. The court has also held that remarks made by judges
during trial that are disapproving, hostile, or critical to any party or witness involved in the
proceeding are generally insufficient grounds for judicial disqualification. United States v.
Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1118 (D.N.J. 1994).
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behavior have been insufficient grounds for recusal or disqualification, indi-
cate that the Code of Judicial Conduct, case law, and statutes strictly govern
what a judge can say or do in the courtroom; however, there are certain cir-
cumstances where a judge's actions may offend a particular party in a pro-
ceeding, but fall short of satisfying the reasonable person standard required
for judicial recusal and disqualification.77
B. Recent Issues Within the Courtroom: Judicial Recusal Based on Sexual
Orientation
The issue of a judge's sexual orientation and judicial recusal was a
question that one of Oregon's Supreme Court Justices recently faced when a
case concerning same-sex marriage was brought before the court in 2004.8
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Rives Kistler, an openly homosexual member
of Oregon's highest court, did not want to jeopardize the future judgment of
the case and, therefore, decided to stop all of his involvement and determine
whether there was a potential conflict of interest.79 Justice Kistler consulted
with both a judicial ethics book and the judicial ethics panel in order to de-
termine whether being homosexual presented a conflict of interest. 80 After
being advised that there was no conflict of interest, he joined the majority
decision ruling "that same-sex marriages were not allowed" in Oregon.8'
The outcome of these circumstances proved that, in Oregon, a judge's sexual
orientation was not ground for judicial recusal even when sexual orientation
was the premise of the proceeding.82 This principal became more clear when
the citizens of Oregon supported that notion by electing Justice Kistler the
following year in a statewide election.83 The premise of this situation exem-
plified the issue that a homosexual judge may have to question whether or
not by ruling on a case concerning sexual orientation, the appearance of a
bias decision or a conflict of interest may be presented.84
77. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla.
1990).
78. Joan Biskupic, Amid Debate over Rights, Number of Gay Judges Rising, USA





83. Biskupic, supra note 78.
84. See id. (suggesting that a judge may have to question whether the public will perceive
his or her decision as bias or prejudice based on his or her sexual orientation).
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IV. FLORIDA LAW: CURRENT POLICIES CONCERNING JUDICIAL RECUSAL &
DISQUALIFICATION
Currently, Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct requires judicial recusal
when a judge discriminates "on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national
origin. [However, m]embership in a fraternal, sororal, religious, or ethnic
heritage organization shall not be deemed to be a violation., 85 Therefore, in
Florida, a judge's involvement or membership in certain groups, such as eth-
nic heritage organizations, will not be sufficient grounds for judicial disquali-
fication although a case may involve the rights of that group.86
Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct currently does not mention what a
judge is expected to do when faced with a potential conflict of interest based
on his or her sexuality.87 Over the recent years, the number of homosexuals
seeking enforcement of their civil rights has dramatically increased, leading
to more cases concerning the issue of sexual orientation being heard
throughout courtrooms worldwide.8  The recent increase of homosexual
judges throughout the nation suggests that the issue of judicial recusal and
disqualification based on sexual orientation will also increase throughout the
state.89
A. Actual Bias and Prejudice
The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, clearly states that one of its pri-
mary goals is to "avoid... impropriety and the appearance of impropriety"
in all of the judge's activities,90 further stating that "[a] judge shall respect
and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."9' Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of an un-biased
judiciary by providing that "[a] judge shall perform the [d]uties of [j]udicial
[o]ffice [i]mpartially and [d]iligently. ''92 This canon stresses the importance
of a judge's judicial duties and adjudicative responsibilities to the court of
law in which the judge represents. 93 Canon 3B(5) states that:
85. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
86. See id.
87. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
88. See generally Biskupic, supra note 78.
89. See id.
90. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
91. Id. Canon 2A.
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[a] judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bi-
as or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, dis-
ability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, and shall
not permit staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's
direction and control do so. This section does not preclude the
consideration of race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or other similar factors
when they are issues in the proceeding.
94
The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct also provides a list of instances
when "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," 95 for example,
when "the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a par-
ty's lawyer ... ." Statements made by judges can also be sufficient
grounds for disqualification if the remarks or statements demonstrate that a
judge may have or has prejudiced the case.97
In addition to the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, the Florida Stat-
utes and case law provide that a judge shall be disqualified if "the party fears
that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically
described prejudice or bias of the judge."98 These bodies of law stress the
importance of judges performing judicial duties fairly and impartially in or-
der to prevent "bring[ing] the judiciary into disrepute."99 These ethical stan-
dards imposed on judges have been tremendously stressed at the state and
federal level, requiring recusal in cases where a judge is actually biased to-
wards the parties involved, or the subject matter of the proceeding."°° Case
law clearly indicates that in order for a judge to not be deemed biased, the
judge must not only be impartial but also leave an impression of impartiality
to all who attended court. 10 1
Although on its face it may seem that only one type of judicial bias ex-
ists, there are several types of bias that can occur throughout a proceeding
that would require immediate disqualification.'02 Before taking a closer ex-
94. Id Canon 3B(5).
95. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E(l).
96. Id. Canon 3E(l)(a).
97. Glaid, supra note 38, at 32.
98. FLA. R. Jun. ADMIN. 2.330(d)(1).
99. See FLA. CODE JuD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) cmt.
100. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
101. See Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
102. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
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amination of the concept of judicial bias based on a judge's sexual orienta-
tion, a distinction should be made between the various types of bias.
1. Bias Toward the Party
In State v. Pattno,103 the defendant filed an appeal alleging that the rul-
ing judge was bias against his sexual orientation as evidenced by the judge
expressing his religious views when reading a passage from the Bible during
the defendant's sentencing." On appeal, the court found that "because the
trial judge interjected his own religious views immediately prior to sentenc-
ing, a reasonable person could conclude that the sentence was based upon the
personal bias or prejudice of the judge."'' 5 The biblical passage that was
read prior to the defendant's sentencing clearly indicated that the judge con-
sidered the defendant's sexual orientation when reaching the sentence.
10 6
The appellate court ruled that the defendant was deprived of both due proc-
ess and the impartiality of the judge when the judge imposed a sentence that
was based on his prejudice of the defendant's sexual orientation.0 7
Judicial bias ordinarily must be directed towards a specific individual;
however, certain jurisdictions do not require that the alleged bias be personal
or directed towards a specific person.0 8 In these jurisdictions, such as Flor-
ida, a judge's negative feelings towards a specific class, such as an ethnic or
religious group, may constitute bias towards individual parties that belong to
that specific class.'0 9 In Baskin v. Brown,110 the contrary perspective to juris-
dictions like Florida was established, here the court made it clear that "[a]
judge cannot be disqualified merely because he believes in upholding the law
... [a] [p]ersonal bias against a party must be shown.'
The critical question surrounding whether a judge or justice is biased
toward a person or class of persons is whether there is sufficient bias that
103. 579 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1998).
104. Id. at 506.
105. Id. at 509 (holding that a judge who injects his or her personal beliefs as a basis for a
ruling "injects an impermissible consideration in the [ruling] process").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 508.
108. CTR. FOR CONTINUING EDUC., DISQUALIFICATION FOR BIAS OR ITS APPEARANCE: SELF
STUDY ARTICLE & SELF ASSESSMENT TEST § 4.5, http://www.cce-mcle.com/tests/ss60l4a.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
109. Id.
110. 174F.2d391 (4thCir. 1949).
111. Id. at 394 (holding that the defendants grounds to disqualify a judge after the judge
refused to recuse himself from a case was not sufficient because the judge did not have a
personal bias against the defendants or the particular class of persons in this case).
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would prevent the judge from being fair and impartial when ruling on the
case as outlined by the Code of Judicial Conduct."2 This critical question of
"whether the statements or activities [of the judge] would suggest to the rea-
sonable man that the judge's bias against a class would give rise to a per-
sonal bias against a party in court who is a member of that class" must be
determined prior to deciding whether a judge should recuse himself or her-
self or be disqualified from a case. l"3
There are many cases where the bias of a judge is based on "the judges'
conduct, specifically, statements made by the judges themselves indicating a
bias against the classes to which the parties [or party] belonged.""..4 This
varies significantly with bias that is based on a judge's sexual orientation,
sex, race, religion, or ethnicity." 5 Florida's current Code of Judicial Conduct
specifically prohibits a judge from being biased or prejudiced based on a
party's race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, age, national origin,
or disability." 6 With this concept in mind, the same consideration should
also be given to a "judge's sexual orientation, which, in the absence of con-
duct or other circumstances to indicate bias toward a party, similarly should




2. Bias Toward the Subject Matter
"[B]ias, as to the subject matter of a case, can [also] compromise the
impartiality of a judge" and may also be sufficient grounds for judicial dis-
qualification."' "The concept of bias toward [the] subject matter, as used
here, poses difficult questions regarding the types of preconceptions that are
permissible in the mind of the trial judge, and those that are not."" 9 Gener-
ally, judges can develop mental impressions and personal opinions through-
out the course of evidence presentations, so long as the judge "does not pre-
judge the case."' 2 ° In Williams v. Reed,'2 the defendant filed for appeal chal-
lenging the judge's decision after ordering a transfer of primary physical
112. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5).
113. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 736, 756 (1973).
114. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 706.
115. Id.
116. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5).
117. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 706.
118. Id. at 706.
119. Id. at 706-07.
120. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
Brown v. Pate, 577 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
121. 6 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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custody of the party's minor child to defendant's former husband/plaintiff. 22
The defendant appealed the judge's ruling, claiming that the trial court erred
when denying her motion for judicial disqualification. 23 The defendant ar-
gued that the judge's comments and conduct throughout the proceeding to-
ward the defendant, based on her sexual orientation, clearly demonstrated
grounds for disqualification.'24 The judge's comments and conduct were
argued to have stemmed from his own personal bias towards the subject mat-
ter of same-sex relationship child custody issues. 25 This type of subject mat-
ter bias clearly demonstrates how a fixed anticipatory judgment can taint or
prejudice a proceeding, resulting in an impartial decision being made based
on a fixed belief regarding the subject matter of a case.'26
The argument of a judge being biased toward a subject matter often is
based on a judge's membership in a minority group; however, "membership
in a minority group [should] not, in itself, indicate [a] greater likelihood" of a
judge deciding on a particular issue in any particular manner. 27 A judge
who abides by the rules outlined in the Code of Judicial Conduct should dis-
qualify himself or herself in the event that he or she feels they would be "in-
capable of detached judgment.' ' 128 Ultimately, a judge's religion, race, sex,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation is not sufficient grounds to infer the appear-
ance of bias or actual bias, and therefore should not warrant disqualifica-
tion.'29 An attorney seeking judicial disqualification based on a judge's
"sexual orientation should be required to show specific examples of the
judge's conduct or other circumstances to support [his or] her charge.' 30
Stereotyping judges based on the preconception that a judge will be
more likely to have bias or prejudice towards a litigant, attorney, or witness,
based on his or her memberships, damages society's confidence in the judi-
ciary."' The judiciary as a whole includes members of various minorities,
including heterosexual, and homosexual judges; therefore, if we are to clas-
122. Id. at 918.
123. Id.
124. Id. ("[The] judge's conduct and statements during the hearing on Ms. Reed's motion
for change of judge would give a reasonable person a factual basis to doubt the judge's ability
to thereafter preside as a neutral arbiter ... ").
125. See id. at 919 (explaining that the judge in this case was personally involved in a
similar situation regarding same-sex relationships and child custody issues concerning his ex-
wife and minor child).
126. See Williams, 6 S.W.3d at 918-19.
127. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 708.
128. Id. at 709.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 714.
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sify judges as being bias or prejudice because of their involvement in a mi-
nority group, such as alternative sexual orientation, that premise would have
to be applied fairly across all groups, meaning that a judge's involvement in
a minority group, such as ethnicity, should also be grounds for disqualifica-
tion. 3 '
B. Appearance of Bias
Ethical standards and statutory law require a judge to not only remove
himself or herself from "any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," but also to avoid any appearance of bias.133
The premise of avoiding the appearance of any bias also comes from "[t]he
basic tenet for [judicial] disqualification [that] '[j]ustice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice.""34 In order for judges "[t]o maintain public confidence
in the judicia[ry]," judges must not only apply the law impartially but must
also appear to do so as well.135 The appearance of impartiality must be used
as the general standard for judicial recusal and when applying this standard
judges should determine whether their impartiality may be questioned from
the perspective of a reasonable person.'36 Although this standard varies
slightly by each jurisdiction, the implications of its appropriateness are con-
sistent.1
37
The appearance of bias or impropriety may derive from a judge's con-
duct during an issue or proceeding, or remarks made to parties involved or to
witnesses.'38 This appearance of impropriety can also come from judicial
frustration, such as when a judge chooses to speak, "[a] judge's attitude to-
132. See Malarkey, supra note 13, at 713-14.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). Society and the governing rules of law demand that a
judge not only recuse himself or herself when there is reason to do so, but judges also have an
equal responsibility to do so when a reasonable person would harbor doubts concerning the
judges impartiality. Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Kan.
1996).
134. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. v. Cassone, 807 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
135. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 710.
136. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining
that when a judge is facing possible disqualification, the judge should consider how his impar-
tiality appears "to the average person on the street," meaning that disqualification is appropri-
ate if a reasonable person were "to know all the circumstances" and would doubt the judge's
impartiality). Id.
137. Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 526 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
138. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impar-
tiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned, " 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 55, 76 (2000).
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ward an attorney practicing in the judge's court[room]," and a judge's busi-
ness or personal relationships.1 39 In United States v. Salemme," 4 the court
reiterated the standard for recusal concerning the appearance of impartiality
as an objective standard, as outlined in section 455 of the United States
Code. 1' The court also stated that the decision of disqualification can even
occur when a "judge is not actually biased or prejudiced," as long as his "im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned. 1 42 This concept is seen through-
out many cases both on the state and federal level, highlighting the impor-
tance of an impartial and fair judiciary. 43 In Salemme, the court thoroughly
explained the importance of this standard and why:
[t]he disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to se-
cure public confidence through proceedings that appear impartial,
but also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the
disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the
system for strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to
their liking.144
This concept of "judge-shopping"'145 is frequently used by parties and at-
torneys when an argument can be made as to the appearance of impropriety
and a new judge would be more favorable to one or more of the parties in-
volved. 46 Courts disfavor this use of disqualification and recusal motions
because these motions cannot be used by litigants as strategies to "judge-
shop" and rather should only successfully be used when there is the appear-
ance of or actual judicial impropriety. 41
139. Id. at 85. The comment to Canon 3B(5) states:
A judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding
and brings the judiciary into disrepute. Facial expression and body language, in addition to
oral communication, can give to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and
others an appearance ofjudicial bias. A judge must be alert to avoid behavior that may be per-
ceived as prejudicial.
FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) cmt.
140. 164 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 1998).
141. Id. at 80; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
142. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
143. See id. at 81.
144. Id. at 52.
145. United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1120 (D.N.J. 1994).
146. See Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 779-80
(D.N.M. 1989) ("Litigants are entitled to an unbiased judge; not to a judge of their choosing").
147. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. at 1120 (explaining that the defendant's previous attempts to
disqualify the judge for insufficient reasons evidenced his attempt to judge-shop). The bal-
ancing test used to determine whether judicial recusal is appropriate involves balancing two
key factors. Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D. Idaho 1979). First, the right for all
litigants to have their case heard and "decided by an impartial tribunal." Id. at 35. Second,
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"[T]he appearance of bias standard theoretically would apply to a
judge's sexual orientation regardless of whether it was a matter of public
knowledge ... ,148 "Clearly, the goal of [section 455] is to foster the ap-
pearance of impartiality... [this concern] also pervades the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, [which] stems
from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in which the
public has unwavering confidence.' 49  Thus, one can argue that because
undisclosed facts such as a judge's sexual orientation can become public
knowledge at any time, "consideration of facts of which the public may be
unaware is proper under a standard emphasizing appearance."' 50 One can
also argue that the Code of Judicial Conduct should not apply to a judge's
sexual orientation because doubts based on a "homosexual judge's impartial-
ity are reasonable and would be widely held by members of the public of
which homosexuals comprise a decided minority."'' The reasonableness of
doubts concerning a homosexual judge's impartiality requires subjective
determination; however, the premise that a vast majority of people or even a
large minority of people would harbor such thoughts is supported by fact that
a small majority or large minority of society fears homosexuality.'52
C. Extrajudicial Activities
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct clearly states that "[a] [j]udge
[s]hall [r]egulate [e]xtrajudicial [a]ctivities to [m]inimize the [r]isk of
[c]onflict with [j]udicial [d]uties."' 53 This Canon not only restricts the extra-
judicial activities a judge can participate in, but also helps preserve the
"[e]xpression[] of bias or prejudice by a judge" based on the activities he or
she participates in.114 Some of these restrictions imposed on judges by the
Code of Judicial Conduct involve avoiding activities that "cast reasonable
"the presumption of qualification and the policy against allowing litigants to engage in judge-
shopping." Id. at 36.
148. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 711.
149. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980). The case
discussed the fact why the issue of judicial disqualification is such a sensitive issue by ex-
plaining that when a motion for judicial disqualification is filed, the court must assess all of
the facts surrounding the circumstances before determining whether a judge's failure to prop-
erly recuse himself or herself from the proceeding "'was an abuse of sound judicial discre-
tion."' Id.
150. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 711.
151. Id. at 713.
152. See id.
153. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUcT Canon 5.
154. Id. Canon 5A-B cmt.
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doubt on the judge's .. impartiality,"'' 55 regulating activities in order to mi-
nimize a risk of conflict with judicial duties,'56 practicing law,1 7 and refrain-
ing from inappropriate political involvement.'58 "A [j]udge is [e]ncouraged
to [e]ngage in [extrajudicial] [a]ctivities to [i]mprove the [l]aw, the [I]egal
[s]ystem, and the [a]dministration of [j]ustice.', 59 A judge's involvement in
extrajudicial activities is encouraged so long as they don't demean the judici-
ary, interfere with judicial responsibilities, or cast doubt on a judge's impar-
tiality. 6°
Although the Code of Judicial Conduct suggests that a judge's sex, re-
ligion, ethnicity, or race is not sufficient grounds for disqualification alone,16'
case law suggests otherwise. 162 A question worth considering is whether
public self-acknowledgement of a judge's sexual orientation "is [a] type of
extrajudicial activity that is discouraged by the Code of Judicial Conduct.' 163
Unlike race, sex, religion, national origin, and ethnicity, "sexual orientation
has not" historically been characterized as warranting special legal protec-
tion.1 64 If our "system of judicial ethics [must] distinguish between extraju-
dicial activit[ies]" that promote a promising judiciary and those that ad-
versely interfere with judicial responsibility, the consideration of a judge's
personal life in relation to his or her sexual orientation and which group of
extrajudicial activities that falls under must be determined. 65
It has been held that through the First Amendment's "application to the
judiciary, ... a judge's right to freedom of expression and association must
155. Id. Canon 5A(1).
156. Id. Canon 5A(3).
157. Id. Canon 5G.
158. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5C(2).
159. Id. Canon4.
160. Id. Canon 4A(1)-(3). The commentary following Canon 4A states:
A judge is encouraged to participate in activities designed to improve the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice. In doing so, however, it must be understood that expressions
of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial activities, may cast reasonable
doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. Expressions which may do so in-
clude jokes or other remarks demeaning individuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status.
Id. Canon 4A cmt.
161. See id. Canon 3B(5).
162. See generally Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D. Idaho 1979); Pennsyl-
vania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp 155, 157-58 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). In Freeman, the court addressed the factor of judicial reasonableness by explaining
that a judge must not only be alert in order "to avoid the possibility" of having his impartiality
questioned, but also to avoid having litigants fear a judge's impartiality. Freeman, 478 F.
Supp. at 36.
163. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 721 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 699.
165. Id. at 722.
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be balanced against the public's right to an impartial judiciary."'66 Although
there are some situations "where a judge's right to freedom of expression and
association outweighs the need to regulate the conduct in question," such as
when the appearance of judicial impartiality is not threatened. 67 "Certainly,
a restriction on a judge's ability to express himself [or herself] regarding so
personal a matter as sexual orientation raises serious first amendment con-
cerns."' 168 Although judges are far more restricted in forming certain social
relationships that may rise to the appearance of impropriety, it is highly un-
likely that a judge will be required to distance himself or herself from social
and family networks based on his or her sexual orientation in order to protect
public confidence in an impartial judiciary. 69 Therefore:
[t]o hold that a homosexual judge's public acknowledgement of
his [or her] sexual orientation is the type of activity discouraged by
the Code of Judicial Conduct would, in effect, impose a require-
ment of secrecy on the judge, potentially far more damaging to
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary than the open
admission of one's sexual orientation.17
0
V. AUTHOR'S CLOSING REMARKS
America is a society that places high expectations on the impartiality of
its judicial branch of government as a mechanism for protecting the integrity
of the law and also to ensure equality for all citizens. As a country that
prides itself for standing behind the premise of equal protection and civil
rights, we take a step backward when we ask ourselves whether judicial im-
partiality is affected by a judge's personal and private sexual orientation. If
the law places expectations on our judges through Codes of Judicial Con-
duct, ethical regulations, and state and federal statutes, why is it that we
don't assume the same expectation, by accepting the fact that sexual orienta-
tion should not raise sufficient grounds for claiming judicial disqualification?
Ultimately, "[t]he rule of necessity arises from the obvious requirement
that, in a legal proceeding, some judge must sit."'' If we are to question
whether a homosexual judge is prejudiced or biased solely based on his or
her sexual orientation, one should also question a black judge's impartiality
166. STEVEN LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHIcAL RESTRIcTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
AcTvrrIEs OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 42 (1984).
167. Id. at 43.
168. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 722-23.
169. Id. at 723.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 717.
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on the basis of race in a proceeding concerning racial discrimination. In
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, '72 this very issue was addressed when the defendants filed a motion for
judicial disqualification based on the racial prejudice of the judge.7 3 Ulti-
mately, the court denied the defendant's motion concluding that just because
"one is black does not mean . . . that he is anti-white.' ' v4 The court also
noted that:
[i]f America is going to have a total rendezvous with justice so that
there can be full equality for blacks, . . . minorities, and women, it
is essential that the "instinct" for double standards be completely
exposed and hopefully, through analysis, those elements of irra-
tionality can be ultimately eradicated. 1
75
Therefore, with this rationale in mind, it cannot be said with certainty that a
homosexual judge will more likely be partial than a heterosexual judge in a
case, involving a homosexual plaintiff and a heterosexual defendant.
Not only is it impractical and insulting to presume that judges are un-
able to set aside their personal beliefs and private views when deciding a
case but it also undermines the strength of the judiciary. It is unfair to ques-
tion a homosexual judge's capability of applying the law fairly and impar-
tially-a principal so embedded in our judiciary-simply because issues
concerning sexual orientation may be raised during the proceeding. If we
demand our judiciary to be blind of our race, sex, ethnicity, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin, and age, why is it that society should be allowed to
openly support a double standard by not providing our judge's that very
same right.
"The sexual orientation of any judge may or may not give him [or her]
insight into the sexual orientation of a party;' ' 176 however, being bias toward
the possibility of a homosexual judge having insight into the sexual orienta-
tion of a party is prejudicial and unfair. It has been noted that "[g]ay and
lesbian judges do not appear to have had a particular impact on gay-rights
172. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
173. Id. at 162-63. The defendants in this proceeding claimed that the judge was biased
based on a speech the judge had given to a group of black individuals, although the speech
contained no references to the defendant's case. See id. at 157.
174. Id. at 163. The court held that although the judge spoke to the Association for the
Study of Afro-American Life and History, a judge's background and association are insuffi-
cient grounds to sustain a motion for judicial disqualification based on bias or prejudice. Id. at
182.
175. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. at 181.
176. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 725.
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issues;" '177 therefore, society should not expect that by entrusting in our ho-
mosexual judges, they are inadvertently impacting gay-rights issues. Ulti-
mately, society should expect a fair and impartial judiciary free of personal
and professional bias; meaning that we should not question the impartiality
of judges based on discriminatory beliefs such as a judge's sexual orienta-
tion, race, age, or ethnicity.
VI. CONCLUSION
When considering the question of whether the citizens of Florida expect
judicial recusal or disqualification of a state or federal judge simply based on
the judge's sexual orientation, society should consider whether the law al-
lows a judge's personal beliefs or views to affect his or her decision making.
Based on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Florida Code of Judicial
Conduct, statutes, case law, and ethical regulations, the answer is clearly no.
A judge should never allow his or her own personal beliefs or views, includ-
ing a judge's sexual orientation, to affect his or her decision making once a
judge is dressed in his or her judicial robe, which represents to all in his or
her presence that he or she will uphold the law fairly and impartially.
The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct currently requires judicial recus-
al or disqualification in circumstances where a "judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."' 78 The rules behind preserving judicial impartial-
ity are supported by the important principal that a judge must at all times act
in such "a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and im-
partiality of the judiciary."'1 79
It would be unfortunate if the citizens of the State of Florida based the
impartiality of a state or federal judge on such a personal matter such as sex-
ual orientation. Individuals that have filed motions for judicial disqualifica-
tion claiming judicial bias based solely on a judge's race have continuously
been unsuccessful.' 8° Similarly, individuals that claim judicial bias solely
based on judges religion or age have also been unsuccessful; therefore, those
individuals who wish to file motions for judicial disqualification solely based
on a judge's sexual orientation should also fail.
Ultimately, the best approach towards eliminating judicial bias based on
sexual orientation is through education.
177. Biskupic, supra note 78.
178. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3E(1).
179. Id. Canon 2A.
180. See generally Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. at 155.
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United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that "on the
whole, judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial func-
tions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-
discipline, and that fortunate alchemy by which men [and women] are
loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted." As long as the ju-
diciary continues to be made up of men and women of different sexual
orientations, the suggestion that a judge's sexual orientation is likely to af-
fect his impartiality damages the public's confidence in the judicial sys-
tem and places little faith in a judge's ability to perform his [or her] duties
in an impartial manner independent of personal considerations.
181
Society must be educated as to what constitutes actual prejudice and bi-
as that would adversely affect a judge's duty to be impartial and fair in all
proceedings. This concept must be then be compared to the notion of mold-
ing the judicial branch to reflect the personal beliefs society has towards
what they believe is morally right and wrong.
If society was to require judicial recusal based on a judge's sexual ori-
entation, we would be sending the negative message to our judges that in
order to preserve the appearance of impartial decision making, judges are
required to keep secret all aspects of their personal life society may shun
upon. Imposing this burden on our judiciary would not only be unfair, cruel,
and against the notion of equality, but would also send a message to other
states and countries that Florida expects their judiciary to fit a particular
mold and those who do not fit that mold will be subjected to silence and se-
crecy or face disqualification. The disqualification and recusal of judges
should be decided based on a rational application of governing law and ethi-
cal codes "and the same considerations that lead one to conclude that a
judge's race, sex, ethnicity, or religion is not a sufficient basis, in itself, to
infer bias, apply with equal validity to a judge's sexual orientation."'' 2
181. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 714 (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n of. the Dist of Colum-
bia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,466 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., declining to participate)).
182. Id. at 725.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fred Phelps is the pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church, whose mem-
bers frequently protest at events across the United States which they perceive
to be sympathetic to gay and lesbian rights, because they believe that the
United States has become overly supportive of such rights.' The following is
a poem written by Fred Phelps, entitled "God Hates America,"2 which is
sung to the tune of "God Bless America."
God hates America
Home of the fags
He abhors them
Deplores them
Day and night, all his might, all his days
From her mountains
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter; B.A., The American University, School of International Service. The author wishes to
thank his family and friends for their support and encouragement, especially his wife Carly,
and his peers David Haas, David Lubitz, and Paul Rogers. He also wishes to thank his profes-
sors for their tutelage, and the entire NOVA LAW REVIEw staff for their hard work.
1. See generally GodHatesAmerica.com, http://www.godhatesamerica.com/index.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
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This homophobic attitude, held by individuals and segments of society
that are sympathetic to Mr. Phelps' viewpoint, is one of the catalyzing forces
behind the efforts of homosexual rights advocates. Sexual orientation is de-
fined as "[a] person's predisposition or inclination toward a particular type of
sexual activity or behavior; heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality."4
Generally, "[t]here has been a trend in recent years to make sexual orienta-
tion a protected class."5 With regard to Florida, there have been muted ef-
forts in sporadic areas since the 1970s, which have met with little success.6
Part II of this article will examine how these efforts have played out on a
local scale, by reviewing the minority of municipalities in Florida which
have enacted ordinances relating to sexual orientation. Part III examines the
dearth of case law that exists which provides protections against discrimina-
tion based upon sexual orientation in the Florida Constitution; Part III also
examines whether or not the United States Constitution may be used to strike
down Florida laws, which discriminate based upon a person's sexual orienta-
tion. Part IV examines the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, a proposed
amendment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, which would grant ex-
plicit protections to gays and lesbians currently lacking in the statute, and
innovative legal theories which have unsuccessfully attempted to find protec-
tions against discrimination based upon sexual orientation in the existing
Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Part V discusses a proposed amendment to
the Florida Constitution which would place a significant obstacle to the right
of homosexual couples to enter into a marriage, or even legal relationships
resembling a marriage. Part VI is a conclusion as to what the state of the law
is in Florida with regard to protections existing against discrimination based
upon sexual orientation and a recommendation as to what the status of the
law should be.
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004).
5. Id.
6. See generally Allan H. Ter, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in
Florida, 24 NOVA L. REV. 793 (2000). Ten provides a historical perspective on the develop-
ment of gay and lesbian rights in Florida, including chronological information on when a
number of ordinances were enacted. Id; see also William E. Adams, Jr., A Look at Lesbian
and Gay Rights in Florida Today: Confronting the Lingering Effects of Legal Animus, 24
NOVA L. REV. 751, 756 (2000).
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II. A SURVEY OF FLORIDA MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE
EFFORTS TO EITHER SUPPORT OR HINDER THE ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES
WHICH PREVENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
There are 301 listed municipalities in Florida, including counties, cities,
villages, towns, and other similar affiliations.7 Beginning in the late 1970s, a
small number of Florida municipalities began to enact ordinances against
discrimination.8 Unfortunately for the gay and lesbian community, the sub-
sequent decades bore out sporadic efforts meeting with limited success,
rather than a concerted statewide push.9 During this time period, there have
been occasional backlashes against gay and lesbian activists, and thus, legis-
lative efforts with regard to sexual orientation can be divided into legislation
that promotes gay and lesbian rights, or hinders gay and lesbian rights.'°
A. Ordinances Enacted to Protect Against Discrimination in Specific Areas
After conducting a survey of the ordinances of all 301 listed Florida
municipalities, which includes counties, cities, towns, villages, and similar
incorporations, it appears that only seventy-one have enacted ordinances"
that are intended to prevent or discourage discrimination based upon sexual
orientation in very specific areas of concern, not merely generalized policies
of non-discrimination. 2 The distinction of being the first municipality in
Florida to pass such an ordinance belongs to Miami-Dade County, which
passed a protective ordinance on January 18, 1977.13 The number of munici-
palities offering protective legislation, while amounting to a sizeable per-
centage of the number of municipalities, is misleading if taken out of context
because among the seventy-one that have enacted protective legislation,
there is a splintering of priorities in all facets of life, with some municipali-
ties enacting protective ordinances in multiple areas, and others enacting
ordinances in only one area.'4 Additionally, while any ordinance offering
protections based upon sexual orientation benefits the gay and lesbian com-
7. Municipal Code Corp., Online Library: Florida,
http://www.municode.com/Resources/code-list.asp?stateID=9 (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
8. Terl, supra note 6, at 804.
9. Municipal Code Corp., supra note 7.
10. See infra notes 16-28, 38-39 and accompanying discussion.
11. See infra notes 16-28 and accompanying discussion.
12. See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying discussion.
13. Terl, supra note 6, at 804; see also Adams, supra note 6, at 757-58, 759 n.58. Ad-
ams lists several Florida cities which had enacted laws, and municipalities which had enacted
ordinances banning discrimination by the year 2000. Id.
14. See generally infra notes 16-28 and accompanying discussion.
[Vol, 32
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss3/1
2008] LITTLE TO BE GA YABOUT
munity, many of the municipalities have enacted protections in relatively
obscure areas which have little practical effect on the lives of gays and lesbi-
ans; while the communities which have enacted protections should be lauded
for their efforts, the thin patchwork of existing Florida ordinances offers little
in terms of a practical solution to discrimination against gays and lesbians. 5
1. Employment, Housing, and Public Accommodations
Eighteen Florida municipalities have enacted policies against discrimi-
nation based upon sexual orientation with regard to employment practices.
1 6
Thirty-one Florida municipalities offer some form of protection against dis-
crimination based upon sexual orientation in the acquisition of housing, se-
curing of credit, or a mortgage.' 7 Ten Florida municipalities prohibit dis-
15. See generally infra notes 16-28 and accompanying discussion.
16. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-221 (2008); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE § 16-/2-21(f)(1) (2007); COCONUT CREEK, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 21-5.1 (2007);
GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-48 (2007); GULFPORT FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 26-20 (2007); JUPITER, FLA., CODE § 15-21(a) (2007); LAUDERDALE LAKES,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 66-36(a) (2007); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-32 (2007);
MIAMI-DADE CouNwY, FLA., CODE § 11A-34(1) (2007); MIRAMAR, FLA., CODE § 16-2(2)
(2007); MONROE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 13-103(a) (2007); OAKLAND PARK, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2-81(5) (2007); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 2-262 (2007); S. FLA.
WATER MGMT. DIST., POLICIES & PROCEDURES § 220-3(c)(1) (2007); SARASOTA, FLA., CODE §
18-36(2) (2007); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-96(a)(2) (2007); TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 26.5-176(a) (2007); W. PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-31
(2007).
17. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-28(1) (2008); LEVY COUNTY, FLA., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 70-36(e)(3) (2008); ORLANDO, FLA., CODE § 57.36(1)(b) (2008); WALTON
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-59(e) (2008); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE §
16Y2-23.1(e) (2007); CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS & ORDINANCES § 1-8-63(c)(3)
(2007); COCOA, FLA., CODE § 7-35(d)(3) (2007); FORT PIERCE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §
8.5-26(3) (2007); FRANKLIN COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES § 9-47(e)(3)
(2007); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-86 (2007); GILCHRIST COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 47-6(c)(2) (2007); GULFPORT, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-30
(2007); LEON COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS § 9-27 (2007); MANATEE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 2-17-76(d)(3) (2007); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-32 (2007); MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 11A-12(l) (2007); MONROE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 13-115(1) (2007);
OCALA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106-136(e)(3) (2007); ORANGE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF
ORDNANCES § 22-33(a)(1) (2007); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 15-36 (2007); PALM
COAST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-25 (2007); PANAMA CITY, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE §
14-93(c)(3) (2007); SARASOTA, FLA., CODE § 18-41(b) (2007); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE §
15-66(a)(2) (2007); SUWANNEE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-97(3) (2007);
TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-71(2) (2007); WINTER HAVEN, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 7.5-30D(3) (2007); OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.5-
59(e) (2006); SANTA ROSA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-139(e) (2006); WAKULLA COUNTY,
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crimination based upon sexual orientation in the realm of public accommo-
dations. 8
2. Telecommunications and Gas
Daytona Beach Shores has an ordinance protecting against discrimina-
tion based upon sexual orientation with regard to access to gas lines. 9
Twenty-one municipalities have enacted ordinances which preclude tele-
communications or cable television companies from discriminating against
clients based upon their sexual orientation.2"
3. The Sale and Procurement of Goods and Services
It is illegal in Miami-Dade County to discriminate based upon sexual
orientation in the sale of goods, or to condone tipping based upon sexual
orientation.2' Four municipalities in Florida have enacted statutes which
protect against discrimination based upon sexual orientation from occurring
in the procurement of goods and services by the municipality.22
FLA., CODE § 13.056(e)(3) (2006); HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF LAWS AND
ORDINANCES § 16 2-96(e)(3) (2003).
18. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-225 (2008); ORLANDO, FLA., CODE §
57.36(1)(b) (2008); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16/2-22(a)(1) (2007); GAINESVILLE,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-67(a) (2007); GULFPORT FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-40
(2007); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-32 (2007); MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 1 A-
19 (2007); SARASOTA, FLA., CODE § 18-46(2) (2007); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE § 15-81
(2007); TAMPA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-61(2) (2007).
19. DAYTONA BEACH SHORES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES App. D § 19 (2006).
20. BAL HARBOUR, FLA., CODE § 7-1 1(13)(a) (2007); BELLEAIR BEACH, FLA., CITY CODE
§ 39(a) (2007); BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-471 (2007); BROWARD
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 20-465(a) (2007); CORAL SPRINGS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-
4(7) (2007); DANIA BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 22-156(a) (2007); GAINESVILLE,
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14.5-157(b) (2007); HOMESTEAD, FLA., CODE § 8-39(a) (2007);
LAUDERDALE-BY-THE-SEA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-24(g)(1) (2007); NEW PORT
RICHEY, FLA., CODE § 13-539(a) (2007); ORANGE PARK, FLA., CODE § 27-33(a) (2007); PALM
BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 116-11 (2007); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 8-
15(e)(3) (2007); PASCO COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-39(a) (2007); RIVIERA
BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-51(c) (2007); SURFSIDE, FLA., CODE § 22-17(b)
(2007); WILTON MANORS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5.5-104(g)(1) (2007); MARCO
ISLAND, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 46-50(a) (2006); N. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 20-4(g)(1) (2006); BAY HARBOR ISLANDS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5/2-
11(13)(a) (2006); PORT RICHEY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 22-39(a) (2005).
21. MLMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 8A-110.1(3) (2007).
22. LAKE PARK, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-255(a) (2007); MIRAMAR, FLA., CODE §
2-260.1 (2007); W. PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 66-8 (2007); WILTON
MANORS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-268(q) (2007).
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4. Ordinances Relating to Forms of Speech
There are two municipalities within the state of Florida that have en-
acted ordinances precluding discrimination based upon sexual orientation in
the disbursement of parade permits. 3
Three municipalities have enacted ordinances which specifically declare
that graffiti with messages that display prejudices based upon sexual orienta-
tion are unlawful.24 Three Florida municipalities have codified nonbinding
campaign pledges to refrain from making sexual orientation an issue in po-
litical campaigns.
5. Ordinances Relating to Vehicular Services
Broward County has enacted barriers against discrimination based upon
sexual orientation by taxi companies.26 North Miami prohibits towing com-
panies from discriminating based upon sexual orientation.27
6. Miscellaneous
Lake Worth, Florida has taken the unique approach of incorporating
Florida's state civil rights protections into a civil rights ordinance covering
only the city of Lake Worth, but has explicitly included sexual orientation as
a protected status.28
B. Ordinances Enacted Which Negatively Impact Efforts Against
Discrimination
Occasionally, attitudes unsupportive of homosexual rights that are held
by lawmakers and their constituents are expressed through legislation.29 Two
methods through which this can be accomplished are by enacting definitions
23. CORAL GABLES, FLA., CODE § 62-192 (2008); BELLE GLADE, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 17.5-4 (2007).
24. S. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-100 (2007); PEMBROKE PARK, FLA., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 5-206 (2004); PARKER, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-101 (2000).
25. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 11-4(e)(1) (2007); FORT MYERS, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 18-536 (2007); N. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-11 l(d)(1) (2007);
PASCO COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 115-6 (2007).
26. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 22 2-7(g) (2007).
27. N. MIAMI, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11-220 (2007).
28. LAKE WORTH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 20-2 (2007).
29. AMY D. RONNER, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW 3 (2005).
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which explicitly exclude homosexual persons from protection, 30 or through
legislation actually attacking the rights of gays and lesbians.31 Perhaps the
most famous example of the latter is the amendment to the Colorado Consti-
tution which was passed in order to ban "all legislative, executive, or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect gay men
and lesbians. 32
The amendment was subsequently struck down by the United States
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,33 because the Court found it unconstitu-
tional that:
[h]omosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class with re-
spect to transactions and relations in both the private and govern-
mental spheres, [and t]he amendment withdraws from homosexu-
als, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused
by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies.
34
The Court concluded that the amendment "classifie[d] homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
This Colorado cannot do. A [s]tate cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws. [The amendment] violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 35
Two Florida municipalities have included definitional clarifications
which are intended to prevent ordinances from being construed to offer pro-
tections based upon sexual orientation,36 and one municipality, in what could
be considered Florida's mini-replay of Romer, enacted legislation hostile to
the enactment of ordinances that would offer greater protections based upon
a person's sexual orientation.37
1. The Definitional Clarifications of Pinellas County and Bradenton
Two municipalities in Florida, seemingly in order to avoid any possible
misconstruing of their ordinances, have provided to the reader that the term
"handicap" does not apply to a person because of their sexual orientation;
30. See infra note 38 and accompanying discussion.
31. See infra notes 32-35, 39-46 and accompanying discussion.
32. RONNER, supra note 29, at 10.
33. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34. Id. at 627.
35. Id. at 635.
36. See infra note 38 and accompanying discussion.
37. See infra notes 32-35, 39-46 and accompanying discussion.
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this effectively prevents courts from interpreting imprecise ordinances as
granting such protections."
2. The Tumultuous Case of Alachua County
Alachua County is unique among Florida municipalities in that it at-
tempted to create a barrier to the enactment of protective ordinances by en-
acting an amendment to its county charter stating, "the board of county
commissioners shall not adopt any ordinance creating classifications based
upon sexual orientation, sexual preference, or similar characteristics, except
as necessary to conform county ordinances to federal or state law."39 The
impetus for passing the amendment began, ironically, with the attempt to
pass a nondiscrimination ordinance which included protections against sex-
ual orientation discrimination, which succeeded in March of 1993 .40 After
this occurred, there was a backlash among Alachua County residents, and
"[t]he Alachua County ordinance was repealed by the voters ... in the Re-
publican landslide general election of November 8, 1994." '41 The amendment
prohibiting the enactment of protective ordinances was also enacted in 1994
after a county referendum on the issue passed with fifty-seven percent of the
vote.42
The amendment prohibiting the enactment of protections based upon
sexual orientation was challenged in a case filed in the Eighth Circuit Court
of Florida, Morris v. Hill.43 A final disposition was entered on the case in a
summary judgment proceeding on November 22, 1996. 44 In Morris, the
court considered the then recently decided Romer to be the controlling case
law, stating that "[t]he issue presented to this court is whether Amendment 1,
the 1994 amendment to... the Alachua County Home Rule Charter, violates
the Equal Protection [C]lause of the Constitution of the United States as in-
terpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans. 45 The
court found that it was, explaining that:
38. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 70-101 (2007); BRADENTON, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 46-2 (2006).
39. ALACHUA COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2.2(D) (2007).
40. Terl, supra note 6, at 839.
41. Id. at 840; see also Adams, supra note 6, at 757-58.
42. ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS 145 (2005).
43. Final Judgment at 1, Morris v. Hill, No. 94-2084-CA (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Nov. 22,
1996).
44. Id. at3.
45. Id. at 1.
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Amendment I to the Alachua County Home Rule Charter,
though narrower in many respects, suffers from the same constitu-
tional infirmities as the Colorado amendment struck down in Ro-
mer. Amendment 1 singles out one characteristic, sexual orienta-
tion, [as] the basis for discrimination against homosexuals and bi-
sexuals, and prevents the Alachua County Commission from pass-
ing any laws without a referendum, to provide protection against
discrimination. It effectively restructures the local government so
that those of homosexual and bi-sexual orientation are disabled
from seeking safeguards that others may seek without constraint,
placing homosexuals and bi-sexuals on an unequal footing from
anyone else when it comes to seeking protection. . . .Under the
analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Romer,
there is no legitimate governmental interest that can support
Amendment 1. Amendment I's focus on sexual orientation cannot
be explained on any rational basis other than ... a manifestation of
the majority's condemnation of homosexuality ... and the desire
to disable homosexuals and bi-sexuals from seeking protective leg-
islation from the county commission.
46
C. A Possible Explanation for the Disinclination of Municipalities to Enact
Protective Ordinances
Beyond the outright hostility displayed in some legislative enactments
against gays and lesbians, there is a potentially more damaging attitude to-
wards homosexual rights that a legislature can adopt; this attitude is that their
enactment will have no beneficial effects upon the rights of gays and lesbi-
ans, and therefore, there is no purpose in making such an enactment. The
City of Hallandale Beach, Florida has displayed such an attitude with regard
to discrimination ordinances in general, which may be one of the reasons it
has not enacted an ordinance which grants protections based upon sexual
orientation.4 7 In a meeting of the City Commission on April 2, 2002, there
was a discussion relating to the creation of a Community Relations Board
which would "foster harmony, work to improve communication, and address
discrimination based [upon] race, religion, economic status, and other fac-
tors." ' The proposed Community Relations Board was struck down because
members of the City Commission felt that Hallandale Beach was too small, it
46. Id at 2-3.
47. See Hallandale Beach, Fla. City Comm'n, Minutes of Regular Meeting (April 2,
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would impede the work of the police, and it was believed that citizens would
be uninterested in such an effort.49
III. FLORIDA CASE LAW AND FEDERAL CASE LAW RELATING TO FLORIDA:
A DISCUSSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The Florida Constitution offers protections to citizens of Florida in ar-
eas of privacy, as well as in equal protection areas." Furthermore, advocates
of homosexual rights have argued in court proceedings that the United States
Constitution precludes Florida from taking certain actions." One example of
this is the attack on Florida statutory enactments using the United States
Constitution. Generally, however, advocates of homosexual rights have
met with extremely limited success in advancing protections based upon
sexual orientation through cases advocating protections under the Florida
Constitution, or attacking actions taken by Florida with the United States
Constitution."
A. Privacy Rights and Protection from Discrimination Based upon Sexual
Orientation
The Florida Constitution states in Article I, section 23 that "[e]very
natural person has a right to be let alone and free from governmental intru-
sion into [his] private life."54 When adopted in 1980, it was thought that
privacy protections would be substantially bolstered. For those advocating
extending privacy protections to protect gays and lesbians from discrimina-
tion, it has been disappointing that Florida courts have shown an "overabun-
dance of caution ... [and] seem reluctant to take section 23's straightforward
command at face value. 56
49. Id.
50. See discussion infra Part III.
51. See discussion infra Part III.A1, B.
52. See discussion infra Part III.A2, B2.
53. See discussion infra Part III.
54. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
55. John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the Reality
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1. Florida Cases Exploring Florida Constitutional Protections
One of the few Florida cases which discuss constitutional protections
against discrimination based upon sexual orientation is a trial court case
which extends limited protection from workplace discrimination based upon
sexual orientation, Woodard v. Gallagher." In Woodard, a deputy sheriff
was fired by the Sheriff of Orange County for homosexual conduct under-
taken before the deputy sheriff began employment with the Sheriffs office.58
The Sheriff became aware of the conduct only through an "accidental dis-
covery of [the plaintiffs] homosexual conduct prior to [the plaintiff] becom-
ing a deputy sheriff and [the plaintiffs] honest answers ... posed to him by
agents of the Sheriff about his sexual conduct and preference."59 The court
considered several constitutional arguments and determined that the Sheriff
had violated the deputy sheriff's right to privacy granted by the Florida Con-
stitution.60
In finding that the actions of the Sheriff violated the privacy rights of
the plaintiff, the court in Woodard explained:
[t]here was no evidence that his job or public life was affected in
any respect by [the plaintiff's homosexual] conduct. Such conduct
was not unlawful and there was no public rumor as to his involve-
ment in any sexual conduct. Also, he stated that he .. .would
even abstain from any personal homosexual relationships if that
was required to keep his job.6'
The appropriate standard of review for analyzing Article I, section 23
claims is articulated in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.62 In
Winfield, the court stated that:
[s]ince the privacy section as adopted contains no textual standard
of review, it is important for us to identify an explicit standard to
be applied in order to give proper force and effect to the amend-
ment. The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we be-
lieve demands the compelling state interest standard. This test
shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on pri-
vacy. The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged
57. 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 41,652, at 71,730-32 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. 1992).




62. 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
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regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its
goal through the use of the least intrusive means.63
In Woodard, while finding that the Sheriff had a legitimate, but not
compelling interest in gaining knowledge about the sexual orientation of
deputies so that he could "make use of the deputies' aptitudes," he could not
use this knowledge to punish the deputies.'
In Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox65
(Cox 1), a case involving Florida's refusal to allow the adoption of a child by
two homosexual men, a Florida appellate court had the opportunity to ad-
dress the issue of sexual orientation and privacy rights,6 6 but chose not to
decide directly as to whether or not sexual orientation is protected by the
Florida Constitution.67 Instead, when the court examined the facts of the
case and noted that the plaintiffs had voluntarily given the information that
they were homosexual,68 the court stated that "[the plaintiffs] voluntarily
admitted that they are homosexual. They cannot claim an expectation of
privacy concerning a fact that they have willingly disclosed. ' 69 The problem
with this logic is that:
[b]y putting the question on the form, the state demanded private
information about the applicants' background. Further, if Cox and
Jackman had not answered the question, one of two things would
have happened-they would have been presumed to be homosex-
ual, or HRS would have specifically inquired as to their sexual ori-
70
entation.
On appeal, in Cox v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services71 (Cox fl), the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower court's
ruling with respect to the decision on whether the Florida Constitution grants
privacy protections to persons based upon their sexual orientation.7 2
63. Id.
64. Woodard, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,652, at 71,73 1.
65. 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc).
66. See id. at 1215-17.
67. Id. at 1217-18.
68. Id. at 1212.
69. Id. at 1215.
70. Tiffani G. Lee, Case Note, Cox v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services:
A Challenge to Florida's Homosexual Adoption Ban, 51 U. MIAMi L. REv. 151, 161 (1996).
71. 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
72. Id. at 903.
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2. The Federal Refusal to Strike down a Florida Law Under United States
Constitutional Privacy Rights
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard Lofion v. Secre-
tary of the Department of Children and Family Services,73 in which a chal-
lenge to Florida's refusal to allow homosexual persons to adopt children was
again asserted.7 4 The plaintiffs, in challenging a Florida statute prohibiting
adoption by homosexual persons,75 relied on Lawrence v. Texas,76 a case in
which the United States Supreme Court wrote an opinion reflecting the
proposition that "the state cannot criminalize private, consensual, homosex-
ual behavior.",77 The statute which the plaintiffs challenged in Lofton reads
"[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual."" In Lofton, the plaintiffs argued that Lawrence "identified a
hitherto unarticulated fundamental right to private sexual intimacy., 79 The
Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the Florida Constitution grants
privacy protections based upon sexual orientation; instead, it distinguished
Lawrence, and rejected the plaintiffs' argument, stating:
[w]e conclude that it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading
of Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right.
Accordingly, we need not resolve the second prong of appellants'
fundamental-rights argument: whether exclusion from the statu-
tory privilege of adoption because of appellants' sexual conduct
creates an impermissible burden on the exercise of their asserted
right to private sexual intimacy. 0
While ultimately deciding that the plaintiffs' interpretation of Lawrence
was incorrect, the court did not definitively state that sexual orientation was
not protected by constitutional privacy rights.8 ' Instead, the court stated that
"the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case ... [and] cannot
be extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual persons."8'2 This
73. 358 F.3d 804 (11 th Cir. 2004).
74. Id. at 808.
75. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007).
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage 17 (Univ. of Va.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper 56, 2007), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context-uvalwps.
78. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
79. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 815.
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should be interpreted not as a definitively negative outcome for homosexual
persons, but rather as a decision which reflects cautious judicial restraint, a
sentiment expressed earlier in the opinion. 3
B. The Florida Equal Protection Clause: A Dead End for Those
Advocating the Extension of Heightened Protections Based upon Sexual
Orientation
The Florida Constitution states: "[a]ll natural persons, female and male
alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are
the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, [and] to pursue happiness." 4
Florida courts have not designated sexual orientation as a suspect class; if
they did so, it would offer a heightened level of protection.85 Florida courts
interpret Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution as being equivalent
to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.6 Federal
courts have declined to raise sexual orientation to the level of a suspect
class.8 7 Florida courts have followed this example, and discrimination based
upon sexual orientation receives rational basis review. 8
1. Woodard and Cox: Indications of Judicial Reluctance
The court in Woodard, while extending privacy protections against dis-
crimination based upon sexual orientation, balked at extending suspect class
status based upon sexual orientation, stating that:
because of the turmoil in this area, I ... shift the equal protection
issue in this case and [do] not reach the decision of finding that
homosexually oriented persons are entitled to heightened scrutiny
as a class and that the Sheriffs actions are unconstitutional under
equal protection standards. In light of [the extension of privacy
protections to the plaintiff], the issue of heightened [equal] protec-
83. Id. at 815.
84. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
85. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983).
86. Sasso v. Ram Prop. Mgmt., 431 So. 2d 204, 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 408 So. 2d 711, 714 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
87. E.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir. 1990).
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tion [rights] to homosexually oriented persons as a class need not
be reached. 89
Despite this outcome, the court engaged in a lengthy discussion in dicta
regarding discrimination based upon sexual orientation, in what reads as an
indictment of higher courts and society:
[t]his case brings into focus the fact that persons, both individually
and as a class, can presently be ... discriminated against by our
government because of their homosexual orientation unless those
persons can show [under the rational basis test] that such discrimi-
nation is completely arbitrary or irrational . . . [despite it being
shown that] a rational basis test can be easily abused and used to
hide prejudice behind constructed or pretextual reasons ... [i]t ap-
pears that the only reason [homosexual persons] have not been
granted heightened equal protection rights is because the differ-
ence in them touches most peoples' deeply ingrained heterosexual
orientation both personally and culturally.
90
The court in Cox I also addressed the issue of equal protection rights
and sexual orientation, but in contrast to the hesitant language in Woodard,
its decision squarely opposed granting equal protection rights based upon
sexual orientation. 91 The court explained that "neither the statutory privilege
to adopt nor the choice to engage in homosexual activity involves a funda-
mental right. Thus, strict scrutiny can apply in this case only if homosexual
activity creates a suspect classification." 92 The court then concluded that
there was no basis to create a new suspect class based upon sexual orienta-
tion, and declined to apply strict scrutiny to the case, applying instead ra-
tional basis review.93 Interestingly, the decision seems to suggest that the
court may have been receptive to an argument for granting intermediate level
review based upon sexual orientation, but "[t]he trial court did not rely upon
an intermediate review [and] [t]he parties have neither argued for such a re-
view nor provided case law from other courts adopting such an approach to
homosexual activity. 94
While Cox I provides insight into how one Florida appellate court ap-
proaches questions of sexual orientation from an equal protection standpoint,
89. Id. (dictum).
90. Id. at 71,731-32 (dictum).
91. Coxl, 627So. 2dat 1218-19.
92. Id. at 1218.
93. Id. at 1219.
94. Id. at 1218.
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unfortunately for those seeking authoritative law on the subject, it is no
longer binding authority on this point of law because it was reversed on ap-
peal in COx j.95 In Cox II, the Supreme Court of Florida did not attack the
legal reasoning of the court in Cox I, but instead found that the factual record
was insufficient to come to a decision on the issue, stating that "[t]he record
is insufficient to determine that this statute can be sustained against an attack
as to its constitutional validity on the rational basis standard for equal protec-
tion under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. A more complete
record is necessary in order to determine this issue."96 The "case was volun-
tarily dismissed before the" case could be heard again to more thoroughly
address the equal protection claims under the Florida Constitution.97 Be-
cause of this outcome, the question of whether or not sexual orientation de-
mands a higher level of review than rational basis remains undetermined.98
2. The Role of Judicial Deference
Because decisions extending constitutional protections based upon sex-
ual orientation are embroiled in cultural controversy,99 it is unsurprising that
decisions are often reached which avoid discussions of extending such pro-
tections. This reluctance is displayed when courts fall back on the philoso-
phy of judicial restraint to avoid deciding cases on particular grounds, such
as in Woodard, where the court stated that the decision to grant heightened
levels of protection based upon sexual orientation "is best left to a higher
court or our legislature."' 00 The Second District Court of Appeal expressed
similar reservations in Cox I, stating that:
[t]he debate over the nature of homosexuality and the wisdom of
the strictures that our society has historically placed upon homo-
sexual activity cannot and should not be resolved today in this
court. For purposes of governance, the legislature is the proper fo-
rum in which to conduct this debate so long as its decisions are
permitted by the state and federal constitutions.'
01
95. See Cox II, 656 So. 2d at 903.
96. Id.
97. Terl, supra note 6, at 824; see also, Adams, supra note 6, at 766.
98. See Lee, supra note 70, at 167.
99. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, andLaw, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 95-96 (2003).
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The court also pointed out that rational basis review is the test which is
the most deferential to the legislature, stating that "[t]his test is intended to
permit the legislature to make most public policy decisions without interfer-
ence from the courts."'' 0 2 In concluding, the court again made reference to
the legislature by stating that "[i]t may be that the legislature should revisit
this issue . . . but we cannot say that the limited research reflected in this
record compels the judiciary to override the legislature's reasoning."'' 3
Lofton, decided by a federal circuit court, also demonstrates an unwill-
ingness to stray away from a position of judicial deference with regard to
sexual orientation and constitutional protections. '4 In Lofton, the court
states that "[t]here is no precedent for appellants' novel proposition ... we
decline appellants' invitation to recognize a new fundamental right ... [s]uch
an expansion ... would well exceed our judicial mandate as a lower federal
court." 5 Thus, because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the
position that they are too low of a court to recognize a new fundamental
right, they have also taken the position that the United States Supreme Court
is the only Court which may properly recognize new fundamental rights. 0 6
IV. THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
AND ATTEMPTS BY ADVOCATES OF HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS TO GAIN
PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1992 THROUGH
THE COURT SYSTEM
Florida has codified a number of protections against discrimination
based upon a person's characteristics or status in what is known as the "Flor-
ida Civil Rights Act of 1992. ' 'I07 The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 was
"patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' 08
The general purposes of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 are to
secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimina-
tion because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
handicap, or marital status and thereby to protect their interest in
102. Id. at 1219.
103. Id. at 1220.




107. FLA. STAT. § 760.01(1) (2007).
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personal dignity, to make available to the state their full productive
capacities, to secure the state against domestic strife and unrest, to
preserve the public safety, health, and general welfare, and to pro-
mote the interests, rights, and privileges of individuals within the
state.'o9
Recently, an amendment was proposed which would enlarge the scope
of statuses protected by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992." ° On March
20, 2007, Florida State Senator Ted Deutch proposed an amendment which
would add "sexual orientation" and "familial status" to the list of protected
statuses, and replace the term "handicap" with the term "disability" through-
out the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,"' and other sections relating to civil
rights. The amendment would offer protections against discrimination based
upon sexual orientation "in the areas of education,'1 2 employment," 3 hous-
ing.' 4 public accommodations," 5 the affording of public lodging," 6 rental
housing, "' access to loans, 8 and development decisions." 9
A. Innovative Efforts to Protect Against Discrimination Based upon Sexual
Orientation
Because the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 does not currently contain
explicit protections against discrimination based upon sexual orientation,
homosexual persons have attempted to find protections using innovative le-
gal theories. 20 These legal theories have met with mixed success, and have
forced homosexual persons to take positions that are often unpalatable.' 21
Two legal theories which proponents of homosexual rights have attempted to
use to extend protections, or could be argued to extend protections to homo-
sexual persons, is arguing that homosexuality is a legal handicap, and argu-
109. FLA. STAT. § 760.01(2).
110. Fla. SB 2628 (2007); see also Fla. HB 639 (2007). HB 639 is the identical version of
SB 2628 in the Florida House of Representatives.
111. Fla. SB 2628, § 1.
112. Id. §4.
113. Id § 6.
114. Id. §9.
115. Id. § 5.
116. Fla. SB 2628, § 7.
117. Id. § 9.
118. Id. § 11.
119. Id. § 12.
120. See infra discussion Part 1V A.
121. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying discussion.
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ing that social stereotypes of HIV/AIDS afflictions among the homosexual
community causes discrimination against homosexual persons.' 22
1. The Perception of Homosexuality as a Handicap or Disability
The proposed amendment strikes the definition of "handicap" and re-
places it with the word "disability," and defines disability similarly to handi-
cap. 23 The definition of "disability" in the amendment is "[a] physical or
mental impairment that a person has, has a record of having, or is regarded as
having, that substantially limits one or more major life activities; or ... [a]
developmental disability.' ' 124 The definition of "handicap" being stricken is
"a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
major life activities, or he or she has a record of having, or is regarded as
having, such physical or mental impairment."' 25 These are somewhat expan-
sive definitions, and it is foreseeable that some people may consider homo-
sexuality to fall within them. 126 Indeed, "[a]lthough most homosexuals likely
would resist being considered disabled, some segments of society continue to
view homosexuality as a handicap.' 27 It is not outside the realm of possi-
bilities that a clever attorney could argue that homosexuality is a legally pro-
tectable handicap; perhaps this is why Pinellas County and Bradenton, Flor-
ida, have enacted ordinances explicitly excluding homosexuality from the
definition of "handicap."'28 The definition of "handicap" in Pinellas County,
as an illustrative example, provides that "reference to 'an individual with a
handicap' or to 'handicap' does not apply to an individual because of that
individual's sexual orientation or because that individual is a transvestite.' 29
Case law exists which demonstrates attempts to make a link between
homosexuality and suffering from a handicap. 3 ° In Blackwell v. United
122. See infra discussion Part W Al-A2.
123. Fla. SB 2628, § 8.
124. Id.
125. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(7)(a) (2007).
126. See Louis P. Nappen, Why Segregated Schools for Gay Students May Pass a 'Sepa-
rate but Equal' Analysis but Fail Other Issues and Concerns, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 101, 111 (2005).
127. Id; see also Alan Medinger, Narrowing the Homosexual Problem, REGENERATION
NEWS (Regeneration Ministries, Baltimore, Md.) March-April 2005, at 2,
http://www.regenerationministries.org/newsletters/200503.pdf (stating that "[u]nresolved
homosexuality is a handicap, but others with far worse handicaps get on with productive
lives," and making further claims that homosexual persons have feelings of inadequacy).
128. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 70-101 (2007); BRADENTON, FLA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 46-2 (2006).
129. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 70-101.
130. See, e.g., Blackwell v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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States Department of Treasury,3 ' a transvestite sued for unlawful discrimi-
nation based upon his perceived sexual orientation when an interviewer per-
ceived him to be homosexual based upon his status as a transvestite. 32 Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a judge for the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia at the time, authored the court's opinion and stated that:
plaintiff-appellant ... suffered discriminatory denial of a govern-
ment employment opportunity because the supervisory officer who
served as second interviewer, Mr. Strange, perceived Blackwell to
be a homosexual.... [T]here is no precedent for holding that one's
sexual orientation or preference [is protected as a handicapped
status, and furthermore] ... the liability of a government depart-
ment.., should not turn on the level of sophistication or ability to
classify of the particular interviewing officer-in this case, on
whether that officer knows that homosexuality and transvestism
are not one and the same. 33
If Florida legislators do not pass an amendment to the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992 in order to include sexual orientation as a protected cate-
gory, it is possible that a homosexual person may attempt to argue that ho-
mosexuality is a "a physical or mental impairment [that] substantially limits
one or more major life activities,"'' 34 in an argument similar to the one made
in Blackwell.135 While the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 is generally in-
terpreted similarly to Title VII claims, 136 it is possible that Florida could di-
verge from federal courts that do not classify homosexuality as a handicap
and allow protections to be extended based upon sexual orientation.'37 Ac-
cording to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which was interpreting the
Florida Human Rights Act-the previous name of the Florida Civil Rights
Act of 1992138
131. Id. at 1183.
132. Id. at 1183-84.
133. Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(7)(a) (2007).
135. Blackwell, 830 F.2d at 1183-84.
136. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 1989) (stating
that "Florida's Human Rights Act appears to be patterned after Title VII of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964").
137. See Andujar v. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Underwriters, 659 So. 2d 1214, 1216 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
138. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Dupont, 933 So. 2d 75, 100 n.35 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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[t]he United States is a land of dual sovereigns. Citizens are sub-
ject to the sovereign power of the United States, but they are also
subject to the sovereign power of the state in which they reside.
Although designed to play different roles in our governmental
scheme, the two sovereigns sometimes legislate on the same sub-
ject. If Congress does not intend for its legislation to displace state
laws on the same subject, a citizen of a state may have rights under
the federal law, and at the same time she may have rights under the
state law.'
39
The court concluded by stating, "it is clear that a claim made under the
one statute is not the same cause of action as a claim made under the
other.
1 40
Further support for the possibility of homosexuality being interpreted as
falling under the definition of "handicap" can be found in Smith v. City of
Jacksonville Correctional Institution14' where the Florida Division of Ad-
ministrative Hearings found that transsexualism was a handicap.' 42 Homo-
sexual persons are considered to have a handicap by some portions of soci-
ety. 143 "Homosexuality and transsexuality [both] subvert norms and expecta-
tions about how women and men should live their lives as sexual beings,
[and] [t]raditional notions of sex and gender are transgressed by both homo-
sexuals and transsexuals."' ' 4 Additionally, some Florida judicial bodies have
extended protections against discrimination to transsexuals,'45 and therefore
it should not seem outside the realm of possibility that judicial bodies in
Florida may extend protections from discrimination based upon sexual orien-
tation to homosexuals.
139. Andujar, 659 So. 2d at 1216.
140. Id. at 1217.
141. No. 88-5451, 1991 WL 833882 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'gs Oct. 2, 1991); but see Order
Dismissing Petition for Relief at 2, Fishbaugh v. Brevard County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 22-
02697 (Fla. Comm'n on Hum. Rel. Aug. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ros/2003/03-1139%20Agency%20Final%200rder.pdf.
142. Smith, 1991 WL 833882, at*14.
143. Nappen, supra note 126, at I 11.
144. Melinda Chow, Note, Smith v. City of Salem: Transgendered Jurisprudence and an
Expanding Meaning of Sex Discrimination under Title VII, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 207, 215
(2005).
145. Smith, 1991 WL 833882, at *14.
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2. Social Stereotypes of HIV/AIDS, the Homosexual Community, and
Efforts to Use Such Stereotypes to Advance Protections for Homosexual
Persons Under Florida Law
Florida Statutes section 760.50 offers protections against discrimination
based upon a person's HIV/AIDS status.1 46 It states in part that "[a]ny per-
son with or perceived as having acquired immune deficiency syndrome, ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human immunode-
ficiency virus shall have every protection made available to handicapped
persons.' ' 47 The Florida legislature found that such protections were neces-
sary because:
persons infected or believed to be infected with human immunode-
ficiency virus have suffered and will continue to suffer irrational
and scientifically unfounded discrimination. The [l]egislature fur-
ther finds and declares that society itself is harmed by this dis-
crimination, as otherwise able-bodied persons are deprived of the
means of supporting themselves, providing for their own health
care, housing themselves, and participating in the opportunities
otherwise available to them in society.
148
Unfortunately, negative stereotypes about homosexual persons pervade
society, including the "stereotype that links homosexual orientation with
AIDS.' ' 149 Because negative stereotypes linking HIV/AIDS to homosexual
persons exist, 5 ' and because discrimination against HIV/AIDS exists in so-
ciety,'5 1 homosexual persons have been discriminated against because of the
belief that they have HIV/AIDS and have challenged this discrimination
based upon this perceived status. 52 In Cordero v. AMR Services Corp.,153 the
146. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (2007).
147. Id.
148. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1).
149. Lawrence Kent Mendenhall, Note, Misters Korematsu and Steffan: The Japanese
Internment and the Military's Ban on Gays in the Armed Forces, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 196, 225
(1995). The dissent in Steffan v. Perry rejects this stereotype. 41 F.3d 677, 720 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc) (Wald, J. dissenting) (noting that "[hiomosexual orientation cannot spread the
AIDS virus. Homosexual, or heterosexual, conduct can-if one participant carries the vi-
rus."); see also Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual
Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133, 157 (1992). "The word 'homosex-
ual' itself raises the negative imagery and characteristic stereotyping that society has imputed
to the term. Common negative images and stereotypes include: homosexuals are loathsome
sex addicts who spread AIDS and other venereal diseases." Mison, supra, at 157.
150. Id.
151. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1).
152. See, e.g., Cordero v. AMR Servs. Corp., 7 A.D. Cases 98, 98 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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[homosexual] [p]laintiff allege[d] that Defendant's stated reason
for his discharge was pretextual. Plaintiff claims that Defendant
terminated his employment in contravention of Florida Statutes
§760.50 because he was perceived to carry... [HIV/AIDS] ... or
to have undergone HIV testing. Plaintiff has been tested for HIV,
but does not carry the virus. 154
In Kaufman v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc.,' 55 a claim was filed
under Florida Statutes section 760.50 because an employee of Checker's
Restaurant had anti-homosexual insults directed at him and references were
made that implied the employee had contracted HIV/AIDS. 156 Cordero and
Kaufman both attempt to make a link between the perception of HIV/AIDS
infection and discrimination based upon sexual orientation.'57 If the Florida
Legislature were to pass an amendment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of
1992-which granted explicit protections against discrimination based on
sexual orientation-such an attempt would not be necessary because litigants
could file suits based solely upon sexual orientation-based discrimination
instead of attempting to make an attenuated link through HIV/AIDS dis-
crimination.'
V. A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON MARRIAGE
Recently, a vocal minority of Florida's populace succeeded in a years-
long effort to place a referendum to amend the Florida Constitution; the aim
of this referendum is to prevent any legislature in Florida from passing laws
which allow homosexuals to marry, or even to enter into a substantially
equivalent relationship.'59 The proposed amendment states that "[i]nasmuch
as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband
and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial
equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized."' 6 By including the words
"substantial equivalent," the proponents of the amendment seek to go further
than banning only gay marriage; under an explanation section on their web-
site entitled "The Amendment, Domestic Partnerships and Civil Unions," the
153. Id.
154. Id. at 98.
155. 122 F.3d 892 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 893.
157. See Kaufman, 122 F.3d at 893; see also Cordero, 7 A.D. Cases at 98.
158. See generally FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (2007).
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proponents explain that they intend the amendment to invalidate "any other
legal union that is treated as marriage.' 61
Broward County has codified a procedure in which gays and lesbians
may obtain a domestic partnership, which provides numerous protections
within Broward County. 62 West Palm Beach has codified a similar domestic
partnership ordinance. 163 Besides the fact that Broward County and West
Palm Beach refer to domestic partnership agreements, these domestic part-
nerships would seem to fall within the boundaries of the proposed constitu-
tional amendment that seeks to ban the substantial equivalent of marriage
otherwise; Broward County, for example, describes a relationship that cer-
tainly sounds akin to marriage, stating that "there are many individuals who
establish and maintain a significant personal, emotional, and economic rela-
tionship with another individual. Individuals forming such domestic partner-
ships often live in a committed family relationship."'" 4 The constitutional
amendment, therefore, has extremely important repercussions for those that
have registered as living in a domestic partnership; their rights may be
stripped. One organization that is campaigning against the amendment states
that:
[t]he ballot language is written in very broad terms that will be
interpreted by our courts. Possible scenarios can include the
termination of all domestic partner registries in the state.
Domestic Partner registries provide for hospital visitation rights.
When the state of Michigan passed similar language, the Michigan
Court of Appeals ruled that the state's constitutional amendment
banning same-sex marriage prevents public institutions from
providing benefits to domestic partners employed by those
institutions. In our own state, the Florida Legislature Office of
Economic and Demographic Research clearly denotes the
possibility of losing domestic partner registries, the loss of
recognized common law marriages and other consequences
affecting both same-sex and opposite sex couples.' 65
The proponents of the amendment have sought to preempt arguments
that the amendment will strip benefits granted through domestic partnership
161. Florida Coal. to Protect Marriage, Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 2008),
http://www.florida4marriage.org/faqs.html [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
162. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE §§ 161/2-151 to 16'/-162 (2007).
163. W. PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 42-47 to 42-50 (2007).
164. BROWARD CoUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16 /-151.
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laws, by stating that "our amendment will not invalidate benefits granted
from domestic partnerships or any other source."' 66 Explaining further, the
proponents state that "[t]he [a]mendment does not affect benefits offered or
contracted in the private sector... [or] prohibit the state or local government
from passing laws which confer rights to unmarried persons."'67 There is a
glaring problem with their explanation that the amendment will not limit
benefits or laws granting rights to unmarried persons, though; the proponents
of the amendment accept a Government Accounting Office assessment that
there are some 1134 rights conferred by marriage. 68 Even if existing Do-
mestic Partnerships are recognized as valid, while the proponents of the
amendment helpfully inform the reader that the amendment will not strip
privately bargained for contractual benefits, or prevent governments from
passing laws which would grant rights to unmarried persons, they fail to ac-
knowledge the obvious repercussion; if the amendment were ratified, there
would need to be some combination of 1134 laws and contracts to grant the
same amount of rights that one marriage certificate grants to heterosexual
spouses. 169
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the state of the law in Florida, with regard to existing protec-
tions against discrimination based upon sexual orientation, is both inconsis-
tent and inadequate; some actions have been taken which are openly hostile
to the rights of gays and lesbians. Across Florida, a few municipalities are
enacting ordinances protecting against discrimination, while some have cho-
166. Fla. Coal. to Protect Marriage, Know Your Opponents Arguments,
http://www.florida4marriage.org/defenders.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) [hereinafter
Know Your Opponents Arguments].
167. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 161.
168. Know Your Opponents Arguments, supra note 166.
169. Additionally, the language of the amendment portends further ominous possibilities:
the denial of rights to those not only in same-sex domestic partnerships, but also to hetero-
sexuals who do not wish to marry, but enter into a domestic partnership or similar union.
Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in interpreting a ratified state constitutional amendment with
similar language to the proposed Florida amendment, stated that "[i]t is undisputed that under
the marriage amendment, heterosexual couples who have not married also may not obtain
employment benefits as a couple on the basis of an agreement." Id. Former United States
Representative and Florida gubernatorial candidate Jim Davis opined that as applied to Flor-
ida, "[i]f [the amendment] passes, unmarried Floridians in committed relationships-
especially seniors who may remain unmarried by choice-could lose their ability to share
healthcare coverage." Jim Davis, 'Marriage Protection' an Unnecessary Burden, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 11, 2008, at A18.
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sen not to; among the municipalities that have, there is a decided lack of ho-
mogeneity in the extent of protections offered. 7 ° Florida courts offer weak
and inconsistent protections depending upon the level of court, and the por-
tion of the Florida Constitution being examined. 7' Federal courts have not
offered a clear guideline as to what legislative enactments by the states are
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution.72 The Florida legisla-
ture has thus far refused to enact explicit protections in the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992; 173 as a result, advocates of homosexual rights have at-
tempted to find protections in innovative, but unsuccessful legal theories. 74
Perhaps most disconcerting of all is the placement on the ballot of a proposed
amendment to the Florida Constitution, which would effectively ban gay
marriage or substantial equivalents in Florida.1
75
Because of the uneven application of protections through the court sys-
tem, the Florida legislature should not ignore the issue of discrimination
based upon sexual discrimination, and should take one of two positions. The
legislature should either enact the proposed amendment to the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992, and explicitly grant protections against discrimination
based upon sexual orientation in order to avoid unexpected and uneven ap-
plications of protections by the court system; or take a different tack, and
follow the examples of Pinellas County and Bradenton, Florida and explicitly
define the terms in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 to prevent protec-
tions from being granted based upon sexual orientation in order to achieve
the same result as those counties. While this may strike some as unpalatable,
it would provide a clear signal to the judiciary of the intent of the legislature,
and would also provide a clear signal to municipalities that feel it is not an
issue that is within their purview. Ideally, the legislature would pass the pro-
posed amendment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, because it would
provide protections much more evenly and quickly than indicating to the
municipalities that they should pass ordinances on the issue. This, however,
is not an ideal world; most likely, the issue will stagnate in the legislature,
and the trend extending protections against discrimination based upon sexual
orientation will continue in sporadic enactments of municipal ordinances.
Unfortunately, the most enthusiastic groups involved in the issue of gay and
lesbian rights seem to be those that oppose them; it remains to be seen
whether the proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution will result in a
170. See discussion supra Part II.
171. See discussion supra Part III.
172. See id.
173. See discussion supra Part IV.
174. See id.
175. See discussion supra Part V.
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step backwards for gay and lesbian advocates, or the bittersweet victory of
maintaining the status quo.
He added, [t]hat ... [t]here was another Point which a little per-
plexed him at present.... I had already explained the Meaning of
the Word; but he was at a Loss how it should come to pass, that
the Law which was intended for every Man's Preservation should
be any Man's Ruin.1
76
176. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 281 (1940).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional reproduction is no longer the sole means of procreation.
Developments in reproductive technology have forced society to confront
traditional assumptions about the family and how the law should regard these
new technological advancements. Assisted reproductive technology has af-
forded the possibility of procreation to persons who once thought that pro-
creation was impossible.' Although society should encourage and reinforce
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Jamie L. Zuckerman is a magna cum laude graduate of Tulane University
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individual choices to nurture children, certain states have placed statutory
limits on who may qualify for reproductive technological advancements. In
Florida, the gestational surrogacy statute requires that the intended parents be
legally married.2 States have also adopted diverse approaches regarding the
presumption of parentage in custody disputes. In traditional surrogacy
agreements, Florida focuses on protecting the rights of the surrogate by al-
lowing her to revoke her consent at any time during her pregnancy and up to
forty-eight hours after the child is born.3
This article will address the constitutionality of the marriage require-
ment in Florida's gestational surrogacy statute and the repercussions of the
right to revoke consent in traditional surrogacy agreements. Part two of this
article will provide a background of gestational surrogacy and traditional
surrogacy. Part three will examine the different theories states adopt in order
to determine legal parentage. Part four will compare Florida's gestational
surrogacy statute to Florida's traditional surrogacy statute. Part five of this
article will present constitutional challenges on restricting surrogacy based
on procreative liberty and the fundamental right to marry. This section will
also examine whether Florida's surrogacy statutes are over or under-
inclusive. Part six will conclude with the premise that the increase of non-
traditional families makes it necessary for Florida to restructure its surrogacy
statutes. In addition, this section will explain how Florida should change its
surrogacy statutes so that its laws will no longer infringe on any of its resi-
dents' procreative rights.
II. BACKGROUND OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND TRADITIONAL
SURROGACY
Every year, millions of couples learn that they are incapable of bearing
children. 4 "For these individuals, alternative reproduction methods are the
with a B.S. in Accounting from the A.B. Freeman School of Business. She would like to
thank her mother Candy, father Steve, and sister Taryn, as she is extremely grateful for their
continuous support and unconditional love. She would also like to thank her colleagues on
Nova Law Review and the faculty of the Law Center, extending special recognition to Profes-
sor Phyllis Coleman and Professor Carolyn Nygren.
1. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and
the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002).
2. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
3. Id. § 63.213(2)(a), (i).
4. Michael E. Eisenberg, Comment, What's Mine Is Mine and What's Yours Is Mine-
Examining Inheritance Rights by Intestate Succession from Children Conceived Through
Assisted Reproduction Under Florida Law, 3 BARRY L. REv. 127, 127 (2002).
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only means by which they are able to have [genetically related] children."5
Surrogacy has readily become a popular option for infertile couples.6 There
are two main types of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and gestational surro-
gacy.7
Traditional surrogacy, referred to in Florida as preplanned adoption,' is
a pregnancy in which the surrogate "provides her own egg, which is fertil-
ized [through] artificial insemination," and then gestates the fetus for another
individual.9 The most common traditional surrogacy arrangement involves
the surrogate being artificially inseminated with the intended father's se-
men.'0 The surrogate then carries the fetus to term and gives birth to the
child for another person." In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate is geneti-
cally linked to the child because she is the biological contributor of the egg. 2
Therefore, the intended mother is never "considered the natural mother of the
child" when the child is born. 3
The second type of surrogacy, gestational surrogacy, is a pregnancy
where one woman-the intended mother-supplies the egg, which is then
fertilized, and another woman-the surrogate-gestates the fertilized egg
and gives birth to the child. 4 Gestational surrogacy can occur in several
5. Id.
6. Amy Garrity, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United
States and Great Britain-A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 809, 809
(2000).
7. Id.
8. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 140. Although Florida uses the term preplanned adoption,
most jurisdictions use the term traditional surrogacy. Florida's gestational surrogacy statute
uses the term commissioning couple while Florida's preplanned adoption statute uses the term
intended parents. Compare FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2007), with id. § 63.213. Florida's pre-
planned adoption statute uses the term volunteer mother while Florida's gestational surrogacy
statute uses the term gestational surrogate. Compare id § 63.213, with id. § 742.15. For
purposes of this article, the term traditional surrogacy will be used in place of preplanned
adoption. The term intended parents will be used to refer to the intended parents in traditional
surrogacy agreements and the commissioning couple in gestational surrogacy contracts. The
term surrogate will be used to refer to the volunteer mother in traditional surrogacy agree-
ments and the gestational surrogate in gestational surrogacy contracts. For purposes of clarity,
this article will use the same terms that are used by most jurisdictions. See Denise E. Las-
carides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1997) (stating the common confusion between "the two types of surro-
gacy").
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (8th ed. 2004).
10. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements
in the Best Interest of Children?, 26 WHWrIER L. REV. 429, 435 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Garrity, supra note 6, at 809.
13. Storrow, supra note 1, at 609.
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (8th ed. 2004).
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ways. 5 "The inten[ded] mother can use her own egg and the inten[ded] fa-
ther [can] use his own sperm," to create an embryo which will then be "fertil-
ized outside of the womb.' 6 The embryo is then "transplanted into the ute-
rus of the surrogate" and there is no genetic link between the surrogate and
the child because the surrogate is not the biological contributor of the egg. 7
Other forms of gestational surrogacy include "the inten[ded] father's sperm
and the egg of an anonymous donor," or the intended mother's egg and the
sperm of an anonymous donor, in order to create an embryo that will be
transplanted into the uterus of the surrogate. 8 Many persons using assisted
reproductive technologies prefer gestational surrogacy over traditional surro-
gacy "because it allows both the intended mother and father to have a bio-
logical connection to the child."' 9
In 1987, national news coverage of the case In re Baby M,2" drew public
attention to the question of where parental rights lie when an infertile mar-
ried couple contracts with another woman to bear a child on their behalf.'
The case arose when Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother, repudiated
the surrogacy contract after giving birth and finding herself unable to part
with the child.22 This was a case of traditional surrogacy, where the child
was conceived by artificial insemination.23 The child was genetically related
to both the intended father, William Stem, and the surrogate, Ms. Whitehead,
with the understanding that Mr. Stem and his wife would raise the child as
their own.2 ' The court denied the parental rights claimed by Mr. and Mrs.
Stem under the surrogacy contract by declaring such contracts void and
against public interest.25 The court recognized Mr. Stem, the intended father,
and Ms. Whitehead, the surrogate mother, as the natural parents based on
their biological relationship to the baby.26 The court granted custody to Mr.
Stem and visitation rights to Ms. Whitehead.27 This case led to "an intense
15. Garrity, supra note 6, at 809.
16. Id. at 809-10.
17. Id. at 810.
18. Id.
19. Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in
Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 606 (2003).
20. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1998).
21. See Alice Hotheimer, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law
and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 571, 574 (1992).
22. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237.
23. See id. at 1235.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1240.
26. See id. at 1247 n.9.
27. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1259, 1263-64.
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national debate and a flurry of legislative activity" with numerous states en-
acting legislation to address surrogate parenting agreements.28
III. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL PARENTAGE
Congress has not enacted federal legislation to deal with the problem of
legal parentage in cases that involve surrogacy. 9 Thus, state legislatures and
state courts have adopted different tests to determine legal parentage based
on intent, genetic contribution, gestation, and the best interests of the child.3°
The conventional surrogacy agreement involved "a fertile husband, an infer-
tile wife, and a fertile [surrogate]" who agreed to use her egg and the hus-
band's sperm to create an embryo and bear the child for the couple.3 Ad-
vances in assisted reproductive technologies, however, have made it possible
to have many potential parents: the intended mother, the intended father, the
sperm donor, the egg donor, and the surrogate.3"
When a court or legislature adopts the intent based theory, legal parent-
age is determined based on the party who "intended to bring the child into
the world" or the one who "orchestrated the reproduction."33 Following this
line of reasoning, the legal parents are the ones who planned to raise the
child.34 The intent theory was originated in California, which was one of the
initial states forced to face gestational surrogacy maternity issues.35 In John-
son v. Calvert,36 the Supreme Court of California was confronted with the
task of determining maternity between the gestational surrogate and the in-
tended mother.37 Because both of these women had a valid claim for mater-
nity, the court was forced to create a new theory of maternity and felt the
case could not "be decided without [ilnquiring into the parties' intentions.' 38
The court looked at the surrogacy contract to determine the parties' inten-
tions regarding maternity and held that "she who intended to procreate the
28. Hofheimer, supra note 21, at 574.
29. Flavia Berys, Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California
Courts Should Proceed When Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W. L.
REv. 321,333 (2006).
30. Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1227 n.19.





35. Larkey, supra note 19, at 622.
36. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
37. Id. at 778.
38. Id. at 782.
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child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law."39
The court's reasoning was based on the premise that the child would not
have come into being if it was not for the intended parents.' Thus, the in-
tended mother had a more natural claim to the child.4
The genetic contribution test determines parentage based on the genetic
relationship between the child and the person who contributed genetic mate-
rial.42 This theory contends that when the child is biologically linked to the
intended parents, the couple will be recognized as the legal parents of the
child.43 In Belsito v. Clark," the couple entered into a gestational surrogacy
agreement whereby the intended mother's sister would gestate the fertilized
genetic material derived from the couple.45 The hospital informed the in-
tended mother that Ohio law required that the birth certificate list her sister's
name as the natural mother.46 Therefore, the intended parents sought a de-
claratory judgment naming them as the legal parents of the child 7.4 The court
held that since the intended parents provided the genetic material for the
child, they were the child's legal and natural parents.48
Before the "emergence of assisted reproductive technologies, most ju-
risdictions [adhered to] the common law rule," which presumed that any
woman who gestates and gives birth to a child is that child's legal mother.49
Advocates of this theory rely on the significance of the gestational mother's
contribution to the child's existence.5" The jurisdictions that adopted this
theory felt that "[t]he gestational mother . . . establishes a unique physical
and emotional bond with the child during the nine months prior to birth, a
bond that the [intended parents] simply cannot attain."5 Essentially, states
that follow the gestational mother theory invalidate gestational surrogacy
contracts because the surrogate and her spouse, not the intended parents, will
always be recognized as the legal parents of the child. 2 When a jurisdiction
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
42. Larkey, supra note 19, at 624.
43. Id
44. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. 1994).
45. Id. at 761.
46. Id. at 762.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 762, 767.
49. Larkey, supra note 19, at 625.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 626.
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adopts this theory, "it discredits the constitutionally protected decision of the
intended parents and the decision of the surrogate who voluntarily partici-
pates in the arrangement."53
The last theory on legal parentage is the best interests of the child stan-
dard, where the court will grant legal parentage to the party that will best
assume the responsibilities of parentage. Proponents of this theory feel that
it allows courts to consider aspects of all theories before deciding who
should be declared the legal parents of the child." Currently, surrogacy stat-
utes usually apply the best interests of the child standard in child custody
disputes as opposed to legal parentage determinations.56 Many feel that the
best interests standard is too problematic because "[i]n some instances, de-
termining the child's best interests is just not feasible" and "[r]anking adults
by their parenting ability would be a bureaucratic nightmare."57
IV. COMPARING FLORIDA'S GESTATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL SURROGACY
STATUTES
No federal legislation has been passed to regulate surrogacy and "[t]he
differing state of the law in this area demonstrates the nation's struggle with
the moral and philosophical considerations involved."58 Due to the lack of
federal legislation, it is necessary to examine gestational surrogacy on a state
statutory basis.59 Florida law explicitly authorizes gestational surrogacy con-
tracts but the statute imposes strict requirements on the contract.60 First, a
binding and enforceable contract mpist be made between the intended parents
and the surrogate.1 In order for the contract to be binding and enforceable,
the gestational surrogate must be "[eighteen] years of age or older" and the
intended parents must be legally married and "[eighteen] years of age or old-
er.",62 Second, before entering into a surrogacy contract, a licensed physician
must determine that: 1) the intended mother is unable to gestate the fetus to
term; 2) "[t]he gestation will cause a risk to the physical health" of the in-
tended mother; or 3) "[t]he gestation will cause a risk to the health of the
53. Id. at 625.
54. Larkey, supra note 19, at 626.
55. Id.
56. Id. at627 n.177.
57. Gillers, supra note 31, at 694.
58. Berys, supra note 29, at 333.
59. See id.
60. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 450.
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fetus."63 Third, the surrogacy contract must include a provision that the ges-
tational surrogate will surrender her parental rights at the birth of the child,
unless it is determined that the child is genetically unrelated to the intended
parents. 4
Florida law also allows individuals to enter into traditional surrogacy
agreements." Although Florida limits gestational surrogacy to married cou-
ples, traditional surrogacy is available to an unmarried couple.66 The tradi-
tional surrogacy statute refers to the "intended mother" and the "intended
father," but nowhere in the statute does it say that the couple must be mar-
ried.67 The statute requires the agreement to include, "[t]hat the [surrogate]
agrees to become pregnant by the fertility technique specified in the agree-
ment, to bear the child, and to terminate any parental rights and responsibili-
ties to the child., 68 In traditional surrogacy, however, the surrogate has up to
forty-eight hours after the child is born to revoke her consent, whereas the
gestational surrogate has no right to revoke her consent.69 In gestational sur-
rogacy, one of the intended parents must be biologically linked to the child,
while no genetic connection is required for traditional surrogacy agree-
ments.70 Furthermore, in traditional surrogacy the intended mother has to
adopt the child because she and the child are not genetically linked.7' Before
she can adopt the child, the surrogate must terminate parental rights because
it is usually the surrogate's egg that is used.72 If the father's sperm was not
used via artificial insemination, then he would have to adopt the child as
well.73
In traditional surrogacy, "the agreement may be terminated at any time
by any of the parties."'74 Essentially, this could mean that the surrogate could
terminate the contract and then turn around and sue the biological and in-
63. Id. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c).
64. Id. § 742.15(3)(c), (e).
65. See id. § 63.213.
66. Compare FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (stating that the intended parents must be married to
qualify for gestational surrogacy), with id. § 63.213 (containing no provision requiring a cou-
ple to be married in order to qualify for traditional surrogacy).
67. See generally id. § 63.213.
68. Id. § 63.213(2)(a).
69. Compare id (stating that the surrogate has the right to revoke consent "any time
within [forty-eight] hours after the birth of the child"), with FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(c) (stating
that the surrogate must agree to surrender parental rights upon the birth of the child).
70. See id. §§ 742.15(3)(e), 63.213.
71. See id. § 63.213.
72. See id. § 63.213(6)(i).
73. See id. § 63.213.
74. FLA. STAT. § 63.213(2)(i).
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tended father for support.75 Due to the lack of cases in Florida focusing on
surrogacy, it is necessary to examine an earlier surrogacy case in another
state and a current custody battle in Florida.76 In the case of In re Mo-
schetta,7 a California court considered for the first time whether traditional
surrogacy contracts, where the surrogate is both the woman who gives birth
to the child and the child's biological contributor of the egg, are enforce-
able.78 The intended parents and surrogate signed an agreement which stated
that the surrogate would be artificially inseminated with the intended father's
semen so that the child would be biologically linked to the father.79 Al-
though there was clear evidence that the surrogate conceived the child with
the intent to facilitate the adoption to an infertile woman, the surrogate was
entitled to rescind the agreement and keep the child.0 The court held that the
child had one mother and that no tie-breaker was required because the ge-
netic mother and the gestational mother were the same person.8" The in-
tended mother had no claim to motherhood because she was not "equally"
the mother of the child.82 The court made it clear that couples "who resort to
traditional surrogacy ... have no assurance their intentions will be honored
in a court of law" and "[fior them and the child, biology is destiny."83 Four
years later, however, the court ruled that the intended mother does have a
claim in gestational surrogacy cases because the surrogate is not biologically
linked to the embryo.8 Thus, the intended mother in a gestational surrogacy
contract, not the surrogate or egg donor, is the lawful mother of the child.85
Presently, a baby battle is occurring in Florida between the intended
parents of a traditional surrogacy agreement and the surrogate they hired.8 6
75. See id. § 63.213(2)(d) (stating that if the intended father has a biological link to the
child "he will assume parental responsibilities for the child"); see also Ann MacLean Massie,
Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent
Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 487, 524 (1991).
76. See Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1258. The author states that there are "few court
decisions on surrogacy contracts" and "far more law review articles discussing this topic than
court decisions." Id.
77. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
78. Id. at 895.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 895, 901.
81. Id. at 896.
82. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
83. Id. at 903.
84. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
85. Id
86. O'Reilly Factor: Bitter Baby Battle (FOX television broadcast July 20, 2007), avail-
able at 2007 WLNR 13850188 [hereinafter O'Reilly Factor].
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Gwyn and Tom Lamitina paid a surrogate to gestate their baby because they
were unable to reproduce on their own.87 The couple, who reside in Orlando,
decorated a bedroom for their baby girl, but their "biggest fear is that [they]
may not be able to bring her home.""8 The surrogate has decided that "she
wants to keep the [baby]"89 and is suing the intended father for child sup-
port.90 As a result of a prior positive surrogacy experience, the Lamitinas
signed a contract with a surrogate in 2006.9" The surrogate accepted all the
benefits of the contract, such as a $1500 deposit. 92 The couple trusted that
the surrogate would carry out the contract and focused their concerns on93 the
health of both the baby and the surrogate.94 The fact that these parties en-
tered into a traditional surrogacy agreement is a crucial part of this case be-
cause Florida law only safeguards the intended parents in a gestational surro-
gacy agreement.95 Despite the intent of the parties and "as unfortunate as it
may be, [the surrogate] was within her Florida rights to rescind the contract
when she did.",96 As a result, it seems that there is no legal recourse for the
intended parents97 and the "baby may never lay its head in [the] crib" the
couple built for her.98
Allowing the surrogate every opportunity to retract the traditional sur-
rogacy agreement at any time leaves the parties whom the "agreement was
meant to protect" constantly worrying about the uncertainty of the outcome. 99
"The intended parents must suffer throughout the pregnancy," fully aware
that they may never "become the child's parents."' ° Traditional surrogacy
agreements contain a clause that allows the surrogate to cancel the agreement
during the pregnancy as well as forty-eight hours after the birth of the
87. Grayson Kamm, Birth Battle: Couple Says Surrogate Morn Won't Give up Baby,
FIRST COAST NEWS, May 23, 2007, http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/florida/news-
article.aspx?storyid=82698.
88. Id.
89. O'Reilly Factor, supra note 86.
90. Kamm, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. O'Reilly Factor, supra note 86.
93. Kamm, supra note 87.




98. Kamm, supra note 87.
99. Eric A. Gordon, Comment, The Aftermath of Johnson v. Calvert: Surrogacy Law
Reflects a More Liberal View of Reproductive Technology, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 191, 207
(1993).
100. Id. at 209.
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child.'' Thus, the intended mother and father "fear that, at any time during
and immediately following the birth of their intended [child], the surrogate
[could] exercise her option [and choose] to maintain custody of the child."' 2
Opponents of surrogacy feel that unmarried persons still have an option be-
cause they are able to enter into traditional surrogacy agreements, but they
just have to "take their chances that the surrogate [will] relinquish custody of
the child at birth."'0 3 However, if the surrogate exercises her option to main-
tain custody, the intended parents would have "no [legal] recourse""° and the
infertile couple could, in essence, become an embryological donor for the
surrogate's child.'0 5
Florida provides an expedited procedure to affirm the child's parentage
for couples participating in gestational surrogacy." "Within [three] days
after the birth of a child," the intended parents can request "an expedited
affirmation of parental status" from the court. 7 If the court determines that
the intended parents and the gestational surrogate entered into "a binding and
enforceable" contract, and at least one of the intended parents is a "genetic
parent of the child," an order is issued stating that the intended parents are
the child's legal' and natural parents."° The Department of Health then
releases a new birth certificate identifying the intended parents as the legal
parents of the child."° For individuals who enter into traditional surrogacy
agreements, expedited affirmation of parental status is not an option."'
Traditional surrogacy agreements create a "high risk of conflict" be-
cause surrogate mothers may regret their decision and refuse to surrender
custody of the child after the child is bom."2 Currently, "Florida's [tradi-
tional] surrogacy policy is geared toward protecting the surrogate,. .. not the
intended parents nor the child-the parties for whom the surrogacy agree-
ment was meant to protect at its inception."' ' Gestational surrogacy affords
infertile couples the opportunity to create a biological child because the
woman could have her "ovum artificially fertilized by the sperm of [her]
101. FLA. STAT. § 63.213(1)(b), (2)(i) (2007).
102. Gordon, supra note 99, at 209.
103. Massie, supra note 75, at 524.
104. Id.
105. Gordon, supra note 99, at 209.
106. FLA. STAT. § 742.16 (2007).
107. Id. § 742.16(1).
108. Id. § 742.16(6).
109. Id. § 742.16(7).
110. Id. § 742.16(8).
111. See FLA. STAT. § 742.16.
112. Larkey, supra note 19, at 610.
113. Gordon, supra note 99, at 207.
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husband... and implanted in the uterus of the surrogate."'"1 4 Due to the fact
that the gestational surrogate is not biologically linked to the child, the in-
tended parents, who are also the biological parents, are in "a stronger legal
position... in the event of a... custody battle.""' 5 Thus, most individuals
favor gestational surrogacy over traditional surrogacy." 6
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Florida requires that the intended parents in a gestational surrogacy
agreement be legally married." 7 The marriage requirement "may be viewed
by some as discriminatory and close-minded in our modem society.""' 8 Even
though unmarried persons may not want to be involved in a romantic rela-
tionship, or even if involved, may not want to marry, "they may still [pos-
sess] the desire to become [a] parent[].""' 9
Single persons wishing to assert constitutional challenges against a
legislative restriction limiting parenthood through surrogacy to
married couples have two available arguments: (1) that such a re-
striction violates their fundamental right of privacy protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
infringes on their right to decide whether to bear or beget a child;
and (2) that this legislative classification based on marital status is
invidious discrimination which violates their rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
A. The Due Process Argument: Procreative Liberty
"The United States has a longstanding tradition of procreative liberty
and each state is responsible for protecting this constitutional liberty granted
to its citizens.'' Protections afforded under the substantive due process
doctrine are established in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Unit-
ed States Constitution.'22 The substantive due process doctrine provides that
the right to privacy protects individuals against unlawful government inva-
114. Larkey, supra note 19, at 610-11.
115. Id at 611.
116. Id. at 606.
117. FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
118. Becky A. Ray, Comment, Embryo Adoptions: Thawing Inactive Legislatures with a
Proposed Uniform Law, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 423, 442 (2004).
119. Id
120. Massie, supra note 75, at 499 (footnotes omitted).
121. Garrity, supra note 6, at 812.
122. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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sion.123 Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court has declared the right to privacy a fundamental right because
it falls under the penumbra of rights that coincide with those in the Bill of
Rights.1
24
Although the United States Supreme Court "has not [yet] addressed"
whether there is a constitutional right of access to assisted reproductive tech-
nology, "it has recognized an individual's right to be free from government
intrusion" concerning matters relating to procreation, family relationships,
and child-rearing. 25 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,126 the Court extended the protec-
tion of privacy to every individual regarding the decision of whether to bear
a child. 27 In regard to family relationships, the Court has held that the fam-
ily is unique to society and that constitutional principles must be applied with
sensitivity and flexibility to meet the needs of a parent and child.
28
1. The Interests of Parents
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,129 the Court stated that the right to procreate is
"one of the basic civil rights of man" and "fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."'' 30 Advocates of surrogacy argue that, "if the right
to procreate through the traditional, coital method is a protected right, then
procreation through surrogacy or other medically available options should
also be protected."''3  There are a growing number of infertile couples who
desperately desire to have and raise a child and "[i]t is the duty of the legisla-
ture to pass laws to protect the[se] citizens ... and ensure that all of the ben-
efits of reproductive technology are available to every member of ... soci-
ety."'3 2 Surrogacy supporters contend that "the liberty interests protected by
the Constitution do not change definition because of the presence or absence
of reproductive technology."' 133 After all, a woman has a fundamental right
123. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-83 (1965).
124. Id. at 483.
125. Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral & International Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood:
The Call for a Uniform Regulatory Scheme in the United States, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 557, 563 (1999).
126. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 453.
128. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
129. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
130. Id. at 541.
131. Gordon, supra note 99, at 200.
132. Garrity, supra note 6, at 832.
133. Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 121 (1997).
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to control her body and the choice of becoming a surrogate or hiring a surro-
gate is a woman's reproductive choice. 34 Furthermore, assisted conception
is still a form of conception, "and arguably no more 'artificial' than the con-
traceptive devices" the United States Supreme Court recognized in Griswold
v. Connecticut3 ' and Eisenstadt.' Therefore, the due process argument is
that "the fundamental right to 'bear or beget a child' [must] include[] access
to any [legal] means of procreation."'3
Proponents of a narrow interpretation of the fundamental right to pro-
create argue that procreative liberty "simply means the right to have natural
children."'3 These proponents argue that the Court's definition of a right to
privacy does not extend to untraditional means of reproduction because these
means "are beyond the scope of the constitutionally recognized procreative
liberty."' 39 While advocates of surrogacy acknowledge the procreative rights
of both the intended mother and the gestational surrogate, opponents feel
"that the procreative choice of a gestational surrogate in conceiving, deliver-
ing, and transferring a child to its genetic parents is not the constitutional
equivalent of exercising her procreative choice to bear her own child."'14
Opponents of surrogacy suggest that because the right to have a third party
serve as a surrogate is not "deeply rooted in tradition," the parties do not
have the constitutional right to have a child if it means that the child will be
conceived through surrogacy. 14 ' Further, some caution that bringing a third
party-the surrogate-into the procreative relationship will put a strain upon
the traditional notions of parenthood and family.'42
In the case of surrogacy, however, none of the state's arguments regard-
ing religious and moral "concerns are justified by harm to another individ-
ual." 43 "[S]tate concerns that do not pose a tangible threat of harm to others
cannot justify the government's intrusion on fundamental rights."'" Re-
stricting gestational surrogacy to a certain class of persons, therefore, would
infringe upon the rights of infertile couples to engage in procreation in situa-
134. Id. at 166.
135. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
136. Kerian, supra note 133, at 121.
137. Id. at 121-22.
138. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 469.
139. Kerian, supra note 133, at 121.
140. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 469.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Krista Sirola, Comment, Are You My Mother? Defending the Rights of Intended
Parents in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements in Pennsylvania, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
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tions where the intended parents want to both be biologically linked to the
child.'45
2. The Best Interest of the Child
The United States Supreme Court has stated that children are entitled to
"constitutionally protected rights and liberties" and that "[a] child has a natu-
ral right ... to be nurtured" just as parents have the right to conceive. 46 Al-
though preconception agreements affect the substantive rights of the unborn
child, "no one represents the interests of the [unborn] children in these con-
tracts.'
147
In order to justify limiting gestational surrogacy to a certain class of
persons, "the state must meet the [extremely] high burden of strict scru-
tiny.' 48 The state is required to show that the regulation is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest. 49 Often times, a state will argue that it
limits surrogacy in order to protect the best interests of the child. 5 ' It could
be difficult to prove, however, that a child raised by its biological parents as
opposed to its intended parents is "a compelling interest because there is no
identifiable harm in placing [a child] with [its] intended parents.''. Oppo-
nents of surrogacy believe in limiting the number of people who can qualify
for this procedure because they feel surrogacy will ultimately have an ad-
verse effect on the unborn child.'52 Rather, the beneficiaries of surrogacy
agreements are the ones who would most probably become reliable and de-
voting parents.
53
The people who have struggled so hard to conceive their own child
are probably the best candidates to be good parents and not the
worst. It hardly seems likely that a couple that endured so much
grief to have its own child would embark on a course of abuse and
neglect with a surrogate child .... After all, children conceived by
normal means often run a far greater risk of abuse. There is surely
a risk of abuse even in apparently stable families. The risk is
greater for children born of troubled marriages that end in divorce,
145. Id. at 153; see also Garrity, supra note 6, at 809-10.
146. Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 468.
147. Id.
148. Sirola, supra note 143, at 151-52.
149. Id. at 152; see also Massie, supra note 75, at 490-91.
150. Sirola, supra note 143, at 152.
151. Id.
152. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REv. 2305, 2320 (1995).
153. See Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1251.
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and still greater for illegitimate children, especially if the mother's
new boyfriend moves in. In these cases, [the legislature does] not
think that the risk of harm to children constitutes a powerful reason
to license, limit, or ban procreation: it seems hard to believe that
these concerns rise to this level in a surrogacy context.
54
B. The Equal Protection Argument
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
equal treatment for individuals who are similarly situated.'55  Thus,
"[s]tatutes that discriminate between married and unmarried individuals and
between men and women's reproductive rights may . . . violate the Equal
Protection Clause."'56  In states that prohibit same-sex marriage, such as
Florida,'57 "[a] gay man or a lesbian's equal protection rights may be violated
because many states provide statutory protection of assisted reproductive
technologies only to married individuals.' 5 8
The Supreme Court has determined that the right to procreate [is]
fundamental, and any ban on that right is subject to strict scrutiny.
With strict scrutiny, a state must show that it had a compelling in-
terest in creating its ban, and that the statute was narrowly drawn.
With assisted reproductive technology, a state would have to al-
lege differences between unmarried and married individuals, or be-
tween men and woman [sic], sufficient to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest in denying unmarried individuals... statutory protec-
tion with assisted reproductive technologies. The second step
would require a state to demonstrate that the ban was neither over
nor under-inclusive.' 59
1. Married and Unmarried Individuals
Gestational surrogacy permits married couples, who choose to utilize
assisted reproductive technologies, to be recognized "as the legal parents of
[the] child.' '"" ° However, unmarried couples are deprived of this privilege. 6
154. Epstein, supra note 152, at 2320-21 (footnote omitted).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
156. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 147, 180 (2000).
157. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2007).
158. DeLair, supra note 156, at 180.
159. Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted).
160. Storrow, supra note 1, at 639.
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Requiring marriage as a prerequisite for gestational surrogacy contracts "is
unfortunate, as it perpetuates the law's failure to recognize the many non-
traditional forms of the family that exist in society today."'6 2 It is important
to recognize that being born into a two-parent traditional family certainly
does not guarantee that the child will grow up in that environment.'63 Cur-
rently, "[a]n increasingly large number of children" are raised by single par-
ents, and just because a child is born to a single parent does not mean that is
how the child will grow up."6 Single parents often find companions with
whom they are able to form a new, two-parent family unit.'65 There is a
strong argument that it is better for a child to grow up in a loving environ-
ment with a single parent as opposed to the child being raised in an argumen-
tative and stressful two-parent household.'66 Several states have enacted pro-
surrogate legislation and "the marital status of the biological father and/or the
intended mother is typically irrelevant in determining a presumption of par-
enthood."'67 Although Florida has enacted surrogacy legislation, the Florida
statute restricts unmarried couples from participating in gestational surro-
gacy.16
8
In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
that banned the use of contraceptives by married couples. 169 The Court held
that the penumbra of rights stemming from the Bill of Rights guarantee a
parent's right to be free from governmental interference when making deci-
sions pertaining to conception and child rearing. 70 In Eisenstadt, the Court
emphasized that "the right to privacy means ... the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."' 71 It can be inferred from several United States Supreme
Court decisions, when looked at comprehensively, that the Court stands for a
161. Id.
162. Id. at 639-40.
163. Massie, supra note 75, at 511 (internal quotations omitted).
164. Id. at 511-12.
165. Id. at 512.
166. Id. at 511-12.
167. Daniel Rosman, Surrogacy: An Illinois Policy Conceived, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 227,
248 (2000).
168. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007) (requiring that a couple be legally married in order
to qualify for gestational surrogacy).
169. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
170. Id. at 482-83, 485.
171. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (plurality opinion) (citing Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
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constitutional right to procreate regardless of marital status. 7 2 "Although it
is permissible to limit the procreative [rights] of prisoners and probationers,
it is inconsistent with the American constitutional tradition to condition pro-
creative liberty upon marital status.' ' 173 Thus, to survive strict scrutiny, a
state's regulation must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state in-
terest. 74 However, "[t]he language of Eisenstadt suggests that the state has
no compelling interest in limiting procreative rights to married couples.' 75
As such, "a legislative requirement that only married couples" meet the defi-
nition of intended parents in Florida's gestational surrogacy statute may not
pass heightened scrutiny.1
76
According to the Equal Protection Clause, persons who are similarly si-
tuated must be treated equally. 77 Therefore, "unmarried persons become a
class who are otherwise similarly situated but treated differently."'' 78 Unmar-
ried persons who cannot naturally procreate are similarly situated to married
persons who cannot naturally procreate because both are only able to procre-
ate through the use of assisted reproductive technology. 79 However, unmar-
ried persons are not treated equally because many state statutes will only
allow married persons legal access to gestational surrogacy. 8 ' Although
financial security and maturity are listed as reasons behind the marriage re-
quirement, "[e]vidence of marital status ...is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for establishing these traits."'' "A more liberal surrogacy policy in this
country would allow all infertile couples, not just the ones who are deemed
worthy by their state legislature, the opportunity to become a family."' 182
172. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that a woman has the right
to terminate a pregnancy); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55 (plurality opinion) (stating that
unmarried couples have a constitutionally protected right of privacy to use contraceptives);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (invalidating the state's ban on the use of contraceptives for
married couples).
173. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case
Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 305, 327 (2006).
174. Massie, supra note 75, at 490-91.
175. Id. at 491.
176. See id. at 512.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
178. DeLair, supra note 156, at 180..
179. Id.
180. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007).
181. Storrow, supra note 173, at 323.
182. Gordon, supra note 99, at 202.
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2. Men and Women's Reproductive Rights: Gay Men and Lesbian Women
"[A]pproximately four million gay men and lesbian women [are] raising
between eight and ten million children."'8 3 Comparable to heterosexual cou-
ples, countless gay men and lesbian women also possess the desire to both
bear and raise children.'8 Many of these individuals want to form a family
unit and provide a child the benefit of their love and dedication.'85 After all,
"[t]hey too have been brought up in families and in a society that identifies
having and rearing children as an important source of meaning and fulfill-
ment."'186 Florida prohibits marriage between persons of the same sex and
defines the term "marriage" as "only [the] legal union between [a] man and
[a] woman."' 87 Florida also explicitly states that it will not for any purpose
recognize same-sex marriages entered into in another jurisdiction.'88 Due to
the fact that Florida bans same-sex marriage, these couples are unable to
marry and thus, unable to qualify for gestational surrogacy.'89
By continuing to advocate vociferously for favored treatment of
married couples in matters of legal parenthood, the heterosexuals-
only marriage movement not only works against our legal tradi-
tions and values, but also ultimately undermines the welfare of
many children whose best hope lies with parents the law does not
allow to marry.' 90
Because gay men and lesbian women do not engage in the traditional
means of reproduction, they must utilize "assisted reproductive technologies
in order to produce genetically related children."' 9'
Although assisted reproductive technology is now available that would
enable homosexuals to have children, gays and lesbians are still confronted
with numerous barriers.' 92 Statutory and case law both create obstacles for
homosexuals utilizing reproductive technology because they "will not have
183. DeLair, supra note 156, at 147.
184. Id. at 148.
185. Id.
186. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 330 (2004).
187. FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1), (3) (2007).
188. Id. § 741.212(1) (emphasis added).
189. See id. § 742.15(1) (stating a gestational surrogacy contract will not be binding and
enforceable unless the intended parents are legally married).
190. Storrow, supra note 173, at 306 (emphasis omitted).
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equal legal standing in defending a parental or custodial challenge."'93 In
states such as Florida, where same-sex couples are prevented from legally
marrying, "their family unit[] [is] not recognized as [a] legal entit[y]."'94
Second-parent adoption law has the ability to remedy this situation because
the non-biological parent can "petition the court to adopt the child" in order
to establish legal parentage.'95 However, same-sex couples are confronted
with additional legal barriers because second-parent adoption is not an option
for gays and lesbians living in states that ban homosexuals from adopting. 6
For example, Florida's adoption statute explicitly prohibits adoption by gay
and lesbian persons.'9 7 As such, in Florida, since a child is unable to be
adopted by a homosexual second-parent, the child will "never have two legal
parents."'98 Gay and lesbian couples want access to assisted reproductive
technology for this exact reason. 199
Opponents of gay and lesbian access to assisted reproduction assert that
it is unnatural.2 "° However, it is no more unnatural than interfering with na-
ture and assisting infertile individuals with the ability to reproduce.2"' Oppo-
nents also feel that gay or lesbian parents would negatively impact a child.2" 2
Yet, many studies show that gay and lesbian parents are equally capable par-
ents and "their children are as well-adjusted as ... children" raised by het-
erosexual parents.20 3 "Conventional notions of homosexuality and its per-
ceived effect on children is [sic] antiquated and scientifically unfounded"
and "[n]o study has ever conclusively linked homosexuality to poor parent-
age.,,°
It is clear that states are free to deny gays and lesbians the right to be
adoptive parents.2 °5 In fact, Florida's statute clearly states, "[n]o person eli-
gible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."2 6
But "[i]n situations in which gays and lesbians seek to bring a child into the
world, claims that children are best raised in a heterosexual married family
193. Id at 162.
194. Id at 171.
195. Id.
196. DeLair, supra note 156, at 171-73.
197. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2007).
198. Storrow, supra note 173, at 341.
199. DeLair, supra note 156, at 171.
200. Robertson, supra note 186, at 330.
201. Id. at 331.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 332.
204. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 147.
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have no logical relevance to protecting the child's welfare, because the child
in question would not otherwise have existed."20 7 Children who otherwise
would not have existed are not harmed by being born to gays and lesbians.0 8
"Because a life with a gay or lesbian parent is still a meaningful life, those
children are hardly protected by preventing their birth altogether.""2 9 Thus,
harm to future offspring would not satisfy a compelling state interest test or
even a rational basis test by denying gays or lesbians the right to reproduce,
whether by traditional means or with the help of reproductive technology.2 10
"Rather than undermine families or harm offspring, access to [assisted repro-
ductive technologies] for gays and lesbians will promote parenting and fam-
ily values, just as it does for heterosexuals., 21
3. Are Florida's Surrogacy Statutes Over or Under-Inclusive?
In order to justify the restrictions placed on gestational surrogacy, a
state could argue "that it has a compelling interest in [protecting] public
morals" and unmarried persons or homosexual persons procreating would
tarnish the concept of traditional family.2 12 The weakness in that argument,
however, is a substantial decrease in the amount of children growing up in a
traditional family household.2 3 In Troxel v. Granville,1 4 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he composition of families varies greatly
from household to household" and "demographic changes of the past century
make it difficult to speak of an average American family. 2 5 Nevertheless,
even if protecting the notion of the traditional family was deemed a compel-
ling interest, "any statute that sought to protect notions of traditional family
by barring access to assisted reproductive technology would be over-
inclusive. 21 6
The state might also argue that restricting gestational surrogacy to cer-
tain persons is permissible because it has a compelling interest in protecting
the health, or more specifically the psychological welfare of its citizens.217
207. Robertson, supra note 186, at 333.




212. DeLair, supra note 156, at 182.
213. Id.
214. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
215. Id. at 63.
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A surrogacy arrangement can psychologically harm the surrogate
mother who must relinquish a child she gestated and gave birth to.
The intended parent(s) could suffer psychologically if a surrogate
were to challenge custody. A child could be harmed if he knew he
was conceived by artificial means and then given up by his moth-
er. Even if the state's argument was sound, a ban against surro-
gacy is under-inclusive because it fails to consider other practices
that would have a similar emotional impact on all parties.218
It seems ironic that Florida would use the psychological health of the
child as a compelling interest when courts are aware that their rulings are
inconsistent with the child's best interests.219 In Wakeman v. Dixon,22 two
women lived together and were domestic partners. 2 ' Thereafter, they
"jointly entered into a[n] ... agreement with a sperm donor., 222 The agree-
ment made reference to both parties and described each of them using the
terms "mother" and "co-parent. "223 "[T]he sperm donor relinquished [all of
his] parental rights" in the agreement and agreed that the "'co-parents'
[would] be responsible for all decisions regarding [the] child conceived
through sperm donation., 224 After Ms. Dixon twice became pregnant, the
couple entered into a co-parenting agreement where both parties recognized
that each parent would "jointly parent the child., 225 Subsequently, the couple
separated, Ms. Dixon relocated with the two children, and Ms. Wakeman
sought "a declaration of parental rights to the two children bom to [Ms.] Di-
xon" based on their agreement.26 The court granted Ms. Dixon's petition to
dismiss and found that it did not have the authority to grant custody or com-
pel visitation by a person who was not a natural parent. 227 Although "the trial
court noted that ... the guardian ad litem. . . made a compelling argument
that it [was] in the best interest[] of the children to enforce the co-parenting
agreement[], 228 the court found the agreement unenforceable.229
218. Id.
219. See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 674 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Van
Nortwick, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 669 (majority opinion).
221. Id. at 670.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 670.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 671.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673.
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Van Nortwick explained that even
though it "would be in the best interests of the ... children" to enforce the
co-parenting agreement, "Florida law does not provide a remedy" which
allows the court to make such a ruling.23° He acknowledged that "[t]he num-
ber of children in Florida raised in ... non-traditional households" is escalat-
ing and he is "concerned that ... Florida law ignores the needs of those chil-
dren., 231 His purpose of writing a concurring opinion was "to urge the Flor-
ida Legislature to address the needs of the children born into or raised in
these non-traditional households'2 32 because this case was evidence that
"Florida law does not protect the interests of the child produced by assisted
reproduction." 233 In Florida, the reality is that a child growing up in a non-
traditional household "is not protected either by statutory rights or by the
ability of courts to secure the best interests of the child., 234
VI. CONCLUSION
Surrogacy provides an attractive reproductive alternative to the large
number of couples suffering from infertility. As a result of the rapid ad-
vancement of reproductive technology, non-traditional family units now have
the ability to raise children. Medical technology should be obtainable by all
persons, regardless of an individual's gender, marital status, or sexual orien-
tation. Moral values alone should not dictate how a person exercises his or
her right of procreative liberty. "Disapproval of single parenthood or homo-
sexuality would not provide ... a justification"235 for denying some persons
access to assisted reproductive technology while granting those services to
others.
States such as Florida, which follow a more traditional interpretation of
parentage, family, and marriage, preclude many deserving individuals the
chance to raise a child. As a consequence of this conventional interpretation,
there is a dual failure. Both children, who could have been brought into this
world, and good parents, yearning for positive family units, are denied such
opportunities. In Florida, the only couples who qualify for gestational surro-
gacy are those that are both married and incapable of having a child through
traditional means. This exclusionary prerequisite, however, results in the
infringement of procreative rights for many individuals who are prohibited
230. Id. at 674 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 674-75.
234. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 675.
235. Robertson, supra note 186, at 349.
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from participating in this miraculous technology. Florida's gestational sur-
rogacy statute does not allow unmarried individuals or same-sex couples to
participate in gestational surrogacy.236 This statute does not reflect the reality
that the number of non-traditional families is rapidly increasing. Addition-
ally, the number of children conceived by reproductive technology is also
escalating. If the public continues to perpetuate negative views of surrogacy,
it could lead to children questioning their existence if they were to find out
how they were conceived. Surely, that result would not be in the best inter-
est of the child. With the composition of current family units shifting, it is
crucial for society to focus on the advantageous aspects of surrogacy:
[T]he impact on the child who learns that her genetic parents
wanted her so much that they went through many medical proce-
dures and spent thousands of dollars in order to bring her into this
world, that she was not an accident but, instead, the miracle child
for which her parents prayed for years; the impact on the birth
mother who realizes that she gave to an infertile couple the mira-
cle of birth and the joy of family life; and the impact on the [in-
tended] parents once they hold the child in their arms and ac-
knowledge that she is theirs to raise and love.237
With society's recognition of this stance, the accompanying result would be
beneficial to all parties involved in surrogacy arrangements.
In view of the increase of non-traditional families coupled with ad-
vancements in reproductive technologies, Florida needs to re-evaluate its
traditional definitions of family and parentage. Florida should provide equal
and uniform opportunities to married heterosexuals, unmarried heterosexu-
als, and homosexuals who wish to participate in surrogacy. By adopting
California's surrogacy provisions, individuals employing surrogate mothers
would be able to obtain pre-birth judgments of parentage regardless of their
marital status, sexual orientation, or genetic contribution to the child.
In both traditional surrogacy agreements and gestational surrogacy con-
tracts, the "intended parent" should be defined as a single adult man, a single
adult woman, or an adult couple, regardless of gender or sexuality, who
agree, in writing, to be the legal parents of the child conceived through as-
sisted reproductive technology. In traditional surrogacy custody disputes,
Florida should consider both the best interests of the child and the intentions
236. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2007) (stating that the intended couple must be legally
married in order to qualify for gestational surrogacy); see also id. § 741.212(1) (stating that
"[m]arriages between persons of the same sex" are not recognized in Florida).
237. Lascarides, supra note 8, at 1234.
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of the contracting parties. In cases where both parties are deemed fit, courts
should concentrate on the parties' intentions. The adjudication of legal par-
entage should be in favor of the party who intended to raise the child.
Thus, the Florida Legislature should strike the marriage requirement in
the gestational surrogacy statute as well as the right to revoke consent in the
traditional surrogacy statute. Florida residents who are deemed fit to raise a
child should not be denied the right to access any kind of assisted reproduc-
tive technology. Once a surrogate signs a traditional surrogacy agreement,
she should be held to fulfilling her intentions of gestating a child for a couple
who is unable to do so without her help. Citizens are entitled to a sense of
legal predictability when they make constitutionally protected decisions re-
garding their procreative lives. Florida must revise its surrogacy statutes to
reflect modem times.
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